

LIBRARY

OF

Theological Institute of Connecticut.

Gift of *the Author*


No.

288
16

BT 710 .M3

Martin, James, 1796-1846.

A short treatise on the
imputation of Adam's first



~~23-33~~

142.19

Rev^d Mr. Ridee
from the
Author

Handwritten text at the top of the page, possibly a title or header.

Handwritten text in the upper middle section of the page.

IMPUTATION

OF ADAM'S SIN.

A
SHORT TREATISE
ON THE
IMPUTATION
OF
ADAM'S FIRST SIN TO HIS POSTERITY.

✓
BY JAMES MARTIN,
Minister of the Gospel, Albany, N. Y.

ALBANY :
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HOFFMAN AND WHITE,

.....

1834.

Copy right secured according to Act of Congress.

ADVERTISEMENT.

The watchman on the walls of Zion is commanded, under the most fearful denunciation, “to blow the trumpet and warn the people,” on every approach of danger. In obedience to this heavenly mandate, the Author, above two years ago, was lead, in a particular manner, to raise his warning voice against the danger arising from the rapid propagation, both from the pulpit and the press, of erroneous sentiments respecting the doctrine of Original Sin. Having, carefully examined the subject, with a special reference to the *Imputation of Adam’s First Sin to his Posterity*, both, as revealed in the Scriptures, and as presented in the writings of some of the ablest divines, he delivered to the people of his charge, in the ordinary course of his ministrations, the substance of what appears in the following Treatise. Afterwards, a considerable portion of the *main argument* was published in numbers, in the RELIGIOUS MONITOR.

The earnest solicitation of friends, in whose judgment the Author greatly confides, has induced him, though with reluctance, to present the result of his labors to the public, in the present form. The subject treated of is certainly one of immense importance. But whether the present attempt will have a beneficial result, in checking error and promoting the truth, depends upon the favor of Zion's King. And to Him and his attendant blessing, this little book, designedly written in defence of His truth, is hereby humbly and prayerfully commended.

Albany, June 20th, 1834.

CONTENTS.

	Page.
CHAPTER I.—INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, . . .	13
CHAPTER II.—EXEGESIS OF ROMANS V. 12	
—19,	20
SEC. 1.—Of the Connection and General Scope of the Passage,	21
SEC. 2.—Of the Parenthesis contained in the Passage, according to the Common Translation,	24
SEC. 3.—Of the “One Man” spoken of, and the Sin and Death which entered by him,	25
SEC. 4.—Of the passing of Death upon all Men,	29
SEC. 5.—The Apostle’s Proof of the fore- going,	31
SEC. 6.—Of the Resemblance between Adam and Christ,	37
SEC. 7.—Of the Contrast between Adam and Christ,	39

	Page.
SEC. 8.—Of the Apostle's conclusion in the 18th verse,.....	42
SEC. 9.—The Reason of the foregoing Conclusion more explicitly stated,....	45
CHAPTER III.—THE FOREGOING EXEGESIS DEFENDED IN OPPOSITION TO THE VIEWS OF THE NEW HAVEN SCHOOL,.....	
	47
SEC. 1.—An Extract from the Christian Spectator, with an Advertisement to the Reader,	47
SEC. 2.—Of a Misrepresentation con- tained in the Extract,.....	51
SEC. 3.—A Mistake corrected, in respect to the meaning of the term "Death," as used by the Apostle,.....	53
SEC. 4.—Concerning the Statement, that "Temporal Death forms no part of the Legal Penalty,"	55
SEC. 5.—The Introduction of an "Econ- omy of Grace," no Proof of the Repeal of any Part of the Legal Penalty,....	58
SEC. 6.—Proofs that Temporal Death does belong to the Legal Penalty.....	61
SEC. 7.—The Ante-Mosaic Period not Peculiarized by the Fact, that "There	

CONTENTS.

ix

Page.

was no Law threatening Death, as its Penalty,".....	66
SEC. 8.—Temporal Death, under what- ever Form it comes, Proves the Pre- vious existence of Sin in its Subject, .	73
SEC. 9.—Of the Kind of Sin of which the Apostle treats,.....	77
CAPTER IV.—ADAM THE FEDERAL REPRE- SENTATIVE OF HIS POSTERITY,.....	
SEC. 1.—Of the Reality of a Federal Transaction with Adam,.....	84
SEC. 2.—Of the Representative Charac- ter of Adam,.....	85
SEC. 3.—The Representative Character of Adam Proved from Romans, v. 12.	93
SEC. 4.—The Same Proved from 1. Cor. xv. 22,	96
SEC. 5.—The Same Proved from the Special Notice which the Apostle takes of the "One Offense,".....	98
SEC. 6.—The Same Proved from a Con- sideration of the Representative Char- acter of Jesus Christ,.....	100
SEC. 7.—The Same Proved from the Comparison, drawn in Scripture, be-	102

	Page.
tween Adam and Christ,.....	108
SEC. 8.—The Same Proved from a Consideration of the Moral condition of Infants,	110
CHAPTER V.—IMPUTATION DEFINED, AND THE POINT IN DEBATE PRESENTED,.....	119
CHAPTER VI.—THE IMPUTATION OF ADAM'S FIRST SIN TO HIS POSTERITY PROVED,.....	128
SEC. 1.—The Doctrine Proved from the Fact of Adam's Sustaining a Representative Character at the Time he Sinned,.....	128
SEC. 2.—From the Apostle's Declaration, Romans v. 19,.....	129
SEC. 3.—From the Condemnation of all Men on Account of Adam's Sin,.....	132
CHAPTER VII.—THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED,	135
SEC. 1.—The Doctrine Proved from the Universal loss of the Image of God,..	135
SEC. 2.—From the Innate Corruption of Human Nature,.....	153

	Page.
CHAPTER VIII.—THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED,	166
SEC. 1.—The Doctrine Proved from the Inability of Adam's Descendants to keep the Commandments of God,	166
SEC. 2.—From the Sufferings and Death of Infants,	179
SEC. 3.—From the Salvation of Infants,	189
CHAPTER IX.—OBJECTIONS ANSWERED, ...	193
SEC. 1.—The Objection, that the Doctrine is contrary to Common Sense, Answered,	194
SEC. 2.—That it Militates against the Justice of God, Answered,	197
SEC. 3.—That it strips Man of a Free-will and State of Probation, Answered,	206
SEC. 4.—That it divests Man of the Character of a Moral Agent, Answered, ..	211
SEC. 5.—That it is Contrary to the Divine Declaration, that "the Son shall not bear the Iniquity of the Father," Answered,	214
SEC. 6.—That it makes God the Author of Sin, Answered,	220
SEC. 7.—That it is Inconsistent with the	

	Page.
Commandments of God, Answered, ..	222
SEC. 8.—That it Contradicts the very Nature of Sin which Consists in Vol- untary Action, Answered,	226
SEC. 9.—The Objection, that Original Sin cannot be Repented of, Answered, ...	228
CHAPTER X.—THE CONCLUSION,	235

A SHORT TREATISE
ON THE
IMPUTATION OF ADAM'S FIRST SIN
TO HIS POSTERITY.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

THE term ORIGINAL SIN, was first introduced by Augustine, in his controversy with the Pelagians, as being a convenient and significant name for an article of truth, which had not till that time been controverted in the Christian Church. But, although Augustine ably defended the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's first sin to his posterity, yet by the term "original sin," he only designated the innate corruption of human nature ; and he so designated it, not merely to express its derivation from our first original, but as being itself the *origin*, or fountain, from which proceed all actual transgressions. By the early Reformers, this term was generally used in the same restricted sense—the imputation of the first sin being maintained by them under a distinct head of doctrine. The term,

however, soon came to be used in a more extensive sense, including both the imputation of the first sin, and also the corruption of nature consequent upon that imputation. And lest there should be any confusion of ideas, or any subterfuge for opponents, created by such a comprehensive use of the term, it was distinguished into "original sin imputed," and "original sin inherent"—a distinction which has ever since been carefully observed by the generality of Calvinistic writers upon the subject. And the observance of this distinction is very necessary. For, there are many, who profess to hold the doctrine of Original Sin, who, when they come to explain themselves, only mean "original sin inherent," or native corruption, totally renouncing the idea of "original sin imputed," or the imputation of Adam's sin, as the ground of that corruption. When, therefore, we speak of Original Sin, in the following Treatise, without any qualification, we would be understood as including both these ideas.

Various have been the opinions of professed Christians in relation to Original Sin. The first departure from the Orthodox faith, on this subject, was made by PELAGIUS, about the beginning of the fifth century. Although, there had existed, in the church, disputes respecting almost all the other

leading doctrines of Christianity, yet history gives us no hint of any discrepancy on this subject, until the time just specified. Pelagius, however, and his followers, fiercely assailed the received doctrine of the church on this head, boldly maintaining, on the contrary, that man, as born into the world, neither possessed a corrupted nature, nor was chargeable with the guilt of Adam's sin. This heresy, through the energy and zeal of AUGUSTINE, and other champions of the truth, was soon condemned by various ecclesiastical councils. But, although the doctrine of Original Sin was, at that time, triumphantly maintained by the church, yet during the long night of Papal darkness, which succeeded, it became corrupted to such a degree, that at the commencement of the Reformation, it was, in the mouths of Papists, an entirely different doctrine, from that which Augustine had so ably defended. At that period the general belief in the Church of Rome was, that the *ill-desert* of Adam's sin was not imputed to his posterity, but only an *exposure* or *liability* to the endurance of evils; and that, although man was now born destitute of positive holiness, yet he possessed no contrary habit of sin. Or, if it was allowed, that there was any thing sinful about the infant seed of Adam, the early administration of Baptism was supposed to be

sufficient to wash it entirely away. In reforming, however, the doctrines of the church from the gross corruptions which a dark age had heaped upon them, the early Reformers were at particular pains to restore the doctrine of Original Sin to its primitive purity. But soon new and deadly enemies to this doctrine sprung up. The SOCINIANS adopted the errors of Pelagius. Even the ANA-BAPTISTS derided this doctrine as "the figment of Augustine." The ARMINIANS followed the footsteps of the Socinians; and contended, with them, "that man had lost nothing by the *fall*, had incurred no damage by the *fall*." After this, QUAKERS and other fanatics sprung up amidst the Reformed churches, embracing the same perverted and anti-scriptural sentiments. The WESLEYAN METHODISTS, though on the whole *Arminian* in sentiment, nevertheless, acknowledged a sinful corruption of nature, with a will, however, left free to the choice of good: But in regard to the guilt of Adam's first sin, so far as it had any bearing upon his descendants, they maintained that it was taken away by the death of Christ. There are many in this country, who, though they discard "original sin imputed," nevertheless maintain "original sin inherent," or an entire corruption of nature. And, in this respect, they are the followers

of one Placæus, (de la Place,) a French Professor, whose heresy was condemned by a National Synod, held at Charenton, A. D. 1644, in these words: "The Synod do condemn this doctrine, as it so restricts the nature of original sin to the hereditary corruption of Adam's posterity, as to exclude the imputation of that first sin, by which Adam fell; and do, therefore, determine, that Pastors, Professors, and all others, be subjected to ecclesiastical censures, who, in discoursing on this doctrine, have departed from the common sentiment of the Reformed Churches, all of which have as yet acknowledged both *that* corruption and *this* imputation, as descending to all the posterity of Adam." This same doctrine, however, which was thus solemnly condemned by a Protestant Synod, in accordance with the universal sentiment of the Reformed Churches, has long existed among us, under the protecting and nourishing embrace of the HOPKINSIANS. But even that remaining portion of truth, on this subject, which the Hopkinsian tenet preserved to us, has been meataphysically murdered by the introduction of a new system; which, indeed, is not a *new* system, but an *old* system, which had its rise in the dark minds of a Pelagius and Socinus. This New Light, or New School system, as it is familiarly termed, and which is very

extensively embraced by CONGREGATIONALISTS and PRESBYTERIANS, throughout our country, represents mankind as born into the world, to be neither holy nor unholy, neither charged with Adam's guilt, nor tinctured with any innate corruption; but placed, at the same time, under such a divine constitution, as will secure in them, the moment they arrive at the period of moral agency, a sinful choice; which sinful choice is made essential to the very being of sin. To this catalogue of opinions respecting Original Sin, it may be added, that among those who would be esteemed orthodox upon the subject, and firm adherents to the Westminster Confession of Faith and Catechisms, there are many, who give such an explanation of the doctrine, as entirely destroys it, so far as the "imputation of Adam's first sin" is concerned. Professing to believe, that "the guilt of Adam's first sin is imputed to all his posterity," by *guilt*, they only mean a *liability* or *exposure* to punishment, entirely excluding the idea of *ill-desert*; and hence, they coincide, very exactly, with the doctrine of the Papists, as before noticed. And as this is the way in which some individuals, who would be considered at the *head* of Orthodoxy, in the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, hold to the imputation of the *guilt* of Adam's sin, as mentioned in their

Subordinate Standards, it will be noticed more particularly afterwards.

Such, then, are some of the sentiments which have been, and still are, entertained, on the very important subject of Original Sin. And, indeed, it may be safely affirmed, that at no former period of the Church, at least since the days of the Reformation, has this doctrine been so extensively corrupted, as at the present. And since it is the doctrine of "original sin imputed," which is so obnoxious to the multitude, so hated, derided and rejected, it is proposed in the following TREATISE to illustrate and establish *this doctrine*; and in so doing, the truth of "original sin inherent" will also, at the same time, be confirmed.

CHAPTER II.

EXEGESIS OF ROMANS v. 12—19.

BEFORE proceeding directly to the execution of the purpose intended, and as a proper foundation of the whole discussion, a brief exegetical view shall be taken of the following interesting portion of Divine Revelation :

Rom. v. 12. Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin: and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned:

13. (For until the law sin was in the world: but sin is not imputed when there is no law.

14. Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression, who is the figure of him that was to come.

15. But not as the offense, so also *is* the free gift. For if through the offense of one many be dead; much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, *which is* by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many.

16. And not as *it was* by one that sinned, *so is* the gift: for the judgment *was* by one to condemnation, but the free gift *is* of many offenses unto justification.

17. For if by one man's offense death reigned by one; much more they which receive abundance of grace, and of the gift of righteousness, shall reign in life by one, Jesus Christ:)

18. Therefore, as by the offense of one *judgment came* upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one *the free gift came* upon all men unto justification of life.

19. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners; so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.

This portion of God's Book, ever since it was written, has been considered by the advocates of the doctrine of Original Sin, as decisive on that subject. And indeed if that doctrine be not taught in this place, at least so far as it regards "the imputation of Adam's first sin to his posterity," we

might the more readily bear with persons for not finding it elsewhere taught in the Holy Oracles. It behooves, therefore, every friend of truth to study this passage with an unprejudiced mind, with prayerfulness and care, that he may understand and “keep the sayings” of the Spirit of truth, which it contains.

SEC. 1.—*Of the Connection and General Scope of the Passage.*

The passage, above quoted, is united to its preceding context by the connecting particle “wherefore.”* The precise idea which forms the basis of the connection is not so obvious. There does not appear to be any *reason* advanced immediately before, from which this passage can be regarded as a legitimate conclusion ; nor any *reason* contained in the passage itself, to which this conjunctive particle, as is frequently the case, can have a prospective reference. We are inclined, therefore, to regard this particle to be here used by the Apostle, simply for the purpose of giving intimation that he was about to sum up and draw to a close the whole discourse contained in the preceding part of the epistle ; much in the same manner that the phrase

* διὰ τοῦτο.

“on the whole then,” is used by us in similar cases. Accordingly, we consider the verses quoted as re-duplicating, not only upon the preceding discussion respecting justification, but also upon what had been proved in the first part of the epistle, concerning the universal guilt and condemnation of mankind. And as the Apostle had said nothing *there*, in relation to the *manner* in which guilt and condemnation had originally entered into the world, he *here* explicitly states it, and that for the particular purpose also, of explaining the *manner* in which justification comes to believing sinners by Jesus Christ. It does, indeed, appear manifest, from the matter and structure of the passage, that the great and leading object of the Apostle, in it, is to explain the *manner*, in which the righteousness of Christ comes to be the ground of a sinner’s justification before God; or *how* ungodly and condemned sinners become righteous through his righteousness. And this he does by comparing it with the *manner*, in which sin and condemnation entered into the world by Adam. For had not sin and condemnation come by Adam, there would have been no occasion for righteousness and justification, coming by Jesus Christ. The matter appears to stand thus—the Apostle had been treating largely of the doctrine of justification, and had fully estab-

lished the point, that it is not by *works*, but by *faith*, that any child of Adam can become justified in the sight of a holy God. But this free justification, we are told, is owing to the finished work of our Lord Jesus Christ. Although persons are “justified freely by grace,” yet it is “through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood.” (Chap. iii. 24.) In the first and eleventh verses of this chapter, we are said to have “peace with God,” and to receive “the atonement” (reconciliation) “through our Lord Jesus Christ.” Thus, the Apostle had shown, that justification, with all its blessed consequences, comes to us *by* and *through* our only Mediator, Christ Jesus. To this point he had conducted the discussion. Now a question arises, or an objector may be supposed to ask it, by way of cavil: How, or in what way, can ungodly sinners, without any meritorious doings of their own, obtain justification through the obedience of another, even Jesus Christ? The Apostle, *in conclusion*, will answer this question; which he does by referring to the case of sin and condemnation entering into the world by Adam. “Wherefore,” as to the manner in which righteousness comes to us for justification by Jesus Christ, it is the same “as by one man sin entered

into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned," &c.

SEC. 2.—*Of the Parenthesis contained in the Passage, according to the Common Translation.*

It will be perceived, that according to the present translation, a comparison is begun in the 12th verse, which is left uncompleted. For the other part of the comparison, termed the *reddition*, our translators refer us to the 18th verse, having marked all the intervening words as a parenthesis. The ellipsis may, indeed, be supplied from the latter part of that verse ; but as that verse forms a general conclusion from the foregoing, and contains in itself a complete comparison of the same import, and as it presents no *grammatical* connection with the 12th, we think the intervening verses should not be regarded as parenthetical. On the contrary, they contain in themselves several distinct propositions and homologous comparisons, all bearing directly upon the general argument. It is no unusual thing in scripture, to have a comparison with only one side of the resemblance stated, especially when the other side is so obvious, that it cannot be mistaken. (See 1 Tim. i. 3.) Hence the scope of the Apostle must be consulted in order to supply the ellipsis in this 12th verse.

And by attending to what goes before and what follows, there is no difficulty in forming the true supplement;—which may be done as has already been stated—“Wherefore,” justification comes to us by Christ, in the same manner, “as by one man sin entered into the world and death by sin,” &c. Or the sentence may be completed thus—“as by one man sin entered,” &c., so by one man, Jesus Christ, righteousness entered into the world, and life by righteousness, and so justification unto life passes upon all believers, for that they are all made righteous in Him. If this be the doctrine of the context, in relation to justification, the Apostle obviously designed, that the comparison should be completed in these or similar terms. And indeed the meaning would not be materially changed, if the verse were regarded as *expressing* a perfect comparison, and read thus: “Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, *even so*, or *so also*,* death passed upon all men,” &c.

SEC. 3.—*Of the “One Man” spoken of, and the Sin and Death which entered by him.*

By the “one man” here mentioned, Adam is un-

* καὶ οὕτως being used for οὕτω καί.

questionably intended. It was by him that sin was introduced into the world of mankind. Death is here presented as the concomitant of sin; but it is stated in the 14th verse, that "death reigned from Adam;" sin, therefore, must have commenced its reign with Adam, and as he was the first of men, he must be the "one man" here intended, by whom "sin entered into the world." Indeed, every doubt in regard to the particular person here meant, is completely removed by the Apostle's declaration to the Corinthians, that "in Adam all die."

The term *sin* used in this verse, does not relate, so much, to sin in general, as to some particular sin, called emphatically, in the original, "the sin," the great, the *mother* sin. All manner of sin did, indeed, enter in by the door of Adam; but the Apostle here refers to the *first sin*, that entered into the world; for, he adds, "and death by sin." Now it is evident, that death was threatened against the very first sin of Adam. Accordingly, when the Apostle asserts, that "by one man sin entered into the world, and DEATH BY SIN," he manifestly speaks of the *first sin* of Adam, his first disobedience, his eating of the forbidden fruit. For by *that* act of transgression, it was, that *death* entered into the world.

The term *death*, in this place, is not to be considered as simply denoting “natural death.” It is here put for the whole penalty threatened against transgression. It was said to Adam, in relation to “the tree of the knowledge of good and evil,”—“in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.” The *death* then threatened, is *that*, which the Apostle here declares to have entered “by sin.” Now natural death forms but a very unimportant part of the divine penalty—the dissolution of the union between soul and body is hardly worthy of being mentioned, when compared with the full amount of evil embraced by the term *death*, as denounced against man’s disobedience. The want of original righteousness, corruption of nature, loss of God’s favor, loss of all communion with him, disability, misery, eternal torment, *these* are the bitter ingredients of that death, which was threatened, and which entered into the world “by one man’s sin.” By *death*, then, wherever found in this context, we are not to understand so much a *natural* as a *spiritual* death. It is the *penalty* with which God has sanctioned his holy law, that is intended. This is evident, from the contrast, which is repeatedly made in this passage, between *life* and *death*. If the life spoken of, signifies a *spiritual life*, and of this there can be no doubt,

then the death, to which it stands 'opposed, must signify a *spiritual death*. In the 17th verse, the *death* which reigns "by one man's offense," is contrasted with the *life*, which believers receive "by one, Jesus Christ." In the 18th verse, the *condemnation*, (to wit, *of death*,) which comes "by the offense of one," is opposed to the *justification of life*, which comes as a free gift, "by the righteousness of one." The 21st verse, presents the same contrast in the most striking manner—"That as sin hath reigned unto DEATH, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto ETERNAL LIFE, by Jesus Christ our Lord." And again in the next chapter, at the 23d verse, similar language is employed—"The wages of sin is DEATH, but the gift of God is ETERNAL LIFE, through Jesus Christ our Lord." Now, it cannot reasonably be supposed, that the Apostle uses the word *death* in a more restricted, or less significant sense, in any one part of this context, than he does in those just specified. Hence, when he tells us, that "by sin DEATH entered into the world," he must mean that DEATH which is the full "wages of sin," and which is the very opposite of *that gift of God* which is "eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord."

SEC. 4.—*Of the passing of Death upon all Men.*

But notwithstanding that the penalty, *death*, entered by the first sin of Adam, he was not its only subject ; it did not *stop* with him ; it “ passed upon all men.” And it so passed, *as* it entered, death entered by the sin of one man, “ and so [that is, by the sin of one man,] death passed upon all men.” It *passed* (διήλθεν) through him *to* (εἰς) all men. This action is spoken of as already completed. It is not said, death *will pass*, but death *passed* upon all men. And if we inquire after the particular time when this happened, it was, when “ by one man sin entered into the world.” But as the penalty, in its full extent, has not been actually endured by all men, some having been pardoned and saved, and millions of others being yet unborn, the meaning must be, that all became, from that moment, “ dead in law,” or that a *sentence* of death was then *judicially* passed upon all. But as this could not have taken place in justice, but upon the supposition, that all were involved in guilt, and thus rendered obnoxious to the penalty, the Apostle adds, “ for that all have sinned.” Here he assigns the reason why “ death passed upon all men.” And it by no means affects the meaning of this clause, whether we rest in the present trans-

lation of it, or adopt the marginal reading, "in whom all have sinned." This latter is the more literal translation of the original, and was generally adopted by the ancient fathers, as also by most of the Reformers. The only difference, however, between the two readings is, that while the one asserts, in so many words, that all men sinned in Adam, the other implies this by necessary inference. For if, in judicial procedure, sin must have precedence of the penalty, and if at some former period of time, death, the penalty of the divine law, passed judicially upon all men, and as all men had not then sinned personally, not having, as yet, been brought into existence, it follows that all must have sinned in Adam. The opponents of the doctrine of Original Sin prefer the common translation of this clause. The other, however, may justly be regarded as entitled to the preference. Because, of the two, it is the more easy and natural rendering; especially, when it is considered, that the words "and so," or "even so," require a repetition of the words "by one man," to complete the sentence: and had this *implied* repetition been *expressed* by the Apostle, perhaps there never would have been any dispute respecting the true rendering of the clause in question. Let the ellipsis, then, be supplied, and the verse will une-

quivocally read as follows: "Wherefore, AS BY ONE MAN sin entered into the world, and death by sin, AND SO, (OR EVEN SO,) death passed upon all men, *by that one man*, IN WHOM all have sinned." And besides, this reading seems to express more forcibly the mind of the Apostle, as intended in the context; and surely we are bound to give to the language of any writer its greatest force in support of his declared sentiments. And why should the declaration, that "all mankind sinned in Adam," be pronounced more harsh and inconsistent than the following?—"IN Adam all die." (1 Cor. xv. 22.) "Levi paid tithes IN Abraham." (Heb. vii. 9.) "God hath raised us up together, and made us sit together in heavenly places IN Christ Jesus." (Eph. ii. 6.) &c.

SEC. 5.—*The Apostle's Proof of the foregoing.*

But is it a fact, that the *all men*, spoken of in this verse, includes the whole human family? The opponents of the doctrine of imputation will not allow, that the terms *all men* and *all* designate, in this place, all mankind universally. They restrict these terms to such as have *sinned actually*. But, we apprehend, that the Apostle's express design, in the next two verses, is to prove that all men, without any exceptions, sinned in Adam. Accord-

ingly he fixes upon a period, when, if ever, such exceptions must have existed; viz: the period between Adam and Moses, when the law possessed a comparative obscurity, there not being that clear external dispensation of it, as was the case afterwards. Now, it is an obvious dictate of reason, that *when there is no law, there can be no imputation of sin*; for sin must be imputed according to the rule of law. But let none maintain, that Adam's breaking of the law of God annihilated it, until it was afterwards given by Moses, and that, consequently, during that period, there could be no sin imputed, there being no rule, according to which, it might, in justice, be imputed. For the Apostle plainly affirms the contrary. He says, (v. 13,) "For until the law, [that is, before it was given by Moses] sin was in the world." During all that period of more than twenty-five hundred years sin existed. Consequently there was also a law in existence, even the moral law, which Adam had violated: "For sin is not imputed when there is no law." But sin was imputed during that period; for, adds the Apostle, "nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses." (v. 14.) And surely, if the penalty reigned, *sin*, the cause of it, must have existed, and also the law, according to which, the penalty was inflicted. Now the Apostle will ad-

mit of no exception, as to the extent of the reign of the penalty, during the period which preceded the giving of the law at Mount Sinai. He declares, that "death reigned from Adam to Moses, EVEN OVER THEM THAT HAD NOT SINNED AFTER THE SIMILITUDE OF ADAM'S TRANSGRESSION." Infants, no doubt, are here characterised. For whom else can the Apostle mean? During the period specified, he intimates, that some had sinned "after the similitude of Adam's transgression," and others had not. This his language evidently conveys. For in saying that "death reigned EVEN over them that HAD NOT SINNED after the similitude of Adam's transgression," he plainly intimates, that others *had so sinned*. By Adam's transgression, therefore, he cannot mean the simple act of his eating of the forbidden fruit; for none ever sinned, after the *similitude* of his transgression, in this way, by personally partaking of that fruit; but he means certain qualities of that act, which rendered it *a sinning actually and voluntarily* against God. And in this way, all his adult offspring sin after the *similitude* of his transgression. They sin *actually and voluntarily*. But the case is different with infants: they are incapable of sinning in this manner:*

* Since this Treatise was written, Dr. Spring, of New-York, has published *A Dissertation on Native Depravity*, in which he ad-

they are, therefore, intended by the Apostle, by “them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam’s transgression.” And yet it is affirmed,

vances an entirely new theory in relation to the moral condition of infants; viz: that *they are guilty of actual sin from the first moment of their birth*. This is not only a *novel*, but a most *extraordinary* sentiment. We do not recollect to have ever seen or heard any thing like it; except that among the Jews there were some who held that infants *committed actual sin before they were born*. The Dr. learns from the Bible, (what every person ought to learn from it,) that infants are *really* sinners as soon as they are born; but he cannot see any other way in which *they can be so*, save by the commission of *actual sin*. Having rejected the avowed doctrine of his own church, respecting the imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity, and the consequent inborn corruption of human nature, he is forced to take the position he does, in order to account for that sinfulness of condition which the scriptures ascribe to infants: And hence, although he uses considerable severity against the divines of the New-Haven school, the difference between him and them is scarcely perceptible, unless it be that he *fixes* the time when infants *begin to commit actual sin*, a little earlier than they do; both parties harmoniously agreeing that “there is *no other sin* in the empire of Jehovah.” Indeed, the New-Haven divines, in their Review of the Dissertation, tell us, that the only point of difference between him and themselves is, “that while *he* maintains that infants knowingly and voluntarily transgress law at the *instant* of their creation, *they* have neither *denied* or *affirmed* this position.” No great difference, truly!

We agree with the Dr. in maintaining, that infants, from the moment they are created *human beings*, or in other words, from the moment in which the union of soul and body is constituted, (though we would not confine that to the moment of their birth,

that *death reigned even over them*. But, if they were made subjects of the penalty threatened against sin, the Righteous Judge must have re-

as he does,) become the subjects of law and possess a moral character: But they may be all this without possessing an immediate fitness for the commission of actual sin. We could also agree with him in calling infants, inasmuch as they possess human souls, *intelligent beings*; provided the term "intelligent" be taken *passively*, and not *actively*: that is, taken for the *faculty*, and not for the *act* of intelligence: For a *faculty* may long exist, before it performs any of its *appropriate functions*. In a word, we agree with Dr. S. in ascribing to the souls of infants all the essential powers or faculties which belong to the human soul: For if a soul be divested of its *essential properties*, it is no longer a soul—any more than a block of marble would be a block of marble if stripped of its essential attributes of length, breadth, thickness and solidity. But we maintain, in opposition to him, that a soul may possess all its essential faculties, without having those faculties *actually* discharging their peculiar functions. Their appropriate functions may not be exercised *immediately*, any more than the bodily organs do not all immediately perform their proper functions. The new born infant possesses all the organic bodily parts of a perfect man; but these are not at once developed in appropriate acts. It possesses legs, but it does not walk; arms, but it does not assist itself; organs of speech, but it does not talk, &c. In like manner we contend that the infant, though possessing a soul, and consequently its *essential moral powers*, does not as soon as born exercise those powers in *voluntary transgression* of the law of God. The Dr.'s arguments to the contrary are far from being convincing. They are all based upon the assumption, that because infants have souls, those souls *must be exercised*, either in the way of obeying or disobeying the moral law of God. There is one text of scripture without refering to

garded them as being chargeable with sin. And since they had committed no sin in their own persons, they must have committed it in a representative, even in *him*, by whom sin and death entered into the world. Besides, it is not a mere natural death, that the Apostle speaks of, as thus reigning over infants, (though this would be sufficient to prove them sinners by Adam,) but, as has been before shown, *death*, the *penalty* of the divine law, *spiritual death* by way of eminence. This death reigned over every one of them, and none of them, though dying in infancy, could have escaped from

any other; which, we think, entirely overthrows the Dr.'s position. The distinguished child, spoken of in the seventh chapter of Isaiah, is represented in the 16th verse, as existing for a time after his birth, without having the knowledge to *refuse evil* and *choose good*—"Before the child shall know to *refuse* the evil and *choose* the good," &c. *Choosing* and *refusing* are acts of the will. Infants, according to Dr. S., sin *voluntarily*, that is, with the *consent* of the will—they *choose* the evil and *refuse* the good. Yet this text explicitly declares, concerning the extraordinary child alluded to, that some time would intervene between his birth and his knowing to *refuse the evil and choose the good*. And surely none will pretend to say, that that child was less quick of apprehension than other children ordinarily are.

Some may consider, that we might have suffered the novel opinion of this writer to pass unheeded; because, as has often been said, few, if any, will be found to adopt it besides the author himself. We do not entirely think so. For we do not see, that his opinion is more difficult to be believed, than the *ravings* of Irving, the *fooleries* of Mormonism, or the *dogma* of the New-

its eternal reign and thralldom, but by the free and sovereign grace of God, which “reigns through righteousness unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ our Lord.”

SEC. 6.—*Of the Resemblance between Adam and Christ.*

At the close of the 14th verse, Adam is called “the figure of him that was to come,” that is, of Jesus Christ, who, from the beginning, was promised to come, as “the seed of the woman, to bruise the head of the serpent;” and afterwards as

Haven school, that there are multitudes of *human beings* that are neither *holy* nor *unholy*—all which things are adopted for *truth* by many in the present day. And this being the case, we cannot pretend to know how many things of similar *wildness* may not be embraced by the men of this generation. One thing, however, we do know, touching the point in hand, that the relinquishment of the long established doctrine of the church respecting the “imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity,” necessarily gives rise, so far as the moral condition of infants is concerned, to wild conjecture, extravagant speculation, *vain philosophy*. For having abandoned that doctrine, persons must either fly in the face of divine revelation and dogmatically assert, with the New-Haven school, that *infants* are neither *holy* nor *unholy*: or, with Dr. Spring, maintain that they *actually* and *voluntarily transgress* the moral law, as soon as *they are born*: or they must set their ingenuity to work and *invent* some other system upon the subject. equally at variance with the sober dictates both of reason and of revelation.

“the seed of Abraham, in whom all the families of the earth should be blessed;” and who is represented in Psalm xl. as saying, “Lo, I come,” &c., and whose praise is celebrated by the church in Psalm cxviii., “Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord.” Now in what sense is Adam called the “figure,” *type*, or *emblematical representation* of our Lord Jesus Christ? It can only be, because he was the *head* and *representative* of his natural seed, and acted in their room, even as our Lord Jesus Christ is the *head* and *representative* of his spiritual seed, and acts in their room. This is the only prominent point of resemblance, that can possibly be traced between them. And if this be not the Apostle’s meaning, it would be a task of endless conjecture to tell what he means. But, that this is his meaning, is evident from the whole scope of this passage, which exhibits these two distinguished personages, as acting in public representative characters—the disobedience of the one entailing sin and death upon all whom he represented, and the obedience of the other procuring righteousness and life for all whom he represented—and also from what this same Apostle declares to the Corinthians, “as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.” Here then we have a full developement of the way, in which

“death passed upon all men,” *even upon infants*; it is, because they sinned in him, who was constituted and acted the part of their federal head and representative; and who, in this grand particular, “was the figure of him that was to come.”

SEC. 7.—*Of the Contrast between Adam and Christ.*

Although there be the most manifest and striking resemblance between Adam and Christ, in point of representative headship, each representing his respective seed federally and universally, yet, in point of *conduct*, and the *effects* resulting from that conduct, the most awful contrast is to be marked. (Verse 15.) “But not as the offense, so also is the free gift. For if through the offense of one many be dead; much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many.” The *conduct* of the one representative was a total failure in point of duty, “an offense,” a *lapse*, a *fall*; that of the other, *righteousness*, which, from the free and gracious manner in which it was performed, and from the free and gracious manner in which it is conveyed to sinners, may well be called the “free gift,” the “grace of God,” and the “gift by grace.” And as to the *effects* resulting from the public conduct of these representatives, they are

infinitely different. The conduct of the one resulted in *death*, that of the other in *life*. Yea, such is the goodness of God, and such the superiority of Christ to Adam in respect of personal dignity, that his righteousness avails more abundantly for the justification of his seed, than does the offense of Adam for the condemnation of his seed. "For if through the offense of one many be dead; MUCH MORE the grace of God," &c. It may be farther remarked on this verse, that the Apostle makes the sin of Adam to be the sin of his posterity. For he says, "through the offense of one many are dead," spiritually dead, deprived of the favor of God, destitute of righteousness, full of corruption, without God, without hope in the world. They are thus dead by the *offense of one*, viz: Adam. And they that are thus dead are called *many*, not to the exclusion of any of the human family; for it is afterwards asserted, that "by the offense of one, judgment came upon ALL men to condemnation," but they are called *many* for the purpose of keeping up the parallel between them and the *many* who live by Jesus Christ.

In the 16th verse, the Apostle continues to pursue the contrast between the public acts of Adam and Christ, in relation to their consequences: "And not as it was by one that sinned, so is

the gift: for the judgment was by one to condemnation, but the free gift is of many offenses unto justification." The term "judgment," denotes a judicial sentence, proceeding upon the assumption of legal guilt; and the term "condemnation," denotes the condition of a criminal, after sentence is pronounced against him, and by which he is declared to be guilty, and stands adjudicated to undergo the merited punishment. Now it is here asserted, that "the judgment to condemnation," spoken of, arose from "one" offense. We have no concern in any of the sins of Adam, save his "one offense." And that "one offense," the Righteous Judge viewed as the legal guilt of all men, and accordingly, as is here implied, and as is expressly stated in the 18th verse, he issued a judicial sentence, involving the condemnation of all. But, although the "one offense" of Adam was thus efficacious for the ruin of all men, still in respect of intrinsic efficiency, it falls short of the gift of righteousness by Jesus Christ. For his obedience abundantly avails, not merely to justification, but to the justification of condemned sinners, and not to their justification from the "one offense" of their representative, only, but to their justification from their many personal offenses, also. "The free gift is of MANY OFFENSES unto justification."

In the 17th verse, the Apostle contrasts the *death*, which came by the sin of Adam, with the *life*, which is enjoyed through the righteousness of Christ; and, in the way of magnifying the work of of the second Adam, he concludes, however certain it be that death reigned by the first Adam, that there is, if possible, a greater certainty, that all, who receive the grace of God, and embrace the gift of righteousness, shall reign in life by Jesus Christ. What a most glorious and dignified personage, therefore, is Jesus Christ! How infinitely meritorious has been his conduct as our representative! Why should any speak against his righteousness, as being vicarious? And why should any refuse to appropriate it as their own righteousness? Since it is in this way, and in this way alone, that we can, with the assurance of absolute certainty, escape death and reap everlasting life. "For, if by one man's offense, death reigned by one; MUCH MORE they who receive abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness, shall reign in life by one, Jesus Christ."

SEC. 8.—*Of the Apostle's conclusion in the 13th v.*

The 13th verse is a general inference, embodying the substance of all that had been proved in the foregoing verses; and in making it, the Apostle,

at the same time, observes the comparative method which he had before adopted. "Therefore, as by the offense of one, judgment came upon all men unto condemnation ; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life." The reader will observe, that the words, *judgment came*, in the former clause, are a supplement borrowed from the 16th verse. Between an offense and a state of condemnation, on account of that offense, there necessarily intervenes a *judgment*, or judicial sentence founded on law ; hence this supplement is natural and is obviously implied in the Apostle's argument. This must be borne in mind ; because, some of the opponents of imputation are ready to admit, that, if the term "judgment" had been here *expressed* by the Apostle, and if by the term *condemnation*, which he uses, he mean any thing more than natural death, then the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin, is established. This, indeed, is honest ; but to the force of truth are we indebted for the concession. For a child may know, if the condemnation, here mentioned, imply an adjudication to suffer the *whole penalty* of the divine law, and this condemnation extend to all men, and that by a judicial sentence, grounded upon the "one offense" of Adam, that, then, all must have been

held guilty in Adam. But can any one seriously doubt that the term “condemnation,” expressed in this verse, relates to *death*, the penalty of the law, even to spiritual and eternal, as well as to temporal death? How unreasonable such a doubt, since that term stands directly opposed to “justification of life!” For surely no person will maintain, that this “justification of life” signifies an exemption from natural death! Candor must admit, that it implies spiritual and eternal life, even such a life as is consequent upon justification before God. And when we also consider, that the supplying of the ellipsis, by the word “judgment,” is, as we have seen, indispensably necessary, it follows, in spite of all opposition and cavil, that Adam’s offense is charged as the guilty cause of the spiritual condemnation of all.—The words, “the free gift came,” in the latter clause of the verse, are also for the same reasons, properly supplied, by our Translators, from the 16th verse. It must not, however, from the language here employed, be supposed, that “justification” by Christ, is co-extensive with “condemnation” by Adam. This would glaringly contradict what is elsewhere taught us, concerning the everlasting destruction of all, “who know not God and who obey not the gospel.” The “all men,” therefore,

in both clauses, does not denote identically the same persons, but only the whole number which each of those great federal heads, who are contrasted throughout the whole of this passage, respectively represented. By the offense of the *one*, "judgment came" upon ALL his representees to "condemnation;" and by the righteousness of the *other*, "the free gift came" upon *all* his representees to "justification of life."

SEC. 9.—*The Reason of the foregoing Conclusion more explicitly stated.*

The 19th verse explains more fully the reason of the divine procedure, mentioned in the 18th. If it be asked, why were all men subjected to a state of condemnation, on account of the offense of one man? We are here furnished with the answer, viz: that "by one man's disobedience they WERE MADE SINNERS," constituted sinners, considered as being guilty of that disobedience. Hence they were condemned, not as innocent creatures, but as being *sinner*s, chargeable in the sight of heaven with the guilt of their representative. And so on the other hand, if it be asked, how are those, who are guilty and condemned sinners, put in possession of that incomparable privilege, "justification unto life?" The answer is, that such,

“by the obedience of one,” Jesus Christ, are MADE RIGHTEOUS, constituted righteous, treated as righteous. Hence they are justified, not as guilty creatures, but as being righteous, legally righteous, through the righteousness of their representative imputed to them. In respect, then, of God’s procedure relative to the condemnation and justification of men, the Apostle’s declaration, in this verse, is not only plain but highly instructive. “For as by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners; so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.”

The foregoing explanatory remarks, it is believed, exhibit the true mind of the Spirit in this confessedly important, though much perverted scripture, and will be helpful in the further prosecution of the subject.

CHAPTER III.

THE FOREGOING EXEGESIS DEFENDED IN
OPPOSITION TO THE VIEWS OF THE NEW-
HAVEN SCHOOL.

SEC. 1.—*An Extract from the Christian Spectator,
with an Advertisement to the Reader.*

THE QUARTERLY CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR for June, 1831, commenting on the passage, which we have been considering in the foregoing chapter, holds the following language :

“The apostle teaches, that death, considered as an event common to all men, is not a legal penalty. We suppose it will be admitted, that the apostle here refers to the sentence denounced after the fall upon Adam and his race, as disclosing the facts respecting his sin and its consequences. Here then we might rest our present position. For, as we have shown, (p. 314,) that sentence was not the sentence of the *law*, nor was its execution the *penalty of the law*. Many die the death denounced in that sentence, who are delivered from the legal penalty. This we regard as absolutely decisive on the point now at issue.

“But we are not obliged to leave the question here. The apostle, in the very passage under consideration, has directly and formally disproved the doctrine, that death comes on men as the *penalty* of any law whatever. He first asserts, that the sin which is in the world, came into it by one man. He next affirms, that death is by sin, and

that death, as the consequence of sin, passed on all men, because all had sinned. In confirmation of this statement, he appeals to a known and acknowledged matter of fact, viz., that before the Mosaic law, sin was in the world. "But, he adds, "sin is not imputed where there is no law;" i. e., sin is not charged and punished, where there is no law. Nevertheless, death the *consequence*, (not the penalty,) of sin, prevailed from Adam to Moses, a period in which there was no law of which death could be the penalty. Sin, therefore, was in the world, (as death its consequence decisively proves,) even when there was no law with death as its penalty. Thus, while the apostle decisively teaches that death is the consequence of sin, he proves that it is not the *legal penalty* of sin, according to any law whatever.

"In confirmation of this view of the passage, we ask, why did the apostle appeal to the prevalence of death from *Adam to Moses*? This period was obviously distinguished by some *peculiarity*, decisive in its bearing on the apostle's argument. By what peculiarity? This is a vital question. We answer, then, not by the fact, that death during this period, was at all more a consequence of Adam's sin, or was more clearly *shown* to be a consequence of Adam's sin, than at any other period. Not that during the period there was no law, by which was the knowledge of sin, and by which sin could be charged, for it is beyond all denial, that there was such a law. What then was the fact peculiar to this period? Plainly this, and only this, that there was no law *threatening death*, as its penalty. To suppose the apostle, then, to speak of death, in this case as a legal pe-

nalty, is to suppose him to argue from a fact, which directly contradicts his own doctrine,—to argue from the prevalence of death during a period, in which there was no law that had death as its penalty. The object of the apostle, then, in referring to this period, is obvious. It was to show, that death *as an event common to all men*, did not come upon them as the penalty of any law whatever; but as an immediate consequence of personal sin, and remotely (in the manner before described) as the consequence of Adam's sin. Thus he proved from the universality of death, according to the original sentence under an *economy of grace*, that all men were under sin and condemnation.

But our brethren think, that the apostle appealed to the prevalence of death from Adam to Moses, for the very purpose of showing, that death during this period, came on men as the **LEGAL PENALTY** of *Adam's* sin. If this opinion can be shown to be wholly groundless, the main point at issue will be decided. We ask, then, how does the prevalence of death from Adam to Moses, prove that it was the legal penalty of Adam's sin? The vast multitude destroyed by the deluge and in Sodom and Gomorrah, are well known to have *deserved* death themselves; to have died, in some respect at least for their own personal sins. How then would such a case prove that men died solely for the sin of another? Surely, the apostle was unfortunate in referring to this fact to prove, that death reigned as the legal penalty of *Adam's* sin exclusively, or in any respect whatever."

We insert the above extract in this place, be-

cause, in connection with another position, that the sin of which the Apostle speaks, is exclusively *actual sin*, it expresses, in general, the views of all, on the subject we are discussing, who have adopted the New-Haven creed, or, as it is termed by others, the New School system; and because a few remarks upon it may tend to farther elucidate and confirm the exposition that we have given of the whole passage under consideration. The SPECTATOR is published at New-Haven, and is understood to be under the supervision of Drs. Taylor and Fitch, and some others of the same faith. The system, which they have adopted and are strenuously endeavoring to propagate, though commonly greeted with the epithet *new*, is, in its principal features, as old as Pelagius himself. The view, which they take of the law, prior to the time of Moses, as containing no threatening of death against its transgressors, originated we believe with Mr. Locke, and was embraced by Drs. Whitby and Taylor of Norwich, all three being deeply tinctured with Pelagianism on the subject of original sin, and especially the last, of whom, a cotemporary writer observed, that, "being mounted as it were on the shoulders of Dr. Whitby and Mr. Locke, he has pretended to see farther than either of them, and to reject every particular article al-

most, even the most essential, of christian faith and gospel doctrine." Between this English Dr. Taylor and our own Dr. Taylor there appears to be the closest harmony of sentiment, respecting the great leading "articles of christian faith and gospel doctrine." Hence, what is called Taylorism among us may be regarded as the progeny of either of these *fathers*, without any serious injury to the lawful claims of *paternity*.

The foregoing extract is, in our opinion, replete with bold assertion, specious sophistry, gross contradiction and palpable error: And under this conviction, we proceed to make some strictures upon it, in the following sections:

SEC. 2.—*Of a Misrepresentation contained in the Extract.*

The gentlemen of the Spectator entirely misunderstand, or misrepresent the views of *genuine* Calvinists, when they represent them as maintaining, that "men die solely for the sin of another," and that "death is the legal penalty of Adam's sin exclusively." This they regard as a very horrible doctrine. And perhaps an Atheist, or Deist might regard as equally horrible *their* doctrine, in making death to be the *consequence* of Adam's sin; especially when they *cannot* or *will not* tell us what

kind of consequence they mean. But do Calvinists maintain the sentiment here *imputed* to them? We aver, that in *no* case, do they make death to be *exclusively* the legal penalty of Adam's sin. In the case of *adults*, they find many *actual sins*, as well as the *imputed sin* of Adam, all demanding the infliction of death. It is in the case of *infants* alone, who are chargable with no actual, personal sin, that they have recourse to the "imputed sin of Adam," to account for their death. And even here, they do not consider, that it is the sin of Adam as such, but his sin as being their federal representative, and as imputed to them, or judicially reckoned *theirs*, that procures their death. Nor is this all; they also take into the account, the corruption of their nature, which *penally* flows from that imputation, and which justly classifies them with legal delinquents, and accordingly exposes them to the penalty of the law. Hence the unbiassed reader will perceive, that Calvinists (properly so called) hold an entirely different creed on this point, from that which the New-Haven School would *unjustly impute* to them.

SEC. 3.—*A Mistake corrected, in respect to the Meaning of the term "Death," as used by the Apostle.*

In the foregoing extract it is taken for granted, that the Apostle, in the passage under consideration, means, by the term *death*, nothing more than *temporal death*. The gentlemen say, "We suppose it will be admitted, that the Apostle here refers to the sentence denounced after the fall upon Adam and his race." This is *not* admitted by Calvinists. They understand the Apostle as referring to the *penalty* threatened *before* the fall, in those words of awful import, "Thou shalt surely die;" concerning which, the gentlemen themselves, in another part of the article from which we have extracted the above, say, "The penalty annexed to the law was 'Thou shalt surely die.' It was death as the full retribution of sin. It was death *in sin*; and considered as the language of a Jewish historian, and as Jewish phraseology, perpetuated and fully explained in the New Testament, we can be at no loss concerning its comprehensive and awful import, when applied to an immortal being." But where in the New Testament is this "Jewish phraseology perpetuated and fully explained," with greater clearness and with more manifest and explicit intention, than by the Apostle in this very

passage? Is he not contrasting the *death*, which came by the disobedience of Adam, with the *life*, which comes by the obedience of Christ? Can he, then, be understood as speaking only of *temporal death* and contrasting it with that *eternal life*, which is by Jesus Christ our Lord? Surely the *life*, of which he speaks, is comprehensive of the *greatest* good, nay, of *all* the good, which the believer in Jesus will ever enjoy; must not the death, then, with which it is contrasted, comprehend the *greatest* evil, and *all* the evil, which mankind deserve on account of sin? But what is *temporal death*, that the Apostle should be supposed to take such particular pains in drawing a contrast between it and *eternal life*? Is it the principal evil which arises from sin? Is it the greatest evil denounced against sin? Indeed, if we understand these divines, *they* will scarcely allow it to be an *evil* at all; they expressly deny that it is a *penal* evil, and seem to insinuate, that it is a blessing, because resulting from a sentence pronounced under an economy of grace. Do they, then, really “suppose it will be admitted,” that the Apostle is here *diverting* himself by forming a contrast between *that death*, which according to them is not a penal evil, but perhaps a blessing, and *that life*, which flows through the merits of a Saviour—even that

eternal life which is the gift of God through Jesus Christ our Lord? Moreover, what conclusively settles the meaning of the term “death,” in the passage referred to, is, that it *alternates* with the term “condemnation.” Thus, while in one verse the Apostle declares, that “DEATH reigned by one,” in another he declares, that “the judgment was by one to CONDEMNATION.” And while he again asserts, that “by one man’s sin DEATH entered into the world and passed upon all men,” he repeats the assertion, saying, that “by the offense of one, judgment came upon all men to CONDEMNATION.” Now can any person seriously affirm, that the Apostle by the term “condemnation” (κατάκριμα) only intends *temporal death*? And if he intends by it something more than temporal death, so he must also, by that other term, with which it is made to alternate.

SEC. 4.—*Concerning the Statement, that “Temporal Death forms no part of the legal penalty.”*

These divines, with great confidence, assert, that “the Apostle teaches, that death considered as an event common to all men, is not a legal penalty;” that “in the very passage under consideration, he has directly and formally disproved the doctrine, that death comes on men as the *penalty*

of any law whatever ;” and again, that “ he proves that it is not the *legal penalty* of sin, according to any law whatever.” This is making the Apostle, indeed, teach strange doctrine. But if *he* teaches such doctrine, how came *they* to tell us, that “ the vast multitude destroyed by the deluge and in Sodom and Gomorrah, are well known to have *deserved* death themselves ; to have died, in some respect at least, *for* their own personal sins.” If the persons alluded to “ *deserved* death and died *for* their own personal sins,” does not this look as if their death were “ the legal penalty of sin ?” Surely if they *deserved* death it must have been according to the sanction of the law ; and if they died *for* their own personal sins, their death must have happened according to the “ legal penalty” threatened against sin. We think, that by referring us to the death of the Antediluvians &c., these divines have disproved their own position, that “ death is not the legal penalty of sin, according to any law whatever.” But they may tell us, that they only mean, that those sinners *deserved* death as the *consequence* of sin, and underwent death, as a *consequence*, for their own personal sins. They make a great parade of the term “ consequence.” They are willing to admit, that death is “ an immediate *consequence* of per-

sonal sin, and remotely the *consequence* of Adam's sin." Their manner of using this term is calculated to deceive. We might suppose, they meant to express, by it, the penal effect of sin, did they not occasionally use it in contrast with the term "penalty." We acknowledge, that death is the consequence of sin ; but alas, it is its penal consequence ! They ought therefore to define to the christian community what they exactly mean by that term, as they use it in the present controversy ; and especially since they elsewhere inform us, that "there are many modes of consequence." Presuming to set aside a term long used in the Christian Church, and to introduce a new one, they should have clearly and unambiguously defined it.

But is it really so, that temporal death forms no part of "the legal penalty of sin?" Has it never come upon any of the race of Adam as a *penal infliction*? Must we, indeed, believe, that persons, who have perished from the earth by the manifest judgments of heaven, and been cut off in the most terrible manner in the very act of sinning against God, suffered nothing of a penal nature in the death which overtook them, nothing of "the legal penalty of sin, according to any law whatever?" These divines say of our doctrine concerning

Original Sin, that "it is contrary to the decision of the competent unpervverted reason of mankind." Were we sure that mankind possessed *such* reason, touching "the things of the Spirit of God," we should certainly be willing to leave to its decision *their* doctrine respecting death.

SEC. 5.—*The Introduction of an "Economy of Grace," no Proof of the Repeal of any Part of the Legal Penalty.*

Let us see how these divines prove, that death is not the penalty of sin. This they do by referring us to the time, when the sentence of death was first pronounced upon fallen man. Immediately after the gracious declaration, respecting the Seed of the woman, was made, God said to Adam, "dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." Hence they tell us, that death, being denounced under an *economy of Grace*, cannot be a legal penalty. "For," say they, "as we have shown (p. 314,) that sentence was not the sentence of the *law*, nor was its execution the *penalty of the law*." We have examined the place referred to, but cannot discover the proof of what they here assert. Now, when they speak of "a sentence *denounced*, after the fall, upon Adam and his race," and elsewhere of "men being *doomed* to temporal

death by a sentence under grace," are we not to understand them as making death an *evil*? For certainly it is not usual to *denounce* a *benefit* on people, or *doom* them to a *blessing*! Accordingly, we have here a sentence *denouncing evil* upon man, which, they say, is "not the sentence of the law, nor its execution the penalty of the law!" A very strange sentence, indeed, to issue from the righteous tribunal of Jehovah! We should say, that a sentence denouncing evil, was a *penal* sentence, and if given correctly, a *legal* sentence. But according to these divines, this sentence was not by the "law of works," but by the "law of faith," or law of grace, for before it was issued, mankind were placed under *an economy of grace*. From this we ought to infer, that death in every instance, from the fall of Adam till the present time, has been a *blessing* and not an evil. Therefore, though the Antediluvians, the Sodomites, the Egyptians, the Amorites &c., all died in the most fearful manner, yet their death was a blessing and not an evil, at least no part of the *legal penalty*; for they all died under "an economy of grace!"

We acknowledge, indeed, that immediately after the fall, a merciful God revealed a plan of salvation by free grace: But that revelation, by no

means, repealed any part of the penalty of God's unalterable law ; so far from this, it distinctly showed in the predicted *bruising of the heel* of the woman's SEED, that the penalty was to be fully endured and not one *iota* of it to be discarded : And hence it also showed, that the only way to escape the penalty was to embrace by faith the promised Redeemer.

We object to the notion, that would place, in consequence of the first promise, all mankind of every age and nation under "an economy of grace;" if by that phraseology, it be meant, that they have all enjoyed sufficient means of grace and would have been saved, had they only used them aright. And we have reason to believe, that such are *secretly* the views of the divines, whom we are opposing, from a consideration of the source, whence they have borrowed this notion about "an economy of grace." But it is not our business at present to examine this point. The question is, whether the revelation of Grace in the first promise repealed that part of the penalty of the divine law, which related to temporal death. And we most unequivocally assert, that it has not. For, except in the case of believers in that promise, the scriptures invariably teach, that temporal death constitutes a part of the legal penalty.

SEC. 6.—*Proofs that Temporal Death does belong to the Legal Penalty.*

That temporal death constitutes a part of the legal penalty we feel bound to maintain :

Because, the Apostle assures us, in (Rom. vi. 23,) that “the wages of sin is death,” without distinguishing between the *first* and the *second* death; clearly intimating that death, under every form, in itself considered, is the *wages*, or *just desert* of sin.

Elsewhere he informs us that “the sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law.” (1. Cor. xv. 56.) Is it possible to assert in plain-er or stronger terms, that “death is the legal penalty of sin.” Here are three things, the *law*, *sin* and *death*. Sin is the connecting link between the law and death, and receives from the law its strength or power to render death *hurtful*. The *death* spoken of is obviously temporal death; *sin* is called its *sting*—a sting containing the venom of of the curse, otherwise it would be a harmless sting; and this sting (which is sin) we are told, has all its power from the *law*, that is, from its authority and sanction. Is there, therefore, nothing *legal* in that strength or power to injure, which sin derives from the *law*? And is there nothing *penal* in that death, which has sin for its *sting*, or

comes armed with it, as its mortal weapon? Besides, the believer is presented to us as glorying over death, triumphantly shouting, "O death where is thy sting?" Is there nothing peculiar in *his* case? Or is it the privilege of all men without exception to greet "the king of terrors" as an *unstinged* and harmless enemy? Surely then, the scripture referred to, solemnly teaches, that all, who do not obtain "the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ," must meet death as "the legal penalty of sin."

And corresponding to this, the Apostle (1 Cor. iii. 21, 22,) says to believers, "all things are yours," and expressly names "death" as one of these things. Now, does not this imply, that death comes to a believer in a different manner from what it does to an unbeliever? And wherein lies the difference, except that to the one it comes as a penalty, while to the other it comes divested of its penal form? To say, indeed, of the dying reprobate, that there is nothing *penal* in his death—to say, that he whom Jehovah pronounces to be "*cursed* in his basket and store, and in his lying down and rising up," is not *cursed* in his *dying*, or does not undergo a *cursed death*, sounds, to say the least of it, exceedingly strange! "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being

made a curse for us ; for it is written cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree." Was there nothing of the *curse*? was there nothing *penal* in the *temporal death* of the Son of God in our nature? This will be denied by none but Socinians, or such as are *socinianizing*. But if Christ's death, viewed in its temporal aspect, as relating to the dissolution of the union between his human soul and body, was *penal*, was the effect of the *curse*, let no man or body of men have the presumption to tell us, that death is not a "legal penalty." Will it then, we ask, be said, in the face of the foregoing testimonies, that death is never "the legal penalty of sin according to any law whatever?"

But besides the evidence already adduced, we have abundance of other proof in the word of God, to convict these divines of holding an egregious error. The same Apostle declares concerning the Gentiles, (Rom. i. 32) that they "knew the judgment of God, that they who committed such things [as he had been specifying] were worthy of death." These blinded heathen, without the aid of supernatural revelation, or even much learning, appear to have had a more correct knowledge of the penal sanction of God's law, than the Rev. gentlemen, we are opposing. From their natural

impressions respecting the nature of the divine law, and respecting the *judgment, threatening, or righteous appointment* of the Great Lawgiver, they *knew*, that death was justly merited, as a punishment for such sins as the Apostle specifies. For to *know*, that men are *worthy of death*, by the *judgment of God*, for a *violation of his law*, is unquestionably to *know* that “death is the legal penalty of sin.” And that the Gentiles had this knowledge the Apostle expressly declares; and, indeed, the same is manifest from the whole history of their sacrifices. Did they not frequently offer up sacrifices and some of these of the most costly nature, on purpose to appease the wrath of Deity, that it might not visit them with temporal calamities, with temporal death, on account of their transgressions? And does the Apostle intimate, that their knowledge on this point, so far as it extended, was incorrect? Does not his manner of expression clearly imply, that he regarded their knowledge as being truly consistent with the character of the divine law?

Again, the scriptures furnish us with some notable instances, where sin is expressly assigned as the penal cause of death. In relation to the death of the Antediluvians by the deluge, we read, “And God saw that the *wickedness* of man was

great in the earth—And the Lord said I will *de-*
stroy man, whom I have created from the face of
the earth.” In relation to the death of the in-
habitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, by fire and
brimstone from heaven, we read, “And the Lord
said, because the cry of Sodom and Gomorrah is
great, and because *their sin is very grievous*; I
will go down now,” &c. The angels ordered Lot
to take his family and depart from Sodom, “lest,”
say they, “thou be CONSUMED in the INIQUITY of
the city,” or as judicious interpreters understand
it, “in the PUNISHMENT of the city.” Were not
the Egyptians also drowned in the Red Sea for
their most deliberate rebellion against God? The
Israelites, in their song of deliverance, say, “In
the greatness of thine excellency, thou hast over-
thrown them that rose up against thee; thou sent-
est forth thy WRATH, which CONSUMED them as
stubble.” And how are we to justify God’s pro-
cedure, in cutting off the nations of Canaan and
giving their land to the children of Israel, if their
death was not merited by their crimes, and was not
sent upon them as a *penal infliction*? Besides these
instances, look also at the case of Er and Onan;
concerning whose death and the cause of it, we
thus read, (Gen. xxxviii. 7. 10.) “And Er was
wicked in the sight of the Lord; and the Lord

slew him." "And the thing, which he (Onan) did, *displeased* the Lord; wherefore he *slew* him also." Now if their death was not deserved, as a punishment for their sins and inflicted on them as such, it is impossible to understand the plainest language. Indeed, to view their death in any other light, would be to represent the righteous Lord as having acted towards them in an arbitrary and capricious manner, giving vent to his displeasure, as earthly tyrants are sometimes wont to do. Thus, we apprehend that we have conclusively proved from the Holy Scriptures that death is to be considered, as included in the "legal penalty of sin."

SEC. 7.—*The Ante-Mosaic Period not Peculiarized by the Fact, that "There was no Law threatening Death, as its Penalty."*

Notwithstanding the foregoing proofs, the New-Haven gentlemen tell us, that "the Apostle, in the very passage under consideration, has directly and formally disproved the doctrine, that death comes on men as the penalty of any law whatever." How? Why, say they, by referring us to a period, viz: that from Adam to Moses, "in which there was no law *threatening death* as its penalty." Supposing this were so, it by no means

proves their assertion, "that death is not the penalty of sin according to *any law* whatever;" for they admit, that during the Mosaic economy, there *was* a law *threatening death* as its penalty. But is it true that during the period referred to, "there was no law threatening death as its penalty?" The falsity of this position must appear obvious to the unbiassed reader, from what has already been stated. The moral law of God is unchangeable in its threatenings against sin. Its *preceptive* nature and its *penal threatening* are essentially and inseparably connected together. It did not, therefore, threaten any thing yesterday, which it does not to-day, and will not to-morrow. It is not to be charged with *partiality*; as if it threatened greater evils against the men of *one age* than those of *another*; or greater evils against a particular nation, than all other nations. But according to the doctrine of these divines, the law of the Lord, "which endureth forever," is both alterable and partial: According to them, it is not founded in principles of eternal rectitude, but flows from the mere will and caprice of an arbitrary Lawgiver. We cannot subscribe to a sentiment so abhorrent both to reason and revelation.

Now, the testimonies, which we have adduced, to prove, that "death is the legal penalty of sin,"

are directly in the face of this *ingenious contrivance* respecting the state of the law from Adam to Moses : For they apply to that period with as much force as to any other whatever. Surely the Apostle cannot be understood as referring to the law as existing under some *Jewish peculiarity*, when, in writing to churches composed principally of Gentiles, he declares, that “the wages of sin is death”—that, “the sting of death is sin and the strength of sin is the law”—and that, the Gentiles, who were without the written law, “knew the judgment of God, that they, who commit such things, are worthy of death.” We have seen, that for their peculiar wickedness and rebellion, God in the most terrible manner destroyed the old world by a flood, burned up the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah with fire and brimstone, and drowned the Egyptians in the Red Sea. And all this destruction of human life happened within the period, concerning which, it is maintained, that there “was no law threatening death as its penalty !” The deaths also of Er and Onan took place in the same period, and are declared (if there be any certainty of meaning in language) to have been inflicted upon them for their personal sins. “And Er was WICKED in the sight of the Lord ; and the Lord SLEW him—And the thing, which he

(Onan) did, DISPLEASED the Lord ; WHEREFORE he SLEW him also." Now we ask, according to what rule of equity, were these men, and the others referred to, destroyed from the face of the earth, on account of their sins, if there were no law in existence threatening death as the punishment of sin? Let this question be answered if it can, without implicating the judicial character of the Governor among the nations.

But, say the gentlemen of the Spectator, "This period was obviously distinguished by some *peculiarity*, decisive in its bearing on the Apostle's argument ;" and they conclude, that this peculiarity could be no other than the fact, that *then* "there was no law threatening death, as its penalty." This peculiarity, they inform us, ceased when the law was given by Moses ; *then*, as in the case of Adam before the fall, the law was made to threaten death as the penalty of sin ; *then*, that threatening of the law was revived, which had lain dead about the space of twenty-five hundred years, ever since Adam ate the forbidden fruit. And was this the peculiar kindness, which Jehovah showed towards the chosen seed of Abraham his friend? Is this what the Psalmist means, when he says, "He hath not dealt so with any nation?" It is indeed difficult to conceive how it comports with

that *special goodness*, which the scriptures everywhere represent Jehovah, as manifesting to his “peculiar people,” if, when he took them into external covenant with himself at Mount Sinai, he added to the law a threatening of death, which had been *repealed* for so many ages, and which was still left repealed, in the case of *all other nations*! Besides, if the nation of Israel existed under a law, threatening them with death for every transgression, and, in this respect, differed from those, who lived in the Ante-Mosaic period, and from all other nations of the earth; might we not have expected to find them suffering death in a more terrible and exemplary manner, or in a manner more indicative of the righteous displeasure of Jehovah, than all other people of all other ages and nations? But was this the case? Or will any dare assert it?—From all these considerations, then, is it not plain? is it not proved, that the gentlemen, as well as Mr. Locke and all who have adopted his sentiment, have entirely mistaken the peculiarity, which the Apostle identifies with the Ante-Mosaic period, and have erred in making him teach (what he never taught,) that during that period “there was no law threatening death as its penalty?”

But might there not have been some peculiarity

connected with that period, “decisive in its bearing on the Apostle’s argument,” other, than the one we have now considered, and which we have shown was no peculiarity at all? It must be admitted, that from Adam to Moses, the law was not so clearly and so fully made known, both in its precept and penalty, as it was at the expiration of that period. That was emphatically a “dark age” in respect of divine revelation. A sufficiency of light was indeed enjoyed, to conduct the chosen of God from this dark world to realms of light and glory; but still when compared with the Mosaic economy, and much more so, with the New Testament economy, it possessed a *comparative obscurity*. Every economy has its peculiarity in point of *light*. The present in this respect excels the former. And were we, while speaking on the subject of faith and salvation, to say, that even before Christ came in the flesh, persons believed in him and were saved; none would be at a loss to understand the intended peculiarity of the period referred to. So the Apostle, speaking of sin and death, which can have no existence when there is no law, informs the church at Rome, that these existed in the world, even before the law was promulged to Israel, from the top of Sinai, in that clear, glorious and truly magnificent man-

ner, with which all were acquainted who possessed "the lively Oracles." There could be no difficulty in tracing the existence of sin and death, after the *fiery law* was issued from Mount Sinai ; but the Apostle, to strengthen his argument, in his wisdom, refers to a period in which the law was less clearly revealed. And *comparative obscurity*, being the grand peculiarity of the Ante-Mosaic period, the Apostle refers to that period, in proof of the proposition, which he had just stated, viz : "all have sinned." Because, if there were any exceptions, they must surely have been found in the DARKNESS of that period, on the principle, "to whom little is given of them little will be required." But no such exceptions were then to be found, as was evident, from the universal reign of death. And indeed, as death is an evidence of the previous existence of sin, the Apostle's mind seems to have been directed to the period in question, on account of the immense destruction of human life, which happened in the deluge and in the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah and the cities of the plain, by the manifest judgments of God ; and particularly, also, on account of the vast multitude of infants, which must have perished in those fearful catastrophes. Hence his allusion to the death of them, "that had not sinned after the

similitude of Adam's transgression.' Those, whose views we are opposing, suppose that the Apostle by this circumlocution intends *actual* sinners, who had not sinned against a law threatening death as a penalty, as Adam did. To admit that he intended infants and that their death was any part of the legal penalty, would be to admit the truth of the doctrine of "Original Sin imputed." Hence their position that the Ante-Mosaic period was peculiarized by the fact, that "there was no law threatening death, as its penalty." But as we have disproved their position, we feel warranted to rest in the good old interpretation of the words referred to, that the Apostle intends infants, who had not sinned *actually* and *voluntarily*, as Adam did, when with a knowledge of the sin and danger, he ate the forbidden fruit. And to account for *their* death, he refers to the representative character of Adam, "who" he adds, "was the figure of him that was to come."

SEC. 3.—*Temporal Death, under whatever Form it comes, Proves the Previous Existence of Sin in its Subject.*

The gentlemen of the Spectator, finally, give as a proof, that death is never "the legal penalty of sin," the fact, that "many who die are delivered

from the legal penalty." Now, we cheerfully admit, that all, who *die in the Lord*, are delivered from the *whole penalty* of the law, and consequently from temporal death, viewed *as a penalty*: For, "Christ was made a curse for them." But this is no proof, that death is not a part of the penalty in the case of all others, of whom it is written, *they are driven away in their wickedness*. When we admit, however, that there is nothing penal in the death of the righteous, it by no means follows, that we destroy the argument, in favor of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, drawn from the death of infants: Because, it being once proved, that death, by the appointment of God, is the penalty of sin, the fact of its coming to a human being in another form, only shows, that *that*, which renders it penal, viz: *sin*, has been removed by a pardon. Had not grace removed the sin, the death would have been penal. When a person dies, his death is either penal, or it is not: If penal, he dies in his sin; if not penal, then, his sin has been remitted through the merits of a Saviour: So that, in either case, the *fact* of death proves the antecedent existence of sin in its subject. The pardon of sin was not, by the divine constitution, to prevent death entirely, but only to change its penal nature and convert it into a bles-

sing. Hence, when the gracious promise was made to our first parents, respecting a Saviour, it was plainly intimated, that although believing in the promise would afford security from the whole penalty of the violated law, yet that branch of it which related to temporal death, though really changed in its nature, should nevertheless still continue in its *outward form*. It was, as if God had said to Adam, “in believing this promise, which I have now revealed, thou shalt indeed be saved from all the *penalty* involved in the threatened death—still, as dust thou art, unto dust thou shalt return.” And such is the language of God to every one of his children : By his grace he pardons them and delivers them from all penal evil, both here and hereafter, yet death in its *outward* and *visible form* must still be undergone—“dust thou art and unto dust thou shalt return.” For wise and obvious reasons, God retains the *outward form* of a penal evil, while all that is *penal* in it, he removes by his grace. Accordingly, we see what the law makes death, and what pardoning grace makes it—The one makes it a *penalty*, the other a *blessing*. And hence, the death of infants, as they are subjects of law, shows conclusively that they are reckoned sinners, whether they be re-

garded, as dying under the curse of the law, or delivered from it by the grace of the New Covenant.

In connection with this point, we must confess our dullness of apprehension, as to the meaning of these divines, according to their own scheme, when they tell us, that the Apostle, in the passage under consideration, “proves from the universality of death that all men are under sin and condemnation.” It seems to be here acknowledged, that sin and condemnation must be as *universal* as death. But within the range of death’s universality, numberless infants are found; therefore, the Apostle proves that infants are under sin and condemnation. Or do they mean to say, that “from the universality of death, deducting about one fourth for the death of infants, the Apostle proves all men to be under sin and condemnation?” Or do they only mean to exclude infants from the *ALL* in that part of the sentence, which contains their conclusion, and assert, that “from the universality of death over both adults and infants, the Apostle proves all adults *only* to be under sin and condemnation?” We cannot tell what they mean, on their own principles. It would seem, they had lost sight, for a moment, of their favorite system, and were unconsciously led to the very threshold of truth.

SEC. 9.—*Of the Kind of Sin of which the Apostle Treats.*

In the same article, from which the foregoing extract is made, the New-Haven divines most pertinaciously maintain, that the sin of which the Apostle speaks, in the scripture under consideration, is exclusively *actual sin*. Now, if there be no such thing in existence as *imputed sin*, if there be no other sin, in the empire of Jehovah, than *actual sin*, as they contend, it follows as a matter of course, that “the sin, of which the Apostle speaks, is not *imputed sin*, but *actual, personal sin*.” Hence they might have saved themselves the labor of attempting to prove a *truism*. Indeed, if their definition of sin, which they have given us in another place, be correct, there is an end at once to all controversy respecting Original Sin. They boldly tell us, that *all sin consists in the known transgression of law, and is the voluntary exercise, or act of a free moral agent*; or, according to their abridged and more convenient form of it, that *all sin consists in voluntary action*. Thus Original Sin, both *imputed* and *inherent*, which some good men have been weak enough to believe in, these divines have banished from the universe in a moment, by the magic power of a *definition*! But why did they not proceed a little further, and

define "actual sin," also, out of the universe? They have, by their definition, already reduced it to comparatively small limits, and why did they not *annihilate* it altogether? "All sin, say they, consists in the *known* transgression of law."—Then, there is nothing like that amount of sin in the world, that some *jealous, suspicious, iniquity-hunting* persons would have us believe. Let the blinded Pagan worship the sun, moon and stars; let him bow down to stocks and stones; let him sacrifice his own children to devils; yea, let him immolate himself upon the altar, which he has erected to a false god, he commits no sin in all this, for he does not *knowingly* transgress the law of his Creator! According to this definition, Paul committed no sin in persecuting the church, because he did it *ignorantly*, in unbelief, and actually thought, he was doing God service! According to this definition, none of the *thoughts, words* or *deeds* of mankind are sinful, except those, which at the time are *known* to be *transgressions* of the law of God! If "all sin consists in the known transgression of law," then, only bring mankind into a state of profound ignorance concerning the law, and you most effectually put it out of their power to commit sin! Accordingly, Satan, "the god of this world," must be of very great benefit

to the children of men, since we are assured, that he *blinds the minds of them that believe not*, the very thing they need in order to keep them from sinning! Yes, the more of ignorance, the more of holiness!

But how does this definition accord with the scriptures? Our Saviour says, "If the *blind* lead the *blind*, both shall fall into the ditch;"—*blindness*, then, is no preservative against sin and destruction. Again he prays for his murderers, "Father *forgive* them for they *know not* what they do;"—he does not accuse them of *known transgression of law*, but nevertheless he regards them as *guilty*, for he prays that they might be *forgiven*. David confesses and prays—"Who can *understand* his errors! Cleanse thou me from *secret faults*." Job prays—"Make me *to know* my transgression and my sin." In a word, we find, that, under the law, *sin-offerings* were expressly appointed by Jehovah, in the case of persons, who might *sin through ignorance against any of the commandments of the Lord*, and thus become *guilty*. (Lev. iv. 2, 13, 22, 27.) With out adducing any other proof, we will leave the intelligent reader to judge for himself, how far these divines have wandered from the rule of the Holy Scriptures, when they assert, that "all sin con-

sists in the known transgression of law." And indeed when we consider that there are "desires of the flesh and of the mind," which are sinful, according to the word of God, and which, nevertheless, do not proceed from the *will*, nor can be identified with *voluntary action*, it is evident that their definition, even in its abridged form, is unscriptural and to be rejected. There may be sin where there is no *voluntary action*. "The thought of foolishness is sin." "To will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good I find not. For the good that I would I do not, but *the evil which I would not, that I do.*" "Let us *cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and of the spirit.*" "They that are Christ's have *crucified the flesh, with the affections and lusts.*" Such scriptures, if we mistake not, are very far from making "all sin consist in voluntary action."

In attempting to show, that the Apostle is speaking exclusively of *actual sin*, these divines assert, that when he says "all have sinned," the word (*ἡμαρτον*) which he uses "denotes *actual personal sin* and that only." But from what has been said respecting their definition of sin, it will be seen, how little they are entitled to belief in making this assertion. Do they not know, that the word literally signifies "to miss the mark?"

But the arrow misses the mark, not only when it passes over it, but also when it falls short of it, or when it passes on either side of it. The law is the *mark*, and sin is *the missing* of it, not only where there is a *transgression* of it, whether *known* or *unknown*, but even where there is the least *want of conformity* to it. This corresponds with the *scripture definition* of sin. "Sin is a transgression of the law." (1. John iii. 4.) The merest novice, in the Greek, knows, that the words *a transgression of the law*, form but an imperfect translation of the single term,* which the Apostle uses. There is no single word in our language, that fully conveys the idea intended by it. Perhaps the term *illegality* comes as near to it as any other. It expresses in fact any *deviation from the law*, whether by *omission* or *commission*, by *act* or by *defect*—it denotes *non-conformity to the law*—it denotes the *want* or *absence* of any thing which the law *requires*. Accordingly, if prayer be *wanting*, it is sin; if charity be *wanting*, it is sin; if holiness be *wanting*, it is sin; if righteousness be *wanting*, it is sin, for *all unrighteousness† is sin*; if love to Christ be *wanting*, it is sin, for "if any man *love not* our Lord Jesus Christ, let him be

* ἀνομία.

† ἀδικία, want of righteousness.

Anathema Maranatha ;" in a word, if there be any thing *wanting* which *the law requires*, it is sin.

From these considerations, we cannot, possibly believe, that the Apostle is speaking of sin in such a *restricted* sense as would correspond with the definition given of it by these divines. He is speaking of sin in the broadest acceptation of the term. And whether he includes "the imputed sin of Adam," depends upon the fact of its existence. The design of the present Treatise is to prove this fact. Hence, at present, we would only remark, that when the Apostle says, "by the disobedience of one many were made sinners," we have, at least, *prima facie* evidence of the reality of *imputed* sin : For he does not say, that by the disobedience of one, many *made themselves sinners*, but, *were made, constituted, or set down as sinners*, by a sentence of Jehovah, the righteous Judge of all ; which could only be, as we apprehend, by his *imputing to them, or judicially charging to their account the offense* of their federal representative Adam.

The foregoing strictures, without adding any more, will, we trust, be considered sufficient to show the reader, that the views expressed in the SPECTATOR, on the passage of scripture referred to, are untenable and exceedingly erroneous,

and that they by no means affect the correctness of the exposition, which we have given of that plain, but much perverted portion of scripture.

CHAPTER IV.

ADAM THE FEDERAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
HIS POSTERITY.

As the exposition, which we have given of the scope and argument of the Apostle in Rom. v. 12—19, and which we have defended against the interpretation of the same passage by the New-Haven School, was only intended to lay a foundation for some further remarks on the subject of “the imputation of Adam’s first sin to his posterity,” we will now proceed to the execution of that intention. And surely when we contemplate the many false and dangerous sentiments that are now so universally entertained respecting this important subject, it becomes those, who would support the character of *witnesses for the truth*, to maintain an intelligent adherence to this part of the Church’s Testimony, and boldly to stand forth in its defence.

The first step, which we will now take upon the subject, shall be to prove, that *Adam by a federal arrangement was constituted the representative of the whole human race*. If this position cannot be proved, the doctrine, respecting the imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity, can never be maintained. But if, on the contrary, this position be

susceptible of proof, then the doctrine in question follows, in a measure, as a matter of course.

There are, here, two topics for discussion. The REALITY of a federal transaction with Adam; and the REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER under which he appeared and acted in that transaction.

SEC. 1.—*Of the Reality of a Federal Transaction with Adam.*

That Adam, as soon as created, was placed under a law, can scarcely be denied. He was made “in the image of God;” but as one feature in that image was holiness, (Eph. iv. 24.) and as holiness is conformity to a moral law, it follows, that he was created under a law, which was the rule and measure of his holiness. He could not have been called *upright* or *holy*, had there not been a moral law written in his heart, in his very creation, with the requirements of which he possessed a perfect conformity. As soon, therefore, as he found himself a living creature, he found himself “under law to God.” And, moreover, this law, under which he was created, possessed the force of a *covenant-law*; that is, it impliedly promised the bestowment of good, in case of continued obedience, and threatened evil, in case of disobedience. None can deny, that the moral law,

as originally given to man, was sanctioned with an implied penalty, otherwise it had been unworthy of the name of a law. And on the other hand, that it contained an implied promise is plain from some declarations of the Apostle Paul. Speaking of this same moral law, he declares, that "the commandment was ordained to life," (Rom. vii. 10.) and again "what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin condemned sin in the flesh." (Rom. viii. 3.) Here he intimates, that there was something, which the law could once accomplish, before it became "weak through the flesh," or before man became so weak through sin, that he could no longer obey it: And what else was that, than the procurement of eternal life, the very thing which embraced the design of the mission of God's Son into the world? And our Saviour undoubtedly referred to the promise of life inherent in the law, as originally given to man, when he replied to a certain young legalist, "If thou wilt enter into life keep the commandments." "Do this and live," is the natural dictate of the divine law. And indeed no law is deserving of the name, if it do not intrinsically possess the formal nature of a covenant. Even human laws do so; for, while they

threaten punishment against their violation, they also impliedly promise governmental security and protection to their observance.

But when we speak of God's having made a covenant with Adam, we mean something more than this *natural covenanting*, to which we have alluded. We find, that shortly after Adam's creation, there was a *positive covenanting* transacted between God and him. "And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat ; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it ; for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." (Gen. ii. 16, 17.) Now, that this was really a *federal regulation* between God and Adam, the transaction itself bears ample proof. Here,—

1. There are two distinct parties mentioned—THE LORD GOD, the Supreme Sovereign and Law-giver of the Universe, and THE MAN, the subordinate lord of the lower creation. And the great inequality of the parties is no valid objection against their mutually covenanting together, when it is recollected, that the whole matter originated with, and was proposed by the superior party, and that too, in the way of manifesting sovereign condescension and goodness to the inferior-party.

There is nothing to prevent a master from entering into a federal compact with a servant.

2. There is a law given. “The Lord God COMMANDED the man.” And this was a *positive law*, proceeding, not from the nature, but from the sovereign will of God ; as it related to a matter, which in its own nature, was indifferent, viz : the eating of a certain fruit. Now if the natural law, under which man was created, contained in itself the force of a covenant, much more may this positive law be regarded as a covenant-law.

3. There is a condition specified. The precise object, about which the regulation was made, was “the fruit of the trees of the garden.” And, with one solitary exception, a free use of the fruit of all the trees growing in Eden was granted to the man. “Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat ; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat of it.” And let it not be said, that this matter was too trifling to constitute an object worthy of a solemn covenant. Because nothing could have been a more satisfactory test of the man’s obedience to the will of his Creator : which was the great object propounded by this transaction. Obedience to this one precept would have secured obedience to the whole moral law ; and disobedience to it was disobedience to

the whole moral law. "Whosoever offendeth in one point is guilty of all." Hence the immediate condition, proposed to Adam, was not so much *doing*, as *refraining from doing*. "But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt NOT EAT of it." What condition could be more easy, considering the great object to be accomplished by it?

4. There is a penalty annexed, as a solemn sanction of the transaction. "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." The evil threatened to be inflicted, in case of disobedience, was DEATH; and not only a *present* but also a *future* death: "dying thou shalt die"—one continued death, from the moment of transgressing to all eternity—involving a painful separation, not merely of the union between soul and body, but what is infinitely more terrible, a spiritual and eternal separation between the covenant-breaker and his God, accompanied with loss, shame, suffering and everlasting infamy.

5. There is a promise implied. Since *death* was expressly threatened as the penalty of disobedience, a promise, including the very opposite of death, must be inferred as having been made to a course of obedience. And as the penalty embraced the greatest amount of evil, the promise

may be considered as embracing the greatest amount of good, viz : LIFE—natural, spiritual and eternal. And,

6. There is the consent of Adam to the terms proposed. By revelation he was made acquainted with the sovereign will of the Lord God, in this matter; and being a truly intelligent being, he perfectly understood the nature of the whole transaction. And accordingly he communicated a knowledge of the eventful affair to the woman, whom God shortly afterwards gave to be with him, and who also considered herself bound by the same deed. For, in the next Chapter she is represented as saying to the Serpent, “WE may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden; but of the fruit of the tree, which is in the midst of the garden, God hath said, YE shall not eat of it, neither shall YE touch it, lest YE die.” Now this is enough to show, that there was actually a consent, on the part of man, to the proposed stipulation. For, being in possession of the knowledge of his Creator’s will, as an upright and holy creature, he could not do otherwise, than yield a free, immediate and cordial consent to it. Indeed in his state of innocence, and while engaged in active obedience, his Creator’s will was his will. And hence, when called to account for his

disobedience, he does not plead that he had never consented to what had been proposed: on the contrary, the apology which he offers plainly indicates, that he had given his consent. "Hast thou eaten of the tree," says God, "whereof I commanded thee, that thou shouldst not eat?" And the man said, "The woman, whom thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat." Here he acknowledges guilt, but endeavors to palliate it, by laying the blame upon her, who was first in the transgression.

Now, from the foregoing considerations, it cannot, with any color of reason, be denied, that God did actually enter into a covenant with Adam. But the scriptures furnish us with many additional proofs upon the subject. Two only shall be noticed.

1. It is written in Hosea, (chap. vi. 7.) "But they like men have transgressed the covenant." With more propriety, these words may be translated, "But they LIKE ADAM have transgressed the covenant." The same phraseology occurs in Job, (chap. xxxi. 33.) "If I have covered my transgression AS ADAM." Here the first man, Adam is unquestionably intended. In the eighty-second Psalm, we meet with the same expression—"But ye shall die LIKE MEN"—which clause

would have been more forcibly expressed, and more in accordance with the scope of the Psalmist, had our Translators rendered it—"But ye shall die LIKE ADAM." But admitting, that the passage in Hosea is correctly translated, who would ever think of excluding Adam from "the men" to whom the prophet compares covenant-breaking Israel? And if he be included, then what covenant was he ever chargeable with transgressing, other than the covenant of which we are speaking?

2. In Hebrews, (chap. xii. 24,) we read of "Jesus, the Mediator of the new covenant." This language suggests, that there was an "old covenant," of which Jesus was not the Mediator. And what else could that covenant have been, than the covenant of works, which had been made with Adam? For, granting, that there is in these words a reference to the *new*, in opposition to the *old* testament dispensation of the covenant of Grace; still as Jesus is the mediator of that covenant, under both dispensations of it, and as there is evidently an allusion, here to a covenant of which he was not the Mediator, we must conclude that the covenant made with Adam is intended. The Covenant of Grace, in respect of origin, is an "everlasting covenant," but in respect of revelation and execution, it succeeds the Covenant of

Works; and in comparison with which it receives the name of the New Covenant.

Thus, then, we have shown, that the Lord God made a covenant with Adam: and if any further evidence of this be required, it may be found in those proofs, which shall now be offered in the discussion of the other topic proposed, viz: that Adam, in this covenant, appeared and acted in the relation of a *representative* to all his posterity.

SEC. 2.—*Of the Representative Character of Adam.*

Adam, being the first man God created, was the “natural head” of all his descendants; or to vary the expression, the “natural root,” from which they all sprung. But this is not what we mean by his being constituted the REPRESENTATIVE of his offspring. This circumstance, indeed, laid a proper foundation, and proved his fitness for sustaining a representative character, but was something entirely distinct from that character. Had Adam, in the covenant, been regarded merely as a natural head, we are free to acknowledge, that his descendants could not, according to our ideas of justice, have been charged with the guilt of his sinful conduct, however they might have suffered temporal evils in *consequence* of his conduct, as

children, though not chargeable with the sins of their parents, frequently become sufferers in *consequence* of their immoral conduct. But when we speak of Adam as a representative, we mean, that he appeared and acted in the name of his posterity, so that in law, his acts became virtually their acts, they, as well as he, being held responsible for them. This remark, therefore, will shew the reader the bearing, that the fact of Adam's representative character has upon the doctrine of Original Sin.

Now, that Adam acted as the federal head and representative of his posterity, may be presumed from the fact of his being placed under a *positive law*. The natural law, under which Adam was created, was, as we have seen, a covenant-law, and was sufficient to have secured him eternal life, in virtue of the implied promise of Jehovah. Why, then, was he put under a positive law relating to "the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil?" Was it, that his obedience might be more easy? This could not affect the facility of his obedience: For, being upright and holy in his nature, he could have obeyed God's law in every respect with more ease than he could have violated it. Indeed, no act of disobedience could have been committed by him, without offer-

ing resistance to the holy propensities of his nature. And admitting, what was probably the case, that the moral law could only be broken through this positive law, still we cannot see, how this could be any advantage to a perfectly holy creature, to whom obedience was more congenial than disobedience. The true reason, therefore, of this new arrangement seems to have been, that Adam might sustain a representative character, a character which he did not sustain while existing simply under the original law given him in his creation; under which law he was only personally considered, acting for himself alone. And had no other arrangement been effected in relation to him, all his children would have been immediately and personally placed under the same law as a covenant-law, the moment they were brought into existence, and would have stood or fallen, according to their respective personal conduct. Moreover, when we consider, that Adam, when created, could have had no consciousness of standing as a representative of others, we see a very glorious propriety in God's entering into a *positive arrangement* with him relative to that matter. And that he might be constituted the representative, or moral head of his posterity, as he was created their natural head, seems obviously to have been

the principal design of that *positive establishment*, relative to “the tree in the midst of the garden,” and which is commonly called THE COVENANT OF WORKS. But we do not rest the argument upon mere *presumptive* proof. The following considerations, if duly weighed, must by every unbiassed mind, be regarded as *proofs positive* upon this interesting subject.

SEC. 3.—*The Representative Character of Adam Proved from Romans, v. 12.*

The word of God represents all mankind as having *sinned in Adam*. (Rom. v. 12.) The last clause of this verse, as we have already seen, may with the utmost propriety, be translated, IN WHOM ALL HAVE SINNED. According, however, to the common translation, the same idea is implied, as the scope of the Apostle abundantly shows. And, indeed, there is nothing stronger in the expression, “in whom, (Adam,) all have sinned,” than in the expression, used in the 19th verse, “by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners.” If many were *made* or *constituted sinners* by the disobedience of Adam, does it not follow, that they sinned *in him*? And it is impossible to conceive, how mankind, being as yet unborn, could have sinned *in him*, or been *constituted sinners* by his diso-

bedience, had he not sustained the character of their representative and acted for them. An attempt, however, is made to evade this argument. And how? Simply by denying, that the Apostle intends *all mankind*, when he asserts, that “death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned.” It is said, *adults* only are intended; and the reason why they die, is because they *sin actually*! But the word, which the Apostle uses, denotes *human beings* without any respect of *age* or *sex*. And if *all* human beings are not intended, the Apostle’s declaration sinks into tameness, to say nothing worse. WHEREFORE, AS BY ONE MAN SIN ENTERED INTO THE WORLD, AND DEATH BY SIN, EVEN SO DEATH PASSED UPON ALL ADULTS, FOR THAT ALL ADULTS HAVE SINNED ACTUALLY! What a mighty Apostolical conclusion! But why lay it down as a *basis*, that sin and death entered into the world by one man, if he only intended to build upon it the fact, that *actual sinners die*? Could not *their death* be accounted for without referring to the *sin* of Adam? And why are infants excluded from the Apostle’s “all men” that die? Do not they die? Then, why not let the Apostle account for *their* death, as well as for that of adults? He does account for their death, for the death of all, as the context abundantly proves, and that by declaring,

that they “all have sinned.” And since a very large portion of human beings that die, are incapable of actual sinning, they must have sinned “in Adam;” which could only have been, by virtue of his representation of them in the Covenant of Works.

SEC. 4.—*The Same Proved from 1. Cor. xv. 22.*

Inspiration declares, that “In Adam all die.” (1. Cor. xv. 22.) Now, even admitting, that it is a temporal dying only, that is here spoken of, this is sufficient to answer our purpose. For in what sense can all men be said to “die in Adam;” in a person, who lived and died before they were called into existence, unless that he represented them at the time, when death was first incurred by transgression? Nor can this conclusion be evaded, by saying, that the Apostle only means, that as Adam became mortal by transgression, so he propagated a mortal nature to all his offspring. Because the Apostle is not speaking of Adam as a *natural*, but as a *moral* head. He ascribes to him the same kind of headship, that he does to our Lord Jesus Christ. When he assures us in the same place, in regard to the resurrection of the just, that “they shall all be made alive in Christ,” most certainly, he is not to be understood as represent-

ing the Saviour to be their *natural*, but their *moral* head. Believers "shall all be made alive in Christ; that is, in virtue of their union to him, and on the ground of some *meritorious* act performed by him, as their moral Head or Representative. And this, we are assured, bears the most exact and striking similarity to the undeniable fact, that "in Adam all die," in virtue of their union to him, and on the ground of some *sinful* act performed by him, as their representative. The nature of the headship in both cases is the same; and if viewed otherwise, the aptness of the Apostle's comparison ceases to be obvious. If then Adam propagated a mortal nature to all his offspring, this, we contend, arose from the fact of his having represented them in that covenant, whose threatening was death—"In the day, thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die;" or as Eve expresses it, "Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die." It must be granted, that if Adam, prior to the fall, possessed immortality of body, as well as of soul, that immortality was not absolute but conditional. Its continuance depended on his continued obedience. Disobedience to the will of his Creator would render him mortal; in that case, he would "surely die." Disobey he did; and accordingly he forfeited his

immortality and became *deservedly* mortal. And hence, his offspring are also mortal in the same sense. Their mortality does not *necessarily* take place from the fact, that they are the descendants of a mortal. It is not absolute. Enoch and Elijah were *translated*. The last generation of Adam will not properly die. "We shall not all sleep." When, therefore we are told, that "in Adam all die," the meaning is not, that all do absolutely and necessarily die, but, that "in him" all became *obnoxious* to death, or *deserving* of death. And surely this involves his representative character. For, death, is in its own nature, a punishment; and a punishment presupposes guilt—hence, if "all die in Adam," it is because they are regarded as having incurred death "in him;" which could only be on the ground of his having acted as their representative, when, by him, sin and death entered into the world. This argument is conclusive with all those, who believe with the Apostle, that "death is the WAGES of sin."*

SEC. 5.—*The Same Proved from the Special Notice which the Apostle takes of the "One Offense."*

That Adam was a representative in the covenant, is evident from the special notice, that is

* See Chap. iii. Secs. 6 and 8.

taken of his "one offense." This *one offense* of Adam, the Apostle repeats again and again, in the passage before explained. Now why this particularity? Why insist so much upon that ONE OFFENSE? Why not attribute the evils, of which he speaks, to the offenses of Adam in general? Or, why not rather attribute them to the offenses of our more immediate parents? Surely our natural connection with them is more immediate than with Adam? The reason is obvious. When Adam committed the "one offense," to which the Apostle alludes, he sustained the peculiar character of a federal representative. But as soon as that offense was committed, he lost that peculiar character, and went back to the private station which he occupied under the natural law. And hence we have no concern in any of his other offenses any more than we have in the offenses of Noah, or any other individual in the line of our ancestry. If Adam, then, was not our representative, at the time he ate the forbidden fruit, what can the Apostle possibly mean, by speaking so emphatically of that *one offense*, and bringing all mankind under its baleful influence?

SEC. 6.—*The same proved from a Consideration of the Representative Character of Jesus Christ.*

Adam was a representative head, otherwise he could not be called “the figure,” or type of our Lord Jesus Christ, (Rom. v. 14.) But do the scriptures attribute to Christ a representative or federal headship? Unless this can be shown, the present argument falls to the ground. The matter, however, is susceptible of the clearest proof. That a covenant was formed, in eternity, between the Father and the Son, relative to the salvation of fallen and guilty man, is evident. For, Jehovah, the Father, expressly declares,† “I have made a covenant with my chosen; I have sworn unto David my servant.” (Ps. lxxxix. 3.) Jesus Christ is here principally intended; for he is elsewhere called the Father’s servant, and his elect, or chosen one: “Behold, my servant, whom I uphold; mine elect, in whom my soul delighteth.” (Isa. xlii. 1.) And he is also called David: “They shall serve the Lord their God, and DAVID their king, whom I will raise up unto them.” (Jer. xxx. 9.) And again: “I will set up one shepherd over them, and he shall feed them, even my servant DAVID,” &c. (Ezek. xxxiv. 23.) Indeed Christ himself is expressly called a *covenant*; implying that both he

and all the blessings of his purchase come to be enjoyed by believers, in virtue of a covenant, of which he is the HEAD. "I will give thee for a COVENANT of the people, for a light of the Gentiles, to open blind eyes," &c. (Isa. xlii. 6.) Do we not also read of "an everlasting covenant;" and of "the blood of the everlasting covenant;" and of "Jesus the Mediator of the new covenant?" These expressions are calculated to mislead us, if they do not point to a covenant of grace, established, before time, with our Lord Jesus Christ. Besides, we have the express terms of this covenant mentioned in the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. "When [IF] thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand. He shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied. THEREFORE will I divide him a portion with the great, [the great for a portion] and he shall divide the spoil with the strong, [the strong for a spoil] BECAUSE he hath poured out his soul unto death," &c. And corresponding to this, the Apostle Paul, when speaking of Christ's having "humbled himself, and become obedient unto death, even the death of the cross," adds, "WHEREFORE also God hath highly exalted him, and given him a name, that is above every name." This exaltation took

place upon the performance of a condition, and as the result of a promise, and, therefore, incontrovertibly proves the existence of a covenant between Christ and his Father. And, indeed, the whole tenor of the gospel proves the same thing. But it is not so much the reality of this covenant, that we are now inquiring after, as the evidence of Christ's representative character in this covenant. And that he sustained this character, and still sustains it, is evident: Because,

1. A certain number of our fallen race is spoken of, as having been given to him, to be redeemed and saved. "All that the Father hath GIVEN me shall come unto me." "Thou hast given him power over all flesh, that he might give eternal life to as many as thou hast GIVEN him." "And I looked, and lo, a Lamb stood on the Mount Zion, and with him an hundred and forty and four thousand, having his Father's name written in their foreheads. These were REDEEMED FROM AMONG MEN, being the first fruits unto God and the Lamb." "Thou shalt call his name Jesus; for he shall SAVE HIS PEOPLE from their sins."

2. Christ speaks as acting in the name and room of these. "I lay down my life for the sheep." "I pray for them." "For their sakes I sanctify myself," &c. And corresponding to this, the Apostle

maintains, that "Christ loved the church and gave himself for it ; that he might sanctify and cleanse it," &c.

3. Christ's people are represented as being his *seed* and the *travail* of his soul. "He shall see his seed." "He shall see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied."

4. It is difficult to conceive, how Jesus Christ, "the holy one of God," should be made under a broken law, and have obedience and sufferings exacted of him, if he were not really sustaining and truly acting in the character of a public head and representative of others.

5. He is expressly called a *surety*. "By so much was Jesus made a surety of a better testament," or covenant. A surety is one who undertakes the payment of another's debts. In law-reckoning, the surety and the debtor are viewed as one person. If the surety pay the debt, the law discharges the debtor, the same as if he himself had paid it. Now our blessed Lord has acted the part of a surety towards his people ; he has paid all the debts which they owed to law and justice ; and hence they become legally discharged. From this Christ's representative character is easily inferred.

6. We find him called by the same name by

which his people are denominated. Thus, he is called ISRAEL : But in what other sense, than that he is the representative of the whole Israel of God ? Hence, we have his language, as originally applied to his own individual case, so interpreted by an inspired Apostle as to refer to all the elect. Thus says Christ, “He is near that justifieth ME,—who is he that shall condemn ME? (Isa. l. 8, 9.) But says the Apostle, with his eye on these words, “Who shall lay any thing to the charge of God’s ELECT? It is God that justifieth. Who is he that condemneth?” &c. (Rom. viii. 33, 34.) And it may be here added, that not only is Christ called by the name of his church, but they are also called by his name. “For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body ; so also is Christ. (1 Cor. xii. 12.) But how can the Church be called *Christ*, unless he be their representing head? But not to multiply arguments on this point, we will only add,

7. That Christ’s resurrection is plainly spoken of, as being that of a representative. In his resurrection he appeared as “the first fruits of them that slept.” (1 Cor. xv. 20, 23.) Under the law, “the first fruits” were offered to the Lord as a representation of the whole fruits of the coming har-

vest ; and their consecration to the Lord was accepted and regarded as a consecration of the whole harvest. Christ's resurrection, therefore, was of a representative nature, and secured the actual resurrection of all his followers. But if Christ represented his people in his resurrection, he must also have represented them in his death, nay, in the whole of his mediatory undertaking and work.

Having thus proved Christ to be the federal representative of his chosen people, we can appreciate the force of the Apostle's words, when he asserts, that Adam was "the figure of him that was to come." All the types of Christ, spoken of in scripture, manifestly refer to his character and work as Mediator. Now, how could Adam have been a type of the Mediator, except by reason of his sustaining a representative character? Adam is nowhere called, either a prophet, priest or king. He is not called a Mediator, as Moses was ; he is not celebrated for destroying the enemies of the church, like Sampson ; he was never in a whale's belly, as Jonah was. How then was he a type of Christ? View him as the representative of all his natural seed, as Christ is of his spiritual seed, and his typical character becomes apparent, the phrase under consideration freed from an unmeaning obscurity, that must otherwise cover it, and the Apos-

tle's argument, in that place, triumphantly sustained.

SEC. 7.—*The same proved from the comparison, drawn in Scripture, between Adam and Christ.*

Adam's representative character is proved from the comparison which the scriptures draw between him and our Lord Jesus Christ. This comparison is very particularly stated in the following words of the Apostle—"If through the offence of ONE many be dead; much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by ONE MAN, JESUS CHRIST, hath abounded unto many. If by ONE MAN'S offense death reigned by one; much more they which receive abundance of grace, and of the gift of righteousness, shall reign in life, by ONE, JESUS CHRIST. Therefore, as by the offense of ONE, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of ONE, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by ONE MAN'S disobedience many were made sinners; so by the obedience of ONE shall many be made righteous." What a striking contrast is here drawn between the effects resulting from the acts of these two characters! These surely must have been *public* or *representative* acts; for they involve the condition of millions. Here

are sin, condemnation and death resulting from the "one offence" of the ONE; and righteousness, justification and life resulting from the "obedience" or "righteousness" of the OTHER! The Apostle also introduces this same comparison, in writing to the church at Corinth—"As in ADAM all die, even so in CHRIST shall all be made alive." (1 Cor. xv. 22.) And afterwards, "The FIRST MAN ADAM was made a living soul, the LAST ADAM was made a quickening spirit—The FIRST MAN is of the earth, earthly; the SECOND MAN is the Lord from heaven." (Verses 45, 47.) Now, if Adam did not sustain a representative character, how is the Apostle, here, to be understood, in calling Jesus Christ "the second man," and "the last Adam?" In what sense is Christ the *second* to Adam, unless it be in respect of his sustaining a representative headship? And in what sense is he the "last Adam," unless it be that he possesses some distinguishing characteristic, which gives him a resemblance to the "first Adam," and which never will be found in any other? And what else can this characteristic be, than representative headship? Besides, these two personages are here presented to us, as each having a numerous body, or class of individuals, resembling himself. "As is the EARTHY, (Adam,) such are they also that are

EARTHLY ; and as is the HEAVENLY, (Christ,) such are they also that are HEAVENLY." (v. 48.) From the scope of the Apostle, these words, in their signification, are certainly to be considered as parallel to, and illustrative of those contained in v. 22—"As in Adam all die ; even so in Christ shall all be made alive." And hence, unless Adam and Christ be viewed as representatives of others, it is difficult to conceive the reason why they should be singled out, in the manner that is here done, and the condition of all mankind be inseparably coupled with them, either for good or for evil. We think, therefore, that the conclusion is unavoidable—when the comparison, instituted in scripture, between Adam and Christ, is duly considered, and when it is also remembered, that Christ is, as was before proved, the representative of the election of grace—that Adam in the covenant of works did really sustain the character of a representing head to all his natural offspring.

SEC. 8.—*The same proved from a consideration of the moral condition of infants.*

The same truth is proved from a consideration of the moral condition of infants. The scriptures most unequivocally teach, that infants are subjects of law, and consequently possess a moral

character. Their being called *children*, identifies them as *human beings*. Indeed, they must be human beings from the moment they possess *humanity*, or *human nature*, in its two great constituent principles of body and soul. Now, to say, as do our modern Pelagians, that these human beings are not subjects of law, or do not possess a moral character, is to classify them with the brute creation, and consequently to make such of them as die in infancy, share the portion of "the beasts which perish." For certainly, on their principles, such could not be received into heaven, unless we absurdly suppose, that there are beings admitted to the glory of the upper world, who are not subjects of law, and whose reception there was not in accordance with any judicial sentence founded on law! But that infants, from the earliest period of their existence as human beings, are subjects of law, may be inferred from what is said respecting our Lord in his *incarnation*—"God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law." (Gal. iv. 4.) No sooner was he possessed of humanity, than he was under law: for, in his being *made of a woman*, he was *MADE under the law*. It is true, he was not made under the law for himself, but as the surety of others; nevertheless, his case obviously teaches, that every person posses-

ing *humanity*, must be under the law; and since infants cannot be supposed to stand surety for others, they are *made under the law* for themselves.

The rite of circumcision, as administered to infants under the former economy, recognized them as possessing a moral character: they were to be circumcised on the eighth day after their birth. Now, had they not been subjects of law, how could they have been the proper subjects of circumcision, which, according to the Apostle, was *a seal of the righteousness of faith*? And the ordinance of baptism, under the present dispensation, teaches the same thing: for if infants are not subjects of law, why baptize them?

Besides, the scriptures represent infants, as being capable of sustaining an *ecclesiastical* relation. The Abrahamic covenant in particular, proves this. The Lord said to Abraham, "I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee, in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee and thy seed after thee." And immediately upon the revelation of this promise, circumcision was appointed as "a token of the covenant." "He that is eight days old, shall be circumcised among you, every man-child in your generations." v. 12. Here, then, we have infants recognized as bearing an ecclesias-

tical relation, and as having a claim to an ecclesiastical ordinance, called “a token of the covenant,” “a seal of the righteousness of faith.” And this relation is still retained by the infant seed of believers. For says Peter, with his eye upon the forecited passage, “the promise is unto you and to your children.” Acts ii. 39. And Paul declares to the Corinthians, that “the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the believing wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the believing husband; else were your children UNCLEAN; but now are they HOLY.” 1 Cor. vii. 14. This text proves, that the matrimonial union is so far sanctified by the *faith* of one of the parties, that the offspring of that union sustains an ecclesiastical relation: indeed, the ingenuity of man cannot give to it any other rational interpretation. In like manner, also, our saviour took up infants* in his arms and *blessed* them, which shows that he regarded them as possessing a moral character; and in saying, “of such is the kingdom of God,” he declared that they were capable subjects of an ecclesiastical relation—that they were proper subjects of the kingdom of grace here, and of glory hereafter. But if

* τα βρέφη, sucking children. Luke xviii. 15.
Mark x. 16.

infants are capable of sustaining an ecclesiastical relation, it inevitably follows, that they are subjects of law—that they possess a moral character.

Having thus proved that infants are subjects of law, let us, for a moment, enquire after their true *moral condition*. And a little reflection most convince all, that, as born into the world, they are to be regarded as *sinner*s under the *curse* of a broken law. It will not be denied, we trust, that some of the infant seed of Adam are received into heaven. The fact of their being embraced in the promise, recognized as sustaining an ecclesiastical relation, and made subjects of church-privileges, most decidedly establishes this. Besides, our Saviour distinctly says, “suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid them not ; for of such is the kingdom of God.” But in what way, or through what channel are they received into heaven ? Unquestionably through the channel of the covenant of grace, and in virtue of the merits of our Lord Jesus Christ. For we have seen, that the covenant of grace, of which Christ is the surety, embraces such in its promise ; and that such have an ecclesiastical relation, or constitute a part of the church. They are, therefore, saved by the merits of Christ : For we read, that “ Christ loved the church, and gave himself for it ; that he might sanctify and

cleanse it with the washing of water by the word ; that he might present it to himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing ; but that it should be holy, and without blame before him in love." Eph. v. 25, 27.*

* The above considerations, it is presumed, sufficiently show how utterly groundless is the position, *slyly* advanced in the following interrogatories :

" What if those of the human race who die in very early infancy, never truly and properly come under the moral government of God in this world ? In respect to many of our race, who do come under the moral government of God in the present life, its rich provisions of grace and mercy, through their perversion, only become the occasion of augmenting their guilt and endless ruin. What then, if God, to avert these evils from one class of the human race, before they become accountable subjects of his moral government in this world, translates them to another, that they may never partake in the pollution of sin, but wake up there in the beauty of holiness ?"—*Christian Spectator*, vol. v., p. 324.

Children were embraced in the Abrahamic covenant, which was a revelation of the covenant of grace : children, both under the former and the present economy, have sustained an ecclesiastical relation ; children, therefore, *are* " under the moral government of God in this world." Moreover, such of the infant seed of believers, as die in infancy and are received into heaven, must be indebted for their happiness, to the merits of the Saviour : otherwise, Christ did not give himself for the *whole* church that he might sanctify and cleanse it—a suggestion most palpably at variance with the express declaration of God's word. It would seem, that the divines of the New-Haven school are determined to set every thing in theology at *loose ends*. Hence their method of starting new theories in the way of *interrogation*, and afterwards changing them from the *interrogatory* to the *assertive* form,

Hence, since there are infants that belong to “the church of the first-born, whose names are written in heaven,” it follows, that they have been purchased by the vicarious sacrifice of the Son of God, and consequently must be viewed, in respect of their antecedent moral condition, as guilty and defiled sinners, yea, as being “by nature children of wrath.” Indeed, it is most obvious, that there are none received into heaven from our world, save such as have been *redeemed* by the blood of Christ.

The hundred and forty and four thousand, whom John saw standing with the Lamb on Mount Zion, were “redeemed from among men.” Besides, if glo-

when they find the community sufficiently prepared to receive them. This has been the manner of heretics in all ages.—In striking out a new way for the reception of infants into heaven, why did not these very *acute* divines make it broad enough for the whole brute creation? On their principles there would be no difficulty in placing in heaven all the *reptiles* that infest our globe. True, they are not “under the moral government of God in this world”—true, they are neither *holy* nor *unholy*, just like infants! but, notwithstanding all this, “*what* if God translates them to heaven, that they may wake up there in the beauty of holiness?” Besides with these divines, death must possess some very potent charm, since it can metamorphose a being, that has no moral character, into one possessing a moral character—can place a being “under the moral government of God,” that was never before under a moral government—and can, *in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye*, cause a being that was neither *holy* nor *unholy* to wake up in heaven in the beauty of holiness!”

rified infants, were not redeemed, they could not unite in singing the song of redeeming love, (Rev. i. 5.) Now all the redeemed were, prior to their redemption, under the curse of the law, that is, under a broken law, and subjected to its curse, or penalty. "When the fullness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to REDEEM them that were under the law." (Gal. iv. 5, 6.) "Christ hath REDEEMED us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us." (Chap. iii. 13.) Redeemed infants are, therefore, to be viewed as being originally under the curse of a broken law. Such truly is their moral condition by nature. But how came they into that deplorable condition, a condition which rendered necessary a *redemption*, before they could be happy with God? They were not brought into it in consequence of their own sinful conduct; for they are incapable of sinning. It must, therefore, have been the conduct of some other that subjected them to the curse. And what other, but Adam? Do the scriptures point out to us any other? And if Adam, by transgression, brought all his infant seed under the curse of that law which he violated, it necessarily follows, that he acted in the character of their representative. The conclusion is inevitable.

Thus, then, we have proved, that by a federal arrangement, Adam was constituted the representative of the human race. And thus, also, we have paved the way for proving, what many either ignorantly or wilfully deny, the imputation of Adam's first sin to his posterity.

CHAPTER V.

IMPUTATION DEFINED, AND THE POINT IN
DEBATE PRESENTED.

That the judge of all the earth would do right, was the firm conviction of Abraham, in relation to the threatened destruction of Sodom. Indeed, injustice is infinitely far from having a place in the character of the Holy One of Israel. "He is a God of truth, without iniquity ; just and right is he." No thought, therefore, that would militate against the most perfect justice of God, should ever be entertained for a moment. Every such thought should be banished from the mind with abhorrence and indignation. He, with an infinite knowledge of his own character, says, "I, the Lord, am a just God." And to this declaration every intelligent mind must respond, in the language of the Psalmist, "Justice and judgment are the habitation of thy throne." Accordingly, in maintaining the "imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity," we also maintain, that this imputation is an act of justice on the part of the divine government. For, Jehovah's justice, in this matter, we hold to be clearly vindicated on the ground of the federal representative character, which Adam sustained at the time when the sin, which is de-

clared to be imputed to us, was committed by him. That Adam did really sustain such a character, we have abundantly proved. And now, according to the plan previously proposed, we proceed to prove the imputation of his breach of covenant to his offspring—his representees. A few explanatory remarks, however, must first be made, with the view of presenting the precise point in discussion.

IMPUTATION, according to scriptural usage, denotes a charging, or setting over of something to one's account in a judicial manner—it is simply a *judicial reckoning*, having either sin or righteousness for its subject, and a moral being for its object. Thus, when God is said “to impute sin” to a person, the meaning is, that, as a Judge, he reckons or accounts that person to be a sinner, and consequently a fit subject of punishment, on account of the sin or sins thus reckoned to him, or placed to his charge. Hence the non-imputation of sin, is equivalent to the pardoning of sin, or the holding of a person guiltless. “Blessed is the man unto whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity.” (Ps. xxxii. 2.) Again, when God is said to impute righteousness to a person, (as in Rom. iv. 11.) the meaning is, that he judicially reckons or accounts that person to be righteous and entitled to his fa-

vor, in consequence of the righteousness thus reckoned or set over to his account.

Sometimes "to impute," in scripture, is to charge to the account of persons that which is properly and personally their own, with a view to their injury or benefit, according to the nature of the thing imputed. Thus Shimei said to David, "Let not my Lord impute iniquity unto me, for thy servant doth know that I have sinned." And thus, also, the good deed of Phinehas, in executing justice upon Zimri and Cosbi, "was counted," or imputed, "to him for righteousness unto all generations." But according to the more ordinary and theological use of the term, it denotes God's judicial act in charging to the account of persons that, which is not properly and personally their own, antecedently to such act of imputation. Thus Adam's eating of the forbidden fruit was not the proper, personal act of his descendants, yet the *sin* of that act, as we will endeavor to prove, is imputed to each of them. Neither are those acts of obedience and suffering, which constitute the righteousness of Jesus Christ, the proper, personal acts of believers, yet the scriptures manifestly teach, that they have that righteousness imputed to them, or placed over to their account; and that God deals with them in the same manner as if they had wrought it out

personally by themselves. And when the sins of the church are said to be imputed to Christ, so that "he was made sin for us," it is never imagined that these became really his personal sins, but only, that they became his in law-reckoning, in such a manner as that he was treated as a sinner, having voluntarily assumed those sins with a view to their expiation.

But when God imputes to a person that which is not properly and personally his own, it must not be supposed that he acts arbitrarily in the matter; as if the thing imputed were, in *no sense*, the person's antecedently to the act of imputation. Such procedure would seem to savor of injustice. No imputation of this kind, we believe, ever takes place in the administration of Jehovah's righteous government. The thing imputed, although *not actually*, is nevertheless *virtually*, the person's, before the imputation of it takes place. And there are two ways in which sin may become virtually and legally a person's before imputation, although he had no personal agency in the commission of it; viz: by *suretiship*, and by *representation*. The sins of elect sinners were imputed to the Mediator in virtue of his undertaken *suretiship*; that is, having assumed them by a voluntary sponsion, they became virtually his, and were ac-

cordingly charged to his account, and he was held obligated to endure their punishment. Corresponding to this, Paul, presenting himself as the surety of Onesimus, says to Philemon, "If he hath wronged thee, or oweth thee ought, put that on mine account," or impute it to me. But in relation to the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, that imputation takes place, not in virtue of suretiship, (for his posterity never stood surety for him,) but in virtue of *representation*. When he, as a representative sinned, all his representees virtually sinned in him. In consequence of this legal connection between him and them, his sin was legally their sin; and it is charged to their account, not merely as the sin of *another*, but as the sin of their *own representative*, and in this respect, virtually theirs; and as such, it is *imputed*, or judicially reckoned to them. In the same manner also, does the righteousness of Christ come to be imputed to believers. When he wrought out that righteousness, he was acting in the character of a representative; it was, therefore, virtually and legally their righteousness as soon as it was completed. It is not theirs, however, actually, and so as to enjoy justification before God on the ground of it, until God imputes it to them for this purpose, in the day of their union to Christ by faith.

It may, moreover, be proper to remark, that Christ's righteousness is ours, even more than is the sin of Adam, prior to its imputation. For in addition to representation, *faith* also gives us an interest in Emmanuel's righteousness. It appropriates, or takes into possession that righteousness, on the ground of the free grant made of it to sinners in the Gospel. And then God imputes it to the believer, sets it down to his account, (the moment he thus appropriates it by faith,) not indeed as the righteousness of another, with whom he has no connection, but as the righteousness of his representative, and now taken into his possession by an appropriating act of faith; and accordingly, he forthwith issues the sentence of his justification. "Abraham believed God, and it was counted (imputed) to him for righteousness." Rom. iv. 3—6. 9. 11. 22—24.

In our present discussion, then, the point to be maintained is, that the sin of Adam is imputed, or judicially charged to the account of all his posterity, not as being their own personal sin, but as being the sin of their legal representative, and moral head, and in this sense, their sin; they being federally united with him, at the time it was committed.

And that this point may be fairly presented, and

the subject properly guarded, we would farther remark, that it is only the *first* sin of Adam; and not any of his other sins, for the imputation of which to his posterity we contend; as his representative character ceased with the perpetration of his first offense—the covenant being then broken, the federal relation, which had been constituted between him and his children, was for ever dissolved.

It may also be noticed here, that the distinction, which some make, when treating of this subject, between the *guilt* and *ill-desert* of Adam's sin, is unwarrantable; and then to maintain the imputation of the former, and not of the latter, is unscriptural and absurd. If the term *guilt* be properly defined, if it be understood in the sense, in which it is unquestionably used in the Westminster Confession of faith and Catechisms, then we are satisfied with the declaration, that “the *guilt* of Adam's first sin is imputed to his posterity.” But to define “guilt,” as only denoting a mere *liability* or *exposure*, or even *obligation to punishment*, is not only to pervert the meaning of that term, as used by the old divines, but also to pervert and corrupt the doctrine of original sin, as taught in the Scriptures, and set forth in all the Confessions of the Reformed churches. The term guilt has always, until lately, been understood to

signify “obligation to punishment *arising out of sin,*” or, *that* in sin which obligates to punishment; and what can that be but *ill-desert*? The Reformers distinguished “guilt” into *potential* and *actual*. By the former they intended the “intrinsic demerit of sin,” that which is *damnable* in sin, and which can never be separated from sin: By the latter they intended “a judicial ordination to punishment,” and which may be separated from sin; a thing that happens in the case of all those who are justified: For, although sin still remains in them, their actual guilt is removed, so that there will be no condemnation to them for ever. Now, it is evident, that when the old divines spoke of the *guilt* of Adam’s sin being imputed to his posterity, they meant guilt in both of these acceptations, viz: the real demerit of Adam’s sin, together with actual obligation to punishment, on account of that demerit: Because, their usual mode of speaking on the subject was, that Adam’s *disobedience*, his *sin*, his *transgression*, his *offense*, the *blame of his act*, &c., was imputed to his descendants. And that the term “guilt,” is used in this extensive sense in our Confession of faith and Catechisms, appears from this, that all mankind are there said to have *sinned in Adam*, and to have *fallen with him in his first transgression*. Besides,

how absurd is it, yea, how unjust is it, to represent God as laying men under obligation to suffer punishment, without, at the same time, charging them with any blame-worthiness, ill-desert, or demerit! Mr. Fisher, in his Catechism, very properly remarks, that “there can be no condemnation, passed by a righteous judge, where there is no crime.” Accordingly, while we deny that the personal act of Adam, in eating the forbidden fruit, is imputed to his posterity, we, at the same time, maintain that the *sin* of that act, its *demerit*, its *guilt*, both *potential* and *actual*, is imputed to every soul of them; which imputation was virtually made when our first parents transgressed the covenant of God, and is actually made, the moment they are successively brought into existence.

Having made these preliminary statements, we will now proceed to advance the contemplated arguments, which go to prove *the imputation of Adam's first sin to his posterity.*

CHAPTER VI.

THE IMPUTATION OF ADAM'S FIRST SIN TO
HIS POSTERITY PROVED.

SEC. 1.—*The Doctrine Proved from the Fact of Adam's Sustaining a Representative Character at the Time he Sinned.*

That Adam's first sin is imputed to his posterity is proved from the fact of his sustaining a representative character, when that sin was committed. This fact has been sufficiently proved.* A denial of it must betray a reckless disregard of the truth. Why, then, did God invest Adam with such a character? Why did he establish a covenant with him in that character? The whole of that solemn transaction must, indeed, have been a piece of divine mockery, if "the Lord God" did not intend that all Adam's posterity should be implicated in his conduct. Did the representative sin? and shall the representees be held innocent? If God do not impute the sin of the representative to those whom he represented, he must disregard an arrangement of his own making, he must turn his back upon a constitution of his own settling. Justice, therefore, to his own character, respect to his own institution, and faithfulness to

* See Chap. iv.

his own word, all demand of him the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity. Had Adam performed the stipulated condition, even the enemies of this doctrine would, no doubt, consider it right and proper to have his obedience imputed to all those in whose name he acted. And is it not equally just and proper in God, since he failed in performing that condition, to charge them all with his disobedience? Indeed, for God not to impute Adam's sin to his posterity, would be to overturn all that he did in constituting him their federal representative. Were not the conduct of the representative charged to the account of the represented, his representation would have been no representation! The truth of our doctrine, therefore, is clearly established, from the fact of Adam's representative character.

SEC. 2.—*From the Apostle's Declaration. Rom.*
v. 19.

That Adam's first sin is imputed to his posterity the Apostle proves, when he declares, that "By one man's disobedience many were made sinners." Rom. v. 19. The context sufficiently shows that the word "many," in that place, denotes the whole posterity of Adam, as was formerly stated. Now, it is not said that they became sinners by

the actual commission of sin, nor by the imitation of Adam's sinful conduct, but that they "WERE MADE SINNERS by one man's disobedience." They are represented as being *passive* in this matter. They *were constituted sinners*, or *set down as sinners*. It is not said, that *they made themselves sinners*. The Apostle obviously intends that it was God, the righteous Judge, who made or constituted them sinners. But God makes none sinners, in any other way, than by *imputing*, or judicially reckoning sin to them. And the sin imputed, in the case specified, is expressly called "the one man's disobedience." Thus it is plain, that God has constituted all men sinners, has placed them under that denomination, by having charged to their account "the disobedience of one man." And this conclusion, which is so manifest from the Apostle's language, cannot be avoided by saying, as some do, that all that is here meant is, that "God treats men *as if* they were sinners on account of Adam's sin, in subjecting them to temporal death." Because, God is a God of justice, and he never treats any as sinners, unless they really be so in the eye of the divine law. And if we say that "God treats men *as* sinners on account of Adam's sin," a respect to the justice and holiness of God, should also lead us to say, that

his sin must first be imputed to them, or legally charged to their account. If we overlook this divine imputation, we run ourselves into inextricable difficulties; we dishonor the character of God; we injure the truth of his holy word.

What a perversion of the Apostle's language is it, to maintain as others do, that all he intends by this declaration is, that "men became actual sinners in consequence of Adam's disobedience!" To elicit such a meaning, two important changes must be made in the Apostle's words; the word "by," must be changed into "in consequence of," and the words "were made sinners," into "made themselves sinners;" changes, which the structure of the Apostle's language utterly refuses. Nor is this all, the next clause would also need to be changed, and read, "so in consequence of the obedience of one shall many make themselves actually righteous!" a sentiment at variance with the whole tenor of the Gospel. This latter clause, however, in which the Apostle *does* say, "so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous," obviously confirms the view we have taken of the former. For is it possible to conceive of any other way in which sinners can be *constituted righteous by Christ's obedience*, except that obedience be imputed to them, or placed over to their

account? Without such an imputation, what influence can his obedience have in changing a sinner's state before God? Without such an imputation, how can his obedience become the sinner's righteousness, in such a manner as to obtain for him, in law, a sentence of justification on the ground of it? Now, the Apostle asserts, that in precisely the same manner in which we are made righteous by Christ's obedience, we were made sinners by Adam's disobedience. His declaration, then, that "by one man's disobedience many were made sinners," most assuredly contains the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity.

SEC. 3.—*From the Condemnation of all Men on Account of Adam's Sin.*

"The judgment was by one [offense] to condemnation.—By the offense of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation." Rom. v. 16. 18. Here, on the ground of Adam's first offense, all men are represented as being judicially condemned to endure the penalty of the divine law. No other reasonable construction can be put on these words. In our former explication of them, we proved that this was necessarily their meaning. Here, then, we are taught, that Jehovah, the righteous Judge,

gives "judgment" against all men; that this judgment involves their "condemnation;" and that all this is grounded upon the single "offense of the one man." Now, who is so blind as not to discover, in this divine procedure, the imputation of Adam's offense to all his seed? Does not this "judgment to condemnation," proceed on the assumption of legal guilt? Would God condemn the guiltless? If then he condemns men on account of Adam's offense, as the Apostle asserts, must he not have viewed them as charged with that offense? But as they never *personally* committed that offense, how can he condemn them as being charged with it, unless it had been *imputed*, or judicially reckoned to them? God's act of condemnation, in this case, most certainly supposes a previous act of imputation. He does not condemn, and then impute, but first imputes, and then condemns. Hence it is utterly inconceivable, how we can maintain with the Apostle, that "by the offense of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation," and yet deny the imputation of that offense to his posterity.

The fact, that the sentence of condemnation spoken of, is not fully executed upon *all*, argues nothing against the fact of *all* having been laid under it, in the first instance. A criminal may be

condemned to the gallows, and yet, before the execution of the sentence, obtain a pardon. God reverses this sentence of condemnation in the case of believers, by pronouncing in their favor a sentence of justification. The righteousness of Christ, being imputed to them, entirely cancels the legal guilt, not only of Adam's offense, which had been committed in their name, and charged to their account, but also of all their own personal offenses. Condemnation, therefore, universally precedes justification. And justice requires that condemnation, in all cases, should be preceded by a guilty cause; which guilty cause is expressly called, in the passage referred to, the "one offense" of "the one man." *It*, therefore, must be regarded as being imputed to as many as have been laid under "the judgment of condemnation," that is to "all men." And the argument is strengthened, when it is considered, that among the "all men" designated, *infants* are included, who are chargeable with no personal offenses of their own, having never sinned "after the similitude of Adam's transgression."

CHAPTER VII.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

SEC. 1.—*The Doctrine Proved from the Universal loss of the Image of God.*

Adam's posterity being deprived of that image of God, in which he was created, proves the imputation of his sin to them. Moses informs us, that "God created man in his own image." The moral image of God, according to the Apostle Paul, consists in "knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness." He says to the Colossians, "ye have put on the new man, which is renewed in KNOWLEDGE, after the image of him that created him," chap. iii. 10; and to the Ephesians, "put on the new man, which after God is created in RIGHTEOUSNESS and TRUE HOLINESS," chap. iv. 24. Adam, accordingly, was created with knowledge in his understanding, rectitude in his will, and holiness in his affections. This was his "original righteousness." This gave him an exact conformity to the moral law, under which he was created. As he could not have been, for a single moment, without such a law, without being also, at the same time, independent of his Creator; so he was no sooner a living soul, than, as has been already remarked, this law, which was given him in his

creation, found him perfectly conformed to all its requirements. It found him not only as a creature, but as possessing all the requisites of an intelligent and upright moral agent. It found him possessing an intellectual aptitude for knowing the great object of his love and worship, and all the duties which devolved on him in the relation of a creature : It found him possessing a will characterized with perfect rectitude, "lying straight with the will of God," and powerfully inclined to choose whatever God chose, and to refuse whatever God refused : And it found him also possessing affections, which were holy, pure, undisturbed, and bent on the enjoyment of suitable objects. Thus, man, in his creation, was constituted morally upright. On his soul was engraven, "HOLINESS TO THE LORD." That image of God, of which we are speaking, gave perfection to his nature, as a rational, moral, and accountable creature. Without it, he would not have been complete, his nature would not have been adapted to answer the moral ends of his creation.

But when we speak of Adam's receiving, in his very creation, this "divine image," which, for the time being, constituted his righteousness before God, we are not to be understood as speaking of *moral acts performed by him*, but of *moral princi-*

*ples implanted in him.** We mean, that he was righteous in *principle*, before that he was righteous in *act*; or, in other words, that he possessed *righteous principles*, before he performed *righteous actions*. Many, we know, deny this, and stoutly maintain, on the contrary, that there can be no righteousness, or holiness, but what consists in *voluntary acts*. They will not admit, that such a thing as righteousness in *principle* is possible. Accordingly, they deny, that Adam was either righteous or unrighteous, holy or unholy, till once he began to exercise his will, not being till then morally different from the brute creation. Hence, also, they deny the correctness of the view which we take of the “moral image of God,” after which man was originally created, when we refer it to the principles of his moral nature, and not to the voluntary acts of his life. But their philosophy is vain and deceitful. For according to it, man *made himself in the image of God*, inasmuch as he was the author of those voluntary acts, which, we are told, must always constitute righteousness or holiness: And according to it, man, also, *made himself upright*, if his uprightness or

* By a *principle*, we understand an inherent quality or power naturally tending to its own developement:—“a constitutional propensity,”—“a cause causing.”

conformity to the moral law, in the first instance, proceeded from the exercise of his own will. This philosophy, therefore, is diametrically opposed to the plain declarations of the Spirit of Truth, that "God created man in his own image"—and that "God made man upright." If it be admitted, that Adam's first acts, as a moral agent, were holy, it ought, also, to be admitted, that they proceeded from holy principles implanted in his nature. If it be asked, Why do not trees walk and graze like cattle? Why do not cattle talk and reason like men? Why do not sheep live by catching their prey like lions? Why do not thorns bear grapes, and thistles figs? We answer, because such things are not agreeable to the inherent principles of their respective natures.

Now, did Adam, as soon as created, perform *holy* acts? Then, surely, this happened in agreeableness to the principles of his nature. Consequently he was indued with *holy* principles. The fish of the sea, the fowls of the air, the beasts of the field, and the creeping things of the earth, were all found acting out the principles of their nature; and must we make man an exception to this rule of action? Must we say, that being in possession of a nature which was neither holy nor unholy, he was found, nevertheless, performing

holy acts? The thing is perfectly absurd. The truth is, had not Adam been created *subjectively* holy, or holy in principle, he would have been incapacitated for the performance of holy actions. Had he been created neither holy nor unholy, and had he acted agreeably to his nature, his actions would have been neither holy nor unholy. The act must be a developement of the principle from which it proceeds, and partake of the same quality. Accordingly, Adam was holy in principle, before he was holy in act. And hence, his "original righteousness," or, what is the same thing, "the image of God," in which he was created, belonged to his very nature, was essential to him as a complete moral agent, and was not something acquired by his after acts. And to assert the contrary, is to destroy all just conceptions concerning the creature *man*; as if it could be predicated of him, in any individual instance, that he was neither a saint, nor a sinner, neither a righteous nor an unrighteous being, without, at the same time, annihilating him as a *man*, and turning him over into the ranks of the brute creation. Adam surely existed before he acted. But he could not have existed as a *man*, as a *moral being*, as a *subject of law*, unless it could have been predicated of him in his existence, that he was either righteous or

unrighteous. Hence, as he was not, at the first, unrighteous, but righteous, it follows, that he *existed* as righteous, before he *acted* righteously. Accordingly, righteousness was inherent in the principles of his moral constitution. And this view of the matter is evidently confirmed by the inspired declaration, that “God saw every thing that he had made, and behold it was VERY GOOD.” Every creature was indued with a nature fully answerable to the end of its creation. Man was made for moral purposes, and was, therefore, blessed with a moral nature, indued with those principles, which in their appropriate development, would necessarily result in the glorification and enjoyment of God—thus was he created *very good*.

Now, have the original principles of man’s moral nature suffered any change? or, in other words, Has the image of God been lost? That it was lost, in the case of our first parents, is evident: Because, immediately after they had transgressed the covenant, they found themselves *naked*, were seized with fear, and shunned the presence of God. “And they heard the voice of the Lord God, walking in the garden, in the cool of the day. And Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the Lord God, among the trees of the garden.

And the Lord God called unto Adam, and said unto him, Where art thou? And he said, I heard thy voice in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself." Gen. iii. 8—10. Now, had their knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, remained the same as before, such a record as this would never have been entered in the book of God, concerning them. But, has this loss, also, been extended to all their posterity that have been called into existence? We answer, yes; for the following reasons:—

After Adam had lost "the image of God," in which he was created, we find it written, that "he begat a son in his OWN LIKENESS, after HIS IMAGE; and called his name Seth." Gen. v. 3.* Here

* "Concerning this Seth it is said, Adam begat him "in his own likeness," after "his image." It does not alter the sense of the words, though we leave out the word *own*, and read them thus, *in his likeness*, &c. Let us consider what must be the meaning of this description, which is so emphatically expressed *in his likeness*, *in his image*. I cannot think a bodily likeness is hereby signified; as if the meaning of the language is, that Seth resembled Adam, in the attitude of his body, or lineaments of his face. There was no need for being so particular in declaring this. All who should see these persons, would see this. This would be viewing the language of the Divine Spirit in a very trifling light. Neither would it be a treating Scripture style with any tolerable decency, to understand them as testifying, that Adam begat a creature of his own species;—that the creature he begat had a human body, and a rational soul. Was not this

the “image of Adam,” stands in contrast with the “image of God.” What a marked difference between the moral nature of Adam and that of Seth,

likeness notour and obvious? What room can there be to doubt of this? This likeness must be viewed in a moral light. Seth was like Adam in his moral state. What was Adam's state, Seth's was the same. What was Adam by this time? was he not a sinner,—a guilty and corrupt person? Yes; the likeness Seth was begotten in, was that of Adam. That Adam was considered as a sinner, when the Spirit says, that Seth was begot in “his likeness,” is evident, not only from the account given of his breaking the covenant, Gen. iii. 6., but also from what immediately follows the history of his begetting this Son. What that is, you have in verse 5, “And all the days that Adam lived, were nine hundred and thirty years: and he died.” Here is an account of him, in whose likeness Seth was begot. What sort of a man was this as to his moral state? Was he an innocent or a guilty person? The determining this point will make it easy to find whether Seth's being begotten in this man's likeness was to his honor, or not. I think the Divine Spirit decides the question in the verse now cited. If the third verse was now read in connection with this one, the point would appear clearly. “And Adam lived a hundred and thirty years, and begat a son in his own likeness, after his image; and called his name Seth. And all the days that Adam lived, were nine hundred and thirty years; and he died.” Here we may easily learn, what sort of an image Seth was begot in. It is certain that it was that of Adam's image. But the question is, what sort of image was Adam's? Was it a holy or sinful one? What is said about him in the 5th verse, may guide us here. Says the Spirit, “do any want to know what sort of a man Adam was by this time? why, follow him a little further, pursue his history, and before you go a great way, you will find him in a grave,—a

in the first moments of their existence! The one was created in the *image of a holy God*; the other was begotten in the *image of a sinful man*! And

breathless and so a lifeless lump. This Adam, who begat a son in his likeness, in his image, this much will I tell you here about him, he was a *dying* man, he was on the road and had his face toward a grave, when he begat this son; death, which is the wages of sin, and a sure visible mark of it, was working then with him; and accordingly, after no very great number of years, from his having this son, performed its last work upon him: *and he died*. Adam then was a sinful man; and so his image behoved to be a sinful one. Seth resembled a dying man; and a dying man is the sure sign of a sinful one.

"I might further notice, that light might possibly be borrowed to this point, by comparing the last clause of the 1st verse, with this 3d verse, "In the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made he him;" Verse 3. "And Adam—begat a Son in his likeness." Observe, that it is not said, And Adam begat a son in *this* likeness. Had it been the image Adam was created in, which Seth was begot in, this would have been the native way of expressing it. I say it is not said, Adam begat a son in *this* likeness, but in *his* likeness.

"Thus it is manifest, that Seth was corrupt from the womb. Some object, Seth was begotten in Adam's likeness; Adam was created in God's image; therefore Seth being begotten in Adam's likeness, was the same in his generation, that his father was in his creation.

"*Ans.* If Adam had retained the image given him in his creation, Seth would have received it in his generation. But we are assured that it was long after he had lost the divine image, that he had this son; so it is observed that he lived a hundred and thirty years before he begat him. Moreover,

"It may be observed, that our likeness and conformity to God, is

this being the case with one of Adam's children, no argument can be adduced to prove, that such is not the case with all his children. Indeed, we are said to be by *nature* the children of *wrath*, Eph. ii. 3. ; which could not be said, if by *nature* or *birth* we bore the "image of God," David says, "behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me," Ps. li. 5. ; which he could not have said, in truth, had he been formed in the womb "after the image and likeness of God."

There is a restoration of the image of God to the soul, in regeneration. "That which is born of the Spirit is spirit." John iii. 6. "If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things

never, in Scripture language, expressed by that of being made *in the image* or *likeness* of any man, any mere man. This privilege is expressed in a quite different manner, 2 Cor. iii. 18. "But we all with open face, beholding as in a glass, the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord," Eph. iv. 24. "And that ye put on the new man, which after God, is created in righteousness and true holiness." Col. iii. 10. "And put on the new man, which is renewed after the image of him that created him."

"It is, then, certain that Adam, on the back of his transgressing the covenant, came to have a seed corrupt and degenerate from the womb. How came such a consequence to follow his so doing, if he did not represent them? the question, I judge unanswerable, and therefore shall not attempt it."—*Rev. R. Smith.*

are passed away ; behold, ALL THINGS ARE BECOME NEW." 2 Cor. v. 17. "Put on the new man, which AFTER GOD IS CREATED in righteousness and true holiness." Eph. iv. 24. "Ye have put on the new man, which is RENEWED in knowledge AFTER THE IMAGE OF HIM that created him." Col. iii. 10. Now, if the "image of God" be restored to the soul, in regeneration, then, surely, it was wanting there, before that work of grace was performed. And if infants are capable subjects of regeneration, and their baptism teaches this, then are they by nature destitute of the "image of God."

Again, the Apostle expressly declares, that "there is none righteous, no, not one." Rom. iii. 10. It is said, indeed, that the Apostle, in this place, only intends adults, or such as have crossed the first point of moral agency. But where is the proof for such an assertion? What right have persons to restrict the meaning of the Apostle's language, unless the scope of his argument require such restriction? On the subject of the Atonement, when such universal terms are required, by the analogy of faith, to be restricted, these same objectors will admit of no restriction: But when the Spirit of God asserts, concerning men, that "there is none righteous, no not one;"

thrice repeating the negation, to put the matter beyond the reach of all dispute, they throw in their restrictions, although the subject requires no restriction ! This may justly be termed "handling the word of God deceitfully." But does the Apostle's language require no restriction in respect of the strong negation which he makes ? Look, for a moment, to the nature of his argument. He is endeavoring to convince the self-righteous Jews, that they were no better than the Gentiles ; that they also were unrighteous in the sight of God. And how does he prove this ? Simply, by making quotations from the book of Psalms, and that of Isaiah. But suppose a Jew had objected to the relevancy of his proofs, saying, that they only established the wickedness of the people who lived in the times of David and Isaiah ; how could the correctness of the Apostle's argument have been defended ? His argument, indeed, would have been good for nothing, had it not assumed the principle, that human nature, since the fall of Adam, remains the same in all ages. Now, if such was the state of human nature in the days of David and Isaiah, that, in consequence of it, men became wicked and ungodly in their lives ; then, human nature remaining the same, it would be accompanied with precisely the same results in the

time of the Apostle. Hence, he reasons from the condition of human nature, to the condition of the individuals of that nature. And his argument is entirely conclusive ; for, the same cause always produces the same effects. What, then, must have been the condition of human nature in the times of David and Isaiah? Unholy, most assuredly ; for, on the assumption that it remained the same in his day, the Apostle argues the sinfulness of the then existing people of the Jews. When he, therefore, declares, that “there is none righteous, no not one ; he describes the true natural condition of every individual of mankind, without exception, unless human nature has changed for the better, since the writing of this epistle to the church at Rome ; a thing not pretended. Hence, men are born into the world destitute of “the image of God.” For if otherwise, it would not be true, that “there is none righteous, no, not one.”

And the same is further evident from the fact, that men possess no innate propensity to love, seek, serve, or enjoy God. Man, as originally created, was indued with such a propensity. His being created in “the likeness of God,” implies this. He could not have been pronounced to be *very good*, he could not have been called *upright*,

he could not have been truly fitted for the supernatural work of glorifying his Creator, had such a propensity of nature been foreign to his moral constitution. Shall we suppose that all the other creatures which God made possessed a natural propensity towards fulfilling the various functions allotted them by infinite wisdom? And must we deny, that there was any propensity in man's nature towards doing that, for which God, in a very peculiar manner, created him, viz: to glorify his Creator and enjoy him for ever? Indeed, to suppose that man was created with no more propensity, or inclination, to serve God, than to serve the devil, is to argue a radical defect in his creation, and to cast reproach upon his Maker. And to assert that such a propensity of nature in man, would have destroyed the freedom of his will, is as great folly as to assert, that God and holy angels, and "the spirits of just men made perfect," do not possess a freedom of will; for, they are wholly and totally inclined to that which is good. Man, however, was able to counteract this propensity of his nature, as his sinning against God mournfully showed.

But it is entirely different with his children from what it was with himself. They are born into the world destitute of any innate propensity

towards doing that which is good and holy in the sight of God. They possess a propensity the very opposite. Hence, the first acts, which they perform as moral agents, are sinful ones. Thus the bitter fountain sends forth bitter streams; and the corrupt tree produces corrupt fruit. But this order would be reversed, had men, as born into the world, a propensity of nature to good. In that case the sweet fountain would be issuing forth in bitter streams, and the good tree would be producing corrupt fruit! And that too, before there could be any counteraction of such propensity by deliberate acts of moral agency, as happened in the case of our first parents.

Besides, we read, that "it repented the Lord that he had made man upon the earth:" but, if infants, like Adam, possessed a propensity of nature to good; if they bore the image of God upon their souls, what more could he require of them in their infantile state? Their relation to the moral law would bear precisely the same aspect as Adam's when he was created; and accordingly he would call them "very good," and would delight in them, for, "the righteous Lord loveth righteousness, and his countenance doth behold the upright," and it would not "grieve him at the heart," that he had made them upon

the earth. But, when it is said without any limitation, that "it repented the Lord that he had made man upon the earth," and that "it grieved him at the heart," we must infer, that *all*, even *infants*, are destitute of all such propensity of nature to love, serve and enjoy God, as Adam received in his creation ; especially since it is written of fallen man, without any restriction, that "every imagination of the thoughts of his heart is evil continually." And notice here, it is not said, that his *heart* simply, is evil, or even the *thoughts* of his heart, but the very *imagination*, the *first rise, formation, or budding forth* of the thoughts of his heart is evil. This surely bespeaks a constitutional proneness to evil, or at least a want of the opposite principle, a propensity to good.

Thus we have proved, that a radical change has taken place in the original principles of man's moral constitution—that the "image of God," in which he was, at first, created, has been lost, and with it, all propensity of nature to "glorify and enjoy God ;" and that this is the case with all the descendants of Adam as they come into our world. Now, it must be confessed, that this is truly an inconceivable loss, an unspeakable evil. And how is it to be accounted for ? This is the grand

query. We unhesitatingly affirm, that it must be accounted for, in one of two ways—either, has God inflicted this evil on man, in the way of mere *sovereignty*, or, in the way of *righteous retribution*. But God never exercises his sovereignty, but in consistency with the perfections of his nature. Would it, then, be consistent with infinite goodness, holiness, justice and truth, to deprive *innocent, unoffending* creatures of that divine image, which he had originally enstamped upon their nature, and thus visit them with such a great and unutterable loss? We cannot think so. Indeed, would not such a procedure, on the part of Jehovah, savor strongly of tyranny and oppression, when it is recollected, that he still requires of man, that he possess this image, and that he perform works, which never can be performed without its possession? A *sovereign* deprivation of this image, then, cannot be maintained, without distorting those views of God's moral character, which the Scriptures present to us. Hence we are obliged to contend, that our loss of the "image of God" proceeds from an act of *vindictive* or *retributive* justice, on the part of Jehovah; or, in other words, that this loss happens to men as a *punishment* for sin. In this matter, therefore, the sufferers are not regarded as *innocent*, but as *guilty*.

But since this loss is sustained by them, as has been proved, before they are chargeable with any personal ill-desert of their own, it follows, that God deals with them on the ground of the sin of their representative, Adam. Having imputed his sin to them, as a righteous Lord and Judge, he does, on account of that sin thus imputed, punish them with the deprivation of his own divine image. And, hence, the want of this image in man is both his sin and his punishment—his *sin*,* as he wants that which the law of God requires in all its subjects—his *punishment*, as he wants that, without which he cannot be happy, yea, the very want of which renders him truly miserable.

* Regeneration, as we have seen, supposes the loss of the image of God; and the great object of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration, as Dr. Witherspoon truly observes, is to restore to the soul the lost image of God. But regeneration is required of us by the law of God; that is, the divine law requires that we recover again the image of God which we have lost. Its loss, therefore, is our sin, otherwise we might remain unregenerate and destitute of God's image, and thus resist the demands of the divine law, without sin, which is absurd. Indeed, if the law requires that we be found in possession of the image of God, it is self-evident, that the want of that image is sinful. But the law actually puts forth such a requirement, as appears from the following scriptures—"Make you a new heart and a new spirit"—"Be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind"—"Be renewed in the spirit of your mind"—"Put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness." &c.

SEC. 2.—*From the Innate Corruption of Human Nature.*

The innate corruption or depravity of human nature proves the imputation of Adam's first sin to his posterity. Human nature as it exists in every individual of Adam's family, both old and young, is not only destitute of the "image of God," but is, also, positively corrupt. This corruption of nature as necessarily follows the loss of the divine image from our souls, as darkness follows the withdrawment of light. Now, by this corruption, we do not mean, that any of the original faculties of the soul are destroyed. All these still remain. The soul is still capable of *thinking*, and *judging*, and *willing*, and *feeling*. We only mean, that all its faculties are in a depraved condition, in a disordered state, and are unfitted for answering the primitive purpose of knowing, loving, serving and enjoying God. Nor do we mean, that any *positive substance* of a *malignant* and *poisonous nature* is infused into the soul, as the cause of the corruption of its faculties. The dead body needs nothing to be infused into it to cause its putrefaction. The absence of life is enough to produce this consequence. So it is here; the want of light and holiness in the soul is sufficient to pro-

duce a universal corruption of all its faculties. But although this corruption be negatively produced, it is nevertheless positive and real ; as much so, as there is positively and really darkness in the place from which all light is excluded ; or, as there is positively and really coldness, where all heat is excluded. We are not, then, to be charged with holding to a *physical depravity*, if by that expression be meant a change in the *essence* of the soul. For we contend that the soul *still* retains all the faculties that ever it had ; only that these exist in such a corrupt and disordered state, as totally disqualifies them for the performance of spiritual and holy exercises.

Now, is man's moral nature thus depraved ? Are the faculties of his soul thus corrupted ? Even the *regenerated* sinner, the saint of God, is not a stranger to this moral corruption. For in him "the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit, against the flesh ; and these two are contrary the one to the other ; so that he cannot do the things that he would." Gal. v. 17. The holy Apostle Paul, relates his own experience, when he says, "I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin, which is in my members. O wretched man, that I am ! who shall de-

liver me from the body of this death?" Rom. vii. 23, 24. And if this eminent saint was thus oppressed in spirit under a sense of the corruption of his nature, who can lay his hand on his heart and say,—"I am clean?" But the Scriptures, in diverse places, do most explicitly teach us *the entire corruption of human nature*. "God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." Gen. vi. 5. "The fool hath said in his heart. There is no God. They are corrupt; they have done abominable works; there is none that doeth good," &c. Ps. xiv. "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked; who can know it?" Jer. xvii. 9. "The carnal mind is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." Rom. viii. 7. "From WITHIN, out of the heart of man, proceed evil thoughts, adulteries, fornications, murders, thefts, covetousness, wickedness, deceit, lasciviousness, an evil eye, blasphemy, pride, foolishness; all these evil things come from WITHIN, and defile the man." Mark vii. 21—23. Men, before regeneration, are described as being "dead in tresspasses and sins," as "walking according to the course of this world, according to the prince of the power of the

air, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience ;” as “ having their conversation in the lusts of the flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh, and of the mind ;” and as “ being by nature the children of wrath even as others.” Eph. ii.

1—3. Indeed, the Scriptures assure us, that *all* the faculties of the soul of man are corrupted. His conscience is *defiled* ; his understanding is *darkened* ; his will is *perverted*, for it is written, that “ the heart [the will] of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil ;” and his affections are *disordered* and *misplaced*, “ set on things below,” so that he loves what he should hate, and hates what he should love. Such, then, is the language which the Scriptures speak in relation to the moral corruption of man.

But it may be said, that all this proves nothing, unless it can be shown that this corruption belongs to infants as soon as born. Be it so. Their corruption or depravity is susceptible of the clearest proof, if the authority of the Bible be admitted, and its declarations be received without perversion. All must acknowledge, that immediately upon his first transgression, Adam’s moral nature became corrupted. Now, revelation informs us, that “ he begat a son in his own image and likeness.” It surely follows, then, that this son

(Seth) was born into the world in possession of a morally corrupted nature; if otherwise, it would not be true, that he was begotten in "the image and likeness" of his corrupt and sinful father. But as it happened in the case of Seth, so it happens in the case of all the children of Adam. For, "who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Not one." (Job. xiv. 4.) "How can he be clean that is born of a woman?" (Job. xxv. 4.) To be born with a nature morally clean can, therefore, belong to none of the descendants of Adam. God has ordained it otherwise. And hence says David, the man after God's own heart, "Behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." (Ps. li. 5.) Some indeed tell us, that we must not interpret David's language literally, that we must not "cut it to the quick," as he only means to say, that he was a sinner very early, even as soon as he was capable of committing actual sin. If this be his meaning, why did he not tell us so himself? Surely it is taking a very unwarranted liberty with his language, which was indited by the Holy Spirit, and which declares, that he was sinful and polluted from his very birth, to tell us that it only means, that he made himself sinful and polluted some months or years afterwards. David is speaking of sinful principles, and not of sinful acts.

And although, in the latter respect, he was not a sinner from the womb, in the former respect he was; otherwise he was guilty of uttering a vile slander against himself. Why is it recorded with a peculiar emphasis, concerning the glorious Son of David, that he was born HOLY, (Luke i. 35.)* un-

* The above declaration of Scripture respecting the human nature of Christ is worthy of very special consideration; because it contains a most triumphant refutation of some erroneous positions, taken by the doctors and disciples of the New-Haven School, as, that "holiness or unholiness cannot be predicated of a nature," and that, "there is no difference, in a moral point of view, between infants in their birth and the man Christ Jesus in his." The angel Gabriel said to Mary—"The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee; therefore, also, that *holy thing*, which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God." Now, what was that *holy thing*, which was conceived in the womb of the virgin Mary and born of her? Was it the *divine*, or the *human* nature of Christ? The latter, as our opponents themselves must admit. Then, the *human nature* of Christ was born *holy*. We acknowledge, that by reason of the hypostatic union of the two natures, the *person* born was *holy*; yet it was not in his *divine* but *human* nature that this holy person was born. Any assertion to the contrary must involve the grossest confusion of ideas, if not blasphemy. Accordingly, there can be no consistent interpretation of this text other than that, which maintains *the inborn holiness of the human nature of Christ*. And if any emotion of wonder rise up in the soul from the fact that a *holy human nature* should be formed of the substance and born of a sinful woman, the text referred to dispels the cause of such emotion, by assuring us, that *that nature* was formed and purified by the over-

less that a perfect contrast might appear between what he was in his birth, and what his father David

shadowing power and influence of the *Holy Ghost*. This is the reason, a *supernatural* reason indeed, why that which was born of the virgin was a *holy thing*.

What then becomes of the assertions—that holiness cannot be predicated of a nature? and that Christ was born with a nature neither holy nor unholy? If a person started out with the full determination to contradict the *Holy Ghost*, we cannot see how he could do so more palpably than by making such assertions. But if human nature was *holy* in the person of Christ at his birth, why may not human nature be *unholy* in us at our birth? it is surely as easy to predicate *unholiness* as *holiness* of a nature. David thought so, when he confessed—"Behold, I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me." And Job thought so, when he asked the question and answered it—"Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Not one?"

Sound divines, whose labors have edified and comforted the church of God, have uniformly maintained, that the holiness of Christ's human nature formed a part of his justifying righteousness, and was necessary on account of the sinful corruption of ours. The law finds us in possession of a sinful nature, but it found him in possession of a holy one. He was no sooner made of a woman than he was made under the law; and he met that law with a holy nature and thus fulfilled its righteousness in that important point.

From the foregoing considerations, then, it follows, in despite of all the sneers and cavils of a *vain philosophy*, that the qualities of a *nature* are as cognizable by the law of God, as the qualities of an *act*. But let not our meaning be perverted, as though we were speaking of a *physical* and not of a *moral* nature. Man viewed as a creature possesses a *physical* nature; and viewed as a subject of God's moral government he possesses a *moral* na-

was in his, and what all the children of Adam are in theirs?

But how comes it to pass, that the very first acts performed by children, after they have attained to what is called the period of moral agency, are universally sinful acts? Nobody pretends that there was ever a solitary exception to this; and yet it is pretended that the moral nature of infants is in no respect corrupted! This is infinitely absurd.

ture. We predicate neither sin nor holiness of his *physical* nature; it is his *moral* nature only that is a proper subject of such predication. And we contend, from the word of God, that the *moral nature* of every human being as born into the world, is *corrupt*, and consequently at variance with the requirement of the divine law, whose unceasing and unalterable demand is, that every son and daughter of Adam should possess the same holy and uncorrupted nature, that was given to him in his creation. But this demand of the law has never been fulfilled, except in the case of our adorable Surety as born in our nature; to which fact, as "a new thing in the earth," Inspiration points the finger of admiration, saying—"That *Holy Thing*, which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God." Hence, as to the assertion, that human nature in the case of infants is, morally speaking, precisely the same as in the case of "the holy child Jesus," we have only to say, that it has been made foolishly and thoughtlessly, if not blasphemously. For if there be, in the whole Bible, a contrast plain, obvious and palpable, it is that which the Holy Spirit draws between the moral character of our Saviour in his birth, and the moral character of all Adam's children in theirs. He was *born a holy thing*—They are "shapen in iniquity and conceived in sin."

What? Does the *sweet* fountain universally send forth *bitter* streams? Does the *good* tree universally produce *corrupt* fruit?

Besides, did not the rite of circumcision, under the law, point to the corruption of infants? Was not the thing sacramentally represented by it, a change of heart? It was said to Israel, "The Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart and the heart of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live." (Deut. xxx. 6.) Now, if the circumcision of the flesh represented the circumcision of the heart, infants, if holy, would have been improper subjects of that rite. In their case, it could have represented no spiritual benefit. The outward circumcision of their flesh, therefore, proved their need of an internal and spiritual circumcision of the heart. And hence, the promise of this blessing pertained to them equally with their fathers. "The Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy SEED."

And under the New Testament dispensation, the ordinance of baptism proves the same thing. This ordinance has a primary respect to *pollution*.—Hence, in allusion to the outward sign, the blessing signified is called "the washing of regeneration." Now, if it be not true that infants need "the

washing of regeneration," need a real change of heart, their baptism must be a solemn mockery. With the same propriety you might baptize angels. And this incongruity actually takes place in the case of those who baptize infants under the false impression, that they are "little angels," or *pure* as angels. And an incongruity equally disgusting takes place in the case of those who baptize infants under the absurd belief, that they are neither holy, nor unholy, but like the irrational creation! Such might, with equal propriety, as far as themselves are concerned, administer that holy ordinance to the fowls of the air, or the beasts of the field! And, by the way, according to this Pelagian notion, what must become of those human beings who die in a state of infancy? Not being *holy*, they cannot be admitted into heaven: And not being *unholy*, they cannot be sent to hell! The portion of *brutes* must, therefore, be their portion! Let those who *can*, believe a conclusion so abhorrent both to Scripture and reason. And if none are found willing to embrace the conclusion, then let them reject, with a becoming indignation, the premises from which it is legitimately drawn.

The foregoing considerations, then, fully establish the moral corruption of human nature in infants. It only remains, now, to complete the

argument, to show *how* this corruption takes place, *how* this *evil* comes to be visited upon all the seed of Adam? And here we need only remark, as before, in relation to the loss of "the image of God," that this painful and highly calamitous dispensation, has not been introduced by *a mere act of absolute sovereignty*, but by an act of a righteous Judge, *duly inflicting punishment upon the ill-deserving*. But as infants are not *ill-deserving*, personally considered, they must be regarded in law, as having *the sin of their representative charged to their account*, and, therefore, obnoxious to the endurance of such a punishment. And here it may also be remarked, that this corruption of nature is to be regarded both as a *sin*, and as the *punishment of sin*. It is a sin, as it is a want of conformity to the law of God; and it is the punishment of sin, as it is an evil inflicted by a judge in the due exercise of justice. In the latter sense, it is to be viewed as coming immediately from the hand of God, but in the former, as conveyed from father to son, in the propagation of the human family.

Nor are we, in this, to be understood as maintaining, either that God is the author of sin, or that parents are capable of giving existence to a sinful being. The human body, of itself, is not an appropriate subject either of holiness or de-

pravity. Holiness or depravity cannot be predicated of mere flesh and bones. The soul is essential to the constitution of a moral agent. The union of soul and body, in a human being, constitutes such an agent. But God is “the Father of spirits;” he is the *immediate* creator of the soul, and he infuses it into a human body, instrumentally prepared by parents for its reception. The soul, however, is created destitute of its original glory; “the image of God”—destitute of “knowledge, righteousness, and holiness.” This destitution is the negative cause of corruption, as the destitution of light is necessarily accompanied with darkness. And the union of such a soul with a material body, gives existence to a human being of a corrupt moral constitution. So far, therefore, as God is immediately concerned in the production of such a being, he acts righteously—acting in the character of a Judge, he only withholds what he would have bestowed, had the representative of the human race fulfilled the condition of the original covenant. The evil, then, of our being born with a corrupt nature is to be charged to the sin of Adam, and to that sin as *imputed* to us, otherwise it could not be attended with such a punitive consequence. And human procreation is the divinely established *mode*, by which this punishment comes to be endured, this

corrupt nature to be transmitted. Indeed, the mere fact of parents being sinful, does not necessarily imply that their progeny must also be sinful. God could have ordered it otherwise. He could, by the infusion of a *holy* soul, have sanctified the propagated body. But he has constituted this matter differently. Hence, we must regard the *procreation* of the species as being the *medium*, which God has established for conveying this *penal* and *sinful* corruption of nature down to the last of the represented posterity of Adam.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

SEC. 1.—*The Doctrine Proved from the Inability of Adam's Descendants to keep the Commandments of God.*

The imputation of Adam's first sin to his posterity is manifest from their innate and total inability to obey the commandments of God. This argument is of the same nature with the last two. It cannot be denied, that man was originally created with a sufficient ability to do whatever God required of him. But if men are now born into the world under an utter inability to perform the requirements of the divine law, it follows, that human nature has undergone an awful change—has suffered a dreadful loss. And as it would be an injurious reflection on the character of Jehovah, to refer this to a mere act of his sovereign will, it must have taken place in pursuance of an act of justice; and hence the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, is established. To complete the argument, therefore, we have only to prove the existence of the inability alluded to. And as much metaphysical dust has been blown upon this subject, it may be proper, in the first place, to brush it away.

A distinction, not only ambiguous but wholly inapplicable, is made here between *natural* and *moral* inability :* And it is contended, that only

* “The learned Amyraldus, did no service to the cause of the reformation by his distinction between a physical and moral power of believing in Christ. He supposed the sinner to have the former, but not the latter. He held, that Christ died for all men according to a decree of God, by which salvation was secured to sinners upon condition of their faith; which general decree, according to him, was to be considered as going before the particular decree, about giving faith to the elect. When it was objected to him, that his notion of the general decree now mentioned was absurd, as it suspended the end of Christ’s death upon an impossible condition;—he denied, that the condition was impossible. “For,” said he, “though I do not, with the Arminians, deny the impotence of fallen man, or his inability to believe, (I allow him to be morally impotent;) yet I hold that man has still a physical or natural power of believing; as he possesses the natural faculties of the understanding and the will. Herein Amyraldus has given a sad example of the abuse of great parts. Shall we suppose, that when Christ undertook for sinners in the covenant of grace, he considered them any otherwise than as most miserable, lost, dead in sin, utterly impotent, (Rom. v. 7, 8. viii. 3,) or that the wisdom of God gave Christ to die for this end, that sinners might attain salvation by a natural power of believing; a power, which, Amyraldus confesses, could never be exerted? Farther, is not faith a most holy and moral act, and, as it takes place in the sinner, purely supernatural? and shall we allow, that a principle which is not moral, but merely physical, can be productive of such a moral and supernatural act? Ought not an act and its principle to correspond with one another? Let the same thing be said of love, which Amyraldus has said of faith, and the Pelagians will triumph;

the *latter* belongs to fallen man ; that he still possesses the *former*, a *natural ability* to do all that God's law requires. Yes, it is the unceasing cry of certain theologians, that every child of Adam is *naturally able*, though *morally unable*, to keep the commandments of God. But what do they mean by a *natural* or *physical* ability, for they use these terms synonymously? Do they mean *that*

who used to speak so much about a natural faculty of loving God above all things. Indeed upon this scheme, there will be no keeping out of the Pelagian opinion about the powers of *pure nature*, and about *physical or natural faculties in man of doing what is morally good*. For, in confuting that opinion, our Divines still maintained, that the image of God was requisite in the first man, in order to his exerting such morally good acts as those of loving and seeking true blessedness in the enjoyment of him. But Amyraldus overthrows this doctrine, while he is led, by the distinction he makes between natural and moral power, to hold, that the conception of man's rational nature necessarily includes in it a power of exerting acts morally good, such as those of desiring and endeavoring to obtain the restoration of communion with the infinitely holy and blessed God. The tendency of this scheme became more manifest, when Pajonius, a disciple of Amyraldus, began to deny the necessity of the Spirit's work in the internal illumination of sinners, in order to their saving conversion. For, said Pajonius, nothing more is necessary to that end, than that the understanding, which has in itself a sufficiency of clear ideas, (according to the language of the Cartesian Philosophy then in vogue,) should only be struck by the light of external revelation, as the eye is struck by the rays of light coming from a luminous object."—*Lcydecker de Veritate Religionis Reformatae et Evangelicae, Lib. ii. Chap. 6. Sect. 82.*

power in man, by which he is able to perform *bodily acts*, such as *walking, running, &c.*? Then, what has this to do on a point which relates exclusively to *mental acts*, such as *knowing* and *loving God, believing, repenting, &c.*? What information can an inquirer receive, when asking whether a sinner be able to *know* and *love God*, to be told, that he *is* able; because he can *run* and *laugh*, and perform a great variety of *mechanical operations*? Or do they simply mean, by employing this term, that man still possesses all the original faculties of the soul; that he has an understanding, a will, a conscience, &c.? But what has this to do with the question respecting the *exercise of those faculties in a holy and spiritual manner*? If I ask, can I *exercise* my understanding in a holy manner, must I be insulted with the answer—Yes, because you possess the *faculty* of understanding? So may an old clock possess all the faculties for keeping time, and yet not be able to keep time, on account of the disordered and rusted condition of those faculties. Or do they only mean by their *natural ability*, that the soul is able to perform *natural acts*, that it can *think*, and *judge*, and *will*, and *love*, in a *natural way*? Still what has this to do with the question respecting its ability to perform *moral* and *spiritual acts*? Is it not offering an insult to the inquirer, who

asks, whether he be able of himself to perform such moral acts, as *knowing*, *believing in*, and *loving God*, to be told—O yes, for you can demonstrate a mathematical proposition, and you can love natural objects, and you can perform a thousand other mental operations of a natural kind? Thus natural and spiritual acts are confounded; and because we can perform the one, it is taken for granted that we can perform the other. But after all, perhaps, those who harp on this ambiguous term, are only to be understood as maintaining, that men are by *nature* or *birth*, able to do all that God requires in his law, as they are said to be by *nature* or *naturally*, that is by *birth*, “the children of wrath.” If this be their meaning, the sentiment is false, for in this sense of the term, men are *naturally unable* to observe God’s law, as can be easily shown. Or, it may be, that they simply intend, by the use of this term, to assert, that there is no *defect* about the faculties of the soul to hinder their spiritual exercise. But if this be their meaning, truth compels us to take the opposite ground, and to maintain a natural inability. For although men do still possess all the original faculties of soul, it is not true that these exist without any defect as to their moral operations. A man may possess all his bodily members, and yet they may

be sadly defective, as to any appropriate exercise of them. His feet may be impotent, his arms may be withered, his eyes may be visited with a cataract, his whole body may be so completely paralyzed as to prevent the smallest motion. In precisely the same way, do we contend, that the faculties of the soul are defective, when viewed in relation to spiritual acts. There is a *cataract* in the eye of the understanding, there is *benumbedness* in the heart, there is *rigidity* in the will, there is *lethargy* in the conscience; in a word, the whole soul is in a paralyzed condition. It may, therefore, with the same propriety, be said, that the paralytic is physically able to rise up and walk, as that the spiritually paralyzed soul, is physically able to keep the commandments of God.

It will be seen, therefore, that the term "natural ability," as used in the present case, is quite ambiguous. Nor is this all, it is wholly inapplicable. An ability for the performance of any given act, must derive its character from the nature of the act to be performed. If the act be *natural*, the *ability* to perform it must be *natural*; and if the act be *moral*, the *ability* to perform it must be *moral*. But the subject under consideration relates exclusively to *moral acts*. To speak, therefore, of a *natural ability* to perform these, is

an abuse of terms. For a *moral act* can only be performed by a *moral ability*. Hence the terms, “natural ability,” and “natural inability,” should be excluded from the discussion of this subject, unless they be used with an entire reference to the *origin* of that *moral* ability or inability, which the case alone involves. In this restricted sense, the epithet “natural,” merely expresses what is *con-nate* to man, or possessed by him as *born* into the world. And, as we maintain, that there is in Adam’s children a *moral inability* to meet the requirements of the divine law, we also contend that *that* inability is *natural* to them.

In regard to the use of the term “moral inability,” a few words must also be said. If by this term, were simply meant an inability to perform moral acts, or to answer the requirements of God’s moral law, it would be proper, and would express a great scriptural truth. We are, indeed, possessed of a “moral inability :” For we are unable of ourselves to do any thing aright, which the holy law of God demands. We cannot believe, nor repent, nor perform any holy moral act, without enjoying the supernatural aid of the Spirit of God. This, however, is not the meaning of the term, as used by those, who advocate the existence of a “natural ability,” and “moral inability,” in

fallen man. For by "moral inability," they tell us, they mean an *inability arising from the will*. According to them, the sinner *can* do every thing which the law requires, but he *will* not : Therefore, while he is *naturally able*, he is *morally unable* to do his duty : His inability arises solely from a *wrong choice*—it is a *voluntary inability* ! Such language appears to us to involve an absurdity : For it supposes, that a *power* to perform our duty can be either created or destroyed, at pleasure, by a simple act of the will ! That so great a matter as "power to keep God's law," can be determined by a mere volition ! Yea, that the sinner chooses *inability*, when he might equally well choose *ability* ! Now, the truth is, that neither ability nor inability, is an appropriate object of volition. If a person possess the power of performing some given action, he cannot, by a mere volition, divest himself of that power ; and if he do not possess the power of performing it, a mere volition can never give him that power. A moral agent, however, may have the power of obeying God, and yet choose not to obey him. But this cannot, with propriety, be called a "voluntary inability ;" it is only *a voluntary disuse of a possessed ability*. Perhaps some will say, that this is all they intend by a "moral or voluntary inability."

Let us inquire, then, whether there really be in fallen man this power, which may be used or dis-used, at pleasure? This is the main question.

Now, that he possesses no such power or ability, is evident; because it has already been proved that he has lost the "image of God," and is totally corrupt; yea, that in regard to spiritual matters, there is a real defect in all the faculties of his soul, his understanding being blinded, his will perverted, his conscience defiled, and his affections alienated; so that he can no more yield a holy obedience to God's law, than the paralytic can rise and walk. And to confirm this truth more fully, let the following passages of Scripture, among others, be attentively considered. "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." (1. Cor. ii. 14.) "The carnal mind is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." (Rom. viii. 7.) "No man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost." (1. Cor. xii. 3.) "No man can come to me, except the Father, which hath sent me, draw him." (John vi. 44.) "*You* hath he quickened, who were DEAD in trespasses and sins." (Eph. ii. 1.) "The hour is coming, and now is,

when the DEAD shall hear the voice of the Son of God ; and they that hear shall live." (John v. 25.)
 " Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots ? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed to do evil." (Jer. xii. 23.)

The above texts plainly teach us, that the ability in question is not to be found in fallen man, that the exercise of it *should* depend upon his will. And who, believing those texts to be inspired of God, can consistently maintain the contrary, that there is a previous power in every man qualifying him for the performance of holy acts, which may be used by him, or not, according to the pleasure of his will ? Surely such a sentiment is no where contained in the word of God. Hence, if the sinner will not do his duty ; if he will not love and serve God ; if he will not come to Christ for life, it is not because he refuses to exercise a possessed ability, but because he has not the ability which can be thus exercised. He cannot, by a mere volition, remove the blindness from his understanding ; he cannot, by a mere volition, slay the enmity of his heart ; he cannot, by a mere volition, banish away that disorder and corruption which have seized on all the faculties of his soul. His inability, therefore, is not seated in his will alone ; it possesses a more comprehensive sway ; it resides in all his faculties.

And those also who would confine it to a mere "disinclination," or "indisposition," egregiously mistake the matter. For we find, that even in the saints there may be an *inclination*, or *disposition*, to do what is good, when the *ability* is wanting. Said Christ to his disciples in the garden, "The Spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak." (Matt. xxvi. 41.) Paul says of himself, "The good that I would, I do not : but the evil which I would not, that I do. Now, if I do that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. I find then a law, that when I would do good, evil is present with me." (Rom. vii. 19—21.) And he writes to the Galatians, "The flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh ; and these are contrary, the one to the other ; so that ye CANNOT DO the things that ye WOULD." (Ch. v. 17.) How, then, can it be said, that the sinner's want of inclination to do his duty, is his only inability, when the saint, with this inclination, is not unincumbered of all inability ?

Having proved, then, that man is unable to keep God's law, it may be inquired whether this inability resides in him from his very birth, or whether it becomes incidentally attached to him afterwards ? Or, in other words, whether it be natural, or ac-

quired? If it be said, that it is acquired; we would ask, at what time did it begin to be acquired? And if it be answered, At the time the first actual sin was committed; we would ask again, how the ability, which must, in that case have existed prior to the commission of the first sin, could consist with the “want of original righteousness,” and with the “inherent corruption of nature,” which we have before proved to exist even in the case of infants? Indeed, mankind could not be said to be “by nature children of wrath,” if they were neither chargeable with sin, nor wanted ability to observe the requirements of the divine law: For this would be all that God could reasonably demand of them in that condition. Again, the Apostle says, “When we were without STRENGTH, Christ died for the ungodly.” Now, did Christ die for any infants? Then they were not only “ungodly,” but also without “strength.” The inability, therefore, of which we are speaking, is natural to man, it belongs inherently to our fallen nature. Since, therefore God has deprived the descendants of Adam of that power, with which he was endowed at his creation, we cannot possibly avoid considering this as a punishment sent on

them for his transgression.* But his transgression must be imputed to them, in virtue of a power contained in the original covenant, before it could be made the basis of a penal procedure against them. Hence, in the infliction of this punishment, God does not act merely as a sovereign, but as a righteous Judge, dispensing justice according to the penal sanction of the covenant of works.

* Man's inability to obey his Creator is his *sin* as well as his *punishment*. This may be illustrated by the case of a convict in a Penitentiary. His confinement there is his punishment for having committed a criminal act; but it is also his sin, as he is thereby disqualified for performing his natural obligations to society. We will suppose him to be a husband and a father—and that his wife and children are suffering through his non-performance, in consequence of his imprisonment, of those duties towards them, which the marriage covenant and the law of nature had made obligatory upon him. Is not, therefore, his state of disability for the performance of those duties his sin? He is living in the constant omission of duties, which he had most solemnly obligated himself to perform. His punishment cannot cancel his obligation to perform those duties. If otherwise, mankind, by turning criminals, would have it in their power to disannul the law of God and cancel all its preceptive claims; yea, to banish that law entirely from the earth. The convict's state of disqualification for discharging the prior obligations of the law is, therefore, a *sinful state*. And indeed he is laid under a necessity of sinning. He would sin if he escaped from the prison, and the fact of his being there, in a state of disability for performing his duty towards his family and society, is also his sin. In like manner, we hold, that man's inability to keep the commandments of God is not only a penal infliction for sin, but is also in itself a sin.

SEC. 2.—*From the Sufferings and Death of Infants.*

The sufferings and death of infants prove the doctrine in question. That many of Adam's children suffer and die in infancy, before the commission of actual sin, is a fact which all are forced to admit. Now, from this fact, the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, is easily inferred. The argument is simply this:—Death is the penalty of sin, but infants, who are not chargeable with actual sin, die, therefore, they must be regarded as having the sin of their representative, Adam, charged to their account. To make this argument conclusive, all that is necessary is to prove that death is the penalty of sin. We know that this is denied, with the greatest boldness, by many; but it is denied in the open face both of reason and of revelation. Reason teaches, that suffering and death are evils, and that innocent creatures cannot be subjected to them, without being chargeable with guilt, unless, what is blasphemous to assert, God, who inflicts these evils, is chargeable with injustice. There is little need, however, of appealing to reason on a point which revelation so plainly inculcates. The three following propositions, laid down by the Apostle Paul, unequivocally

cally teach, that sin is the meritorious and procuring cause of death. "Sin entered into the world and death by sin;"—"death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned,"—"the wages of sin is death." (Rom. v. 12, and vi. 23.) Temporal death, although far from embracing the whole of the death, of which the Apostle speaks, is nevertheless included in it. It is, therefore, a part of the wages of sin, that is to say, sin is its meritorious cause. Does it not, then, inevitably follow that death is the penalty of sin? For what is meant by the penalty of sin, but an evil suffered on account of sin, as its meritorious cause? And in no other light do the Scriptures present death, when viewed in its own nature, and as unaffected by the mediation of Christ Jesus. Christ's mediation has, indeed, changed the aspect of death in the case of all believers; and if the same be said in relation to the death of infants, the point in debate is yielded. For if Christ has interfered in their behalf, and removed whatever is penal in death relative to them, then this supposes them to have been antecedently obnoxious to a penal death, and consequently chargeable with sin. Scripture assures us, that "the sting of death is sin," and that the removal of this sting is owing to the mediation of Christ. (1. Cor. xv. 55—57.) Hence,

death, as befalling infants, is accompanied with this sting, or it is not. If it be, it is a penal death; if not, there is an indebtedness to the work of a mediator, and but for which, it would have been a penal death, or a punishment for sin. If sin, which is declared to be the "sting of death," had no existence in the case of infants, they could have no interest in the mediation of Christ, they could not unite in the resurrection song of the just, "O death, where is thy sting? Thanks be to God, who giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ." It may be asserted, then, with the utmost confidence, that death, in itself considered, and abstracted from all connection with the mediation of our blessed Redeemer, is an evil, a punishment for sin. And this is farther confirmed from what is declared to have been the end of Christ's incarnation. "The Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil." (1. John iii. 8.) Death must be included among the works of the Devil. "As the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he (Christ,) also himself likewise took part of the same; that through death he might destroy him, that had the power of death, that is, the Devil." (Heb. ii. 14.) Now, wherever death comes to any of the children of men, old or young, Satan either has the "power

of it," or he has been dislodged from that power. But it will be granted, that he has no power over death, except by means of sin—surely he has no power over it but what sin gives him: Hence, the atonement which Christ has made for sin, "through his death," is that which has divested Satan of his "power of death." Let death, therefore, come in either of the ways above specified, the case is precisely the same, so far as our argument is concerned. For it is obvious that sin and death are legally connected, antecedently of all consideration of Christ's death, and the consequent destruction of Satan's power. In other words, death, in its own nature, is the penalty of sin.*

Many futile attempts are made to invalidate the force of the foregoing reasoning, as applied to the death of infants. It is pretended that their death is a *chastisement*, and not a *punishment*. But this is yielding the point in dispute; for who does not perceive that a *chastisement* always presupposes some fault, some sin in the subject of it? The sufferings and death of infants are supposed, by others, to form a part of a system of *moral discipline*, designed for the betterment of their condition. But the application of such "moral dis-

* See chap. iii. Secs. 6 and 8.

cipline," without any sin in its subjects, appears to be incompatible with the moral rectitude of the divine government. It would resemble the case of a parent giving his child a most unmerciful beating, and at the same time telling him, "You have never committed any wrong, you have never offended me at all, I only inflict this salutary discipline upon you with the view of bettering your condition, of rendering you more capable of enjoying happiness hereafter!" Such procedure in a parent, would surely be regarded with abhorrence; and shall such procedure be ascribed to the God of holiness? Indeed, could we, when witnessing the sufferings and agonies of the dying infant, be persuaded of the entire innocence of the little sufferer, in the view of the Divine mind, we should esteem the author of its sufferings to be a Moloch, instead of the "Holy One of Israel, who delighteth in mercy." But it is further said, that innocent brutes suffer and die, and why not charge them with the sin of Adam, as well as infants? We answer, that the brute creation was remotely affected by the sin of Adam; he was constituted their lord; he was appointed a head of dominion to them; and although he did not represent them in the covenant, yet his fall *disgraced* them, and his sin was remotely visited upon them. Any dis-

grace or calamity, which befalls the head of any government affects the whole body politic. "If the head suffer, all the members suffer with it." In like manner, when "the lord of this lower creation" fell, by transgression, from his high dignity, all the subjects of his dominion were involved, consequentially, to a certain extent, in his disgrace and ruin. The brutes suffer in the sense, in which they are capable subjects of suffering. Their sufferings cannot be *penal*, because they are not proper subjects of sin, not being subjects of a moral law. But it is essentially different with infants. They stand related to Adam in a far more interesting and exalted manner. They are related to him, both as their natural and moral head. They are also proper subjects of penal suffering. They are human beings; they bear the image and likeness of fallen Adam: they, are, moreover, subjects of the moral law of God, else they could not be received into heaven, unless we suppose an absurdity, that there are some in heaven that are not subjects of law.* Hence, it is unreasonable to compare the sufferings of children to those of brutes. But if they do not suffer and die like brutes, then their sufferings and death, in their own nature con-

* See chap. iv. Sec. 8.

sidered, must be the penal effect of sin, not, indeed, of their own personal sin, for they have none, but of the sin of Adam imputed to them.

But we are told again, that the death of infants can only be viewed as the *consequence* of Adam's sin, and not its penal effect. The Socinians formerly contended, that death was a "consequent of nature," and that men would have died, although sin had never entered into the world. This sentiment is found to contradict the Bible so glaringly, that it is relinquished by those, who, in many respects, coincide with the inventors of it; and the ground, on which *they* would stand, is, that death is in no case the penalty, but only the *consequence* of Adam's sin. And so it might be said that the incarnation of the Son of God, was the *consequence* of Adam's sin; that the preaching of the Gospel was the *consequence* of Adam's sin; and that the singing of the redeemed, in glory—"Unto him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood," &c., was the *consequence* of the sin of Adam. But has death, especially in the case of infants, no other connection, than instances of this kind, with the sin of Adam? If death be only a *consequence* of sin, how came the Apostle to tell us that it is "the wages of sin?" Is it answered, that "the wages" of our personal

sins “is death?” The Apostle makes no distinction—death, wherever it appears, is “the wages of sin.” And does it appear among infants, who have no personal sins of their own? then it must be the *wages* of Adam’s sin as charged to their account.

But to disprove our position, it is again asserted, that death is a blessing to infants, as it is a blessing to all believers. We answer, that death is a blessing to believers only through the Mediation of our Lord Jesus Christ; and if it be a blessing to infants in the same manner, then it follows, that irrespective of his mediation, it would not be a blessing to them, but a curse, and consequently the penal effect of sin. But to avoid this conclusion, those whom we are opposing are obliged to maintain, (what indeed is very absurd,) that death comes to infants as a *blessing in consequence of Adam’s sin!* We acknowledge that God, in the exceeding riches of his wisdom and grace, has overruled the sin of Adam and made it redound to his greater glory, and to the greater happiness of his redeemed people; but to convert death into a *blessing, coming in consequence of Adam’s sin*, sounds exceedingly strange! This is to represent sinning Adam as a head of blessing and not of evil to his posterity! Here is at least one blessing

for which glorified infants are indebted to the first and not to the second Adam, viz : the blessing of death ! We do most heartily grant, that death is a blessing to all those “who die in the Lord.” But they enjoy it as a blessing, not in consequence of Adam’s sin, but as the fruit and effect of Christ’s righteousness. There is, indeed, nothing penal in death to a believer ; but this is because Christ has died for him, and by means of his death has robbed death of its sting. And the believer is warranted to view death, as coming to him through the death of his Saviour, and consequently as a blessing. But at the same time, death, considered in its own nature, and as “reigning by the offense of Adam” and as abstracted from all consideration of the death of Christ, is *a penal evil*, is “the wages of sin.” And hence the death of infants conclusively establishes the truth of “original sin imputed.”*

In Chapter vi., Section 3., we have shown, that Adam’s *offense* had procured a judgment, or sentence of condemnation, against all mankind.—There is, indeed, a difference between condemnation, or adjudication to the endurance of the penalty of God’s law, and the actual infliction of that

* See Chap. iii. Sec. 8.

penalty. But in the arguments which have succeeded, we have proved the actual infliction of the penalty, to a certain extent, upon all the offspring of Adam; we have proved that they are born into the world destitute of the image of God, are possessed of a morally corrupted nature, and are disabled for meeting the requirements of the divine and unalterable law of God; which evils constitute the elements of spiritual death, and are, therefore, parts of the threatened penalty actually inflicted. And we have also proved the infliction of another part of the penalty, or what is equivalent thereto, in the temporal sufferings and death of infants. But the penalty has been thus actually inflicted on Adam's seed, on account of his "one offense." For says the Apostle, "through the offense of one many are dead;" and again, "by one man's offense death reigned by one." (Rom. v. 15, 17.) Has the penalty, then, been inflicted upon all, and that on account of Adam's offense, as the Apostle declares? How is it possible, then, to avoid the conclusion, that that offense has been imputed to all? Does God inflict the penalty of his law upon any of his creatures for an offense, if that offense be not legally and judicially charged to their account? To suppose such a thing would be little short of blasphemy; it would surely be a

high affront offered to the character of the Holy One of Israel. It is true the penalty is not inflicted upon all, in its full extent. This only takes place in the case of those, who go down to the pit of eternal destruction. In regard to all the present generation of mankind, and in regard to all the "spirits of the just made perfect" before the throne, the penalty, so far as it embraces eternal death, has not been inflicted; but as embracing spiritual death, it has been experienced by all of these. Consequently the argument holds good; for if, in any instance, the penalty has not been fully inflicted to the whole extent of the threatening, this has been owing to the sovereign grace and mercy of the Lord our God. On the whole, then, if death, spiritual and temporal, according to the proofs offered, has "reigned by the offense of one," over all, even over infants, who have committed no sin in their own persons, how can this be reconciled to the justice of God, if there has not been a universal imputation of the guilt of Adam's first sin?

SEC. 3.—*From the Salvation of Infants.*

The salvation of infants proves, that Adam's first sin is imputed to his posterity. This we urge as our *last* proof of the doctrine, from the convic-

tion that any additional proofs would be unnecessary and superfluous. And here, we do not wish to be understood as maintaining, that all those who die in infancy are saved. The Scriptures make a distinction between the seed of the ungodly and the seed of believers. God is called the God of the seed of the righteous, but he is no where called the God of the seed of the unbelieving and unholy. But why this distinction, if all infants, dying in a state of infancy are saved? We cannot believe, that the infants who perished in the flood, when Noah only was found righteous before God—that the infants who were consumed in Sodom, when God declared, that if there had been *ten* righteous persons in the city, he would not have destroyed it for their sake—that the infants belonging to the company of Korah, that were swallowed up by the earth—and that the infants of the daughter of Babylon, concerning whom God said, “happy shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones,” were all saved. The Scriptures do not direct us to believe any such thing. Are we not rather to believe that God displays his sovereignty in relation to the salvation of infants, as he does in relation to the salvation of adults? Here we are willing to leave the matter, believing that the “Judge of

all the earth does right," while he is not bound "to give us an account of any of his matters." But, what is sufficient for the present argument, the Scriptures, do expressly teach us the salvation of some infants. Says our blessed Lord, "Suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of heaven." Now, the *salvation* of infants presupposes them to be subjects of *guilt and pollution*. Were they not chargeable with sin, Christ could not be their Saviour. This is evident from his name—"Thou shalt call his name JESUS, *for he shall save his people from their sins.*" And to this corresponds that heavenly song, "Unto him that loved us, *and washed us from our sins in his own blood,*" &c. If infants have any part in *the redemption that is in Christ's blood*, and if they are adopted into God's family, they must be viewed as antecedently lying under the curse of the law, and as belonging to the family of Satan; for "God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons." (Gal. iv. 4, 5.) In a word, if infants are saved by Jesus Christ, they must originally possess the character of *lost sinners*: for "the Son of Man came to seek and to save that which was **LOST.**" (Luke xix. 10.) "I am

not sent but to the LOST SHEEP of the house of Israel." (Matt. xv. 24.) Since infants, therefore, are *sinful, under the curse, and lost*, and their salvation presupposes all this, how can we avoid the conclusion, that Adam's sin is imputed to them, inasmuch as they have never, in their own persons, transgressed the law of God? Indeed, it is utterly impossible to escape from this conclusion, without denying the salvation of infants altogether, or, what is equally unscriptural, denying that their introduction into heaven is owing to the obedience and blood of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.* And such is our confidence in the convincing force of this argument, that we would be willing to depend upon it alone for the truth of the great doctrine, which we have been endeavoring to establish. Hence this, in connection with the other arguments advanced, if we are not egregiously mistaken, most triumphantly sustains the position, that ADAM'S FIRST SIN IS IMPUTED TO ALL HIS POSTERITY.

* See Chap. iv. Sec. 8.

CHAPTER IX.

OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.

Such is the corruption of human nature, its perversity and opposition to the truth, that we know of no doctrine of divine revelation, against which objections have not been made. From the sublime doctrine of the Trinity to that of the Resurrection of the dead, every link in the golden chain of revealed truth has been assailed by all the power and ingenuity, that men of "corrupt minds" have been able to command and exert. The doctrine of Original Sin, from its peculiar prominence in the system of supernatural revelation, has received its full share of inveteracy and opposition. A host of sneers, cavils and artful objections have been brought to bear against it. But it still retains its place in the great system, and moves on in its orbit of light. In its defence the friends of truth may have to encounter trouble, obloquy and much labor, but its destruction is impossible. For sooner may heaven and earth pass away, than one of the words or doctrines of "the Amen, the faithful and true Witness."

The objections at present made against the leading doctrine, defended in the preceding pages, are all either of Pelagian or Arminian origin and have

been answered a thousand times ; yet as they are brought forward in something of a new dress, and are urged with much confidence and complacency, even to *the subverting of souls*, it becomes necessary still to meet them, undress them, expose and condemn them. In the progress of this Treatise, we have already anticipated and removed the greater part of these objections ; especially such as are levelled against particular parts of the general argument. There are a few, however, of a general character, which have not yet been noticed, and some of those that have been, require a more expanded answer than was before given. To introduce these and give them such answers, as we hope will be considered satisfactory, is our design in the present Chapter.

SEC. 1.—*The Objection, that the Doctrine is contrary to Common Sense, Answered.*

It is objected to the doctrine of Original Sin, as presented in the preceding pages, that it is contrary to the dictates of common sense. “The doctrine of imputed sin,” says the New Haven School, “is contrary to the decision of the competent unperverted reason of mankind ; i. e. contrary to common sense, and as such to be rejected.” Now, there are three things wrong about this ob-

jection.—*First*, there is a *begging of the question*, or a taking for granted the point in dispute. The doctrine of Original Sin, as we hold it, implies the *corruption* or *perversion* of *human reason* in spiritual matters, yet the objection speaks of the “unperverted reason of mankind ;” hence the objection can have no other force than that of a bare contradiction. And, indeed, it is surprising to hear people talk of the “unperverted reason of mankind,” after what the Apostle has said—“The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him ; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned.” And Solomon says—“He that trusteth to his own understanding is a fool.”—*Secondly*, there is in the objection the setting up of a judge, whose *competency* to decide the controversy we deny ; and accordingly from whose decision, if it be against us, we have the right to appeal. Who made *common sense* “a judge over us” in this matter ? Does its jurisdiction extend to matters of pure revelation ? And besides, is it not a *prejudiced* judge ? Is not the carnal and unsanctified reason of mankind unfriendly, nay, positively inimical to the humbling and self-emptying doctrines of the Holy Bible ? Granting that reason is a competent judge in mere natural things, we can by no means allow it to

possess this dignity in “the things of the Spirit of God.”—And *Thirdly*, there is in the objection a *falsehood*, when it is asserted, that the doctrine in dispute is “contrary to common sense.” For it is only contrary to the *unsanctified* common sense of mankind, and not to the common sense of those, who have been taught, by the Spirit of God, the truth as it is in Jesus. This doctrine has never been opposed by the *sanctified* reason of the thousands, who have, in every age of the Church, embraced it, as one of God’s truths, and some of whom have died *martyrs* in its defence.

We protest, however, against the practice of determining any doctrine of revelation by an appeal to the common sense of mankind. By the Scriptures, and by them alone, must we determine “whether these things be so.” The doctrine in question is one of pure revelation. Our reason cannot be supposed to know any thing respecting the federal representative character of Adam—the hinge on which the whole controversy mainly turns. That point may be true or false, for any thing that reason knows to the contrary. But if the Bible reveals it that is enough, and reason, when sanctified by the grace of God, will never be found entering a decision against it. The Deist rejects revelation entirely, because it appears to

him to be *unreasonable*: The Unitarian rejects the doctrine of a Trinity of persons in the Godhead, because it appears to him to be *unreasonable*: Are they therefore right? And if the Pelagian and Arminian *et omne id genus* reject the doctrine of Original Sin, because to them it appears *unreasonable*; must we, therefore, conclude that they are right? Must we oppose and reject every thing as *false*, that is opposed by the corrupt reason of *some*? Besides is it not grossly absurd and even *ridiculous*, when we wish to ascertain whether a particular tenet be a *revealed* truth or not, to forsake the Bible, where, if it be a truth, it ought to be found, and go about and feel the pulse of common sense upon the subject? The Bible Christian will never be at the pains of enquiring after the decision of the common sense of a blind and ungodly race on any point, which he knows should be determined by the Scriptures alone. “To the law and to the testimony, if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them.”

SEC. 2.—*That it Militates against the Justice of God, Answered.*

The doctrine we maintain is objected to, on the ground, that it militates against the justice of God.

This objection proceeds upon the false assumption, that Adam's posterity were, in no respect whatever, concerned in his sin. We grant, indeed, that they had no actual agency in the commission of that sin, which "brought death into our world and all our woe;" but we hold, that they were concerned in it, when viewed as the legal representatives of Adam. The objectors entirely overlook this consideration. And it would become them, before urging their objection, to disprove, on solid scriptural ground, the representative character of Adam. But this it is impossible for them to do.—Is it then, a shocking absurdity, or does it imply an act of injustice in God, for him to treat us as guilty, on account of the sin of our federal representative? Then, is it as great an absurdity for the Holy Spirit to inform us, that all the tribes of Israel came to Hebron to make David king; when we are assured, that it was only the elders, the representatives of the tribes, that came. (2. Sam. v. 1. 3.) Although the great mass of the people were actually at home, attending to their own personal concerns, yet they were all present at Hebron, in their representatives, and were viewed as concurring in the act of making David king. And was there no injustice in imputing this act to all the individuals of the different tribes, which

was only personally performed by their representatives? No more, then, is it unjust in God to charge the sin of Adam to the account of all those, whom he, by a divine constitution, represented in the Covenant of works.—God imputes, for justification, the righteousness of Christ to all those whom he represented, when he fulfilled that righteousness. (Rom. iv. 11. 24. x. 3. 4.) Is it unjust in God to make this imputation? No more, then, is it unjust in him to impute, for condemnation, the sin of Adam to those whom he represented, at the time, when that sin was committed. Indeed for God to pursue a contrary course, in either of these cases, would, according to our apprehension of things, savor strongly of injustice.—Is the sin of the soul charged upon the body? Yes. Why so? In virtue of the union subsisting between them. In like manner, in virtue of the representative union subsisting between Adam and his posterity, his sin is imputed to them. Then, as to the want of original righteousness and the corruption of nature befalling them as a punishment of the sin of their representative, there is no injustice in this. If such procedure be viewed as unjust, who will undertake to vindicate the justice of God, in visiting the nation of Israel with three years of *famine*, on account of Saul's cruelty towards the Gibeon-

ites? or in directing seven of his sons to be *hung* for that sin of their father? (2 Sam. xxi.) This case, and others of a similar nature, which might be adduced, it would be well for the objectors to consider, before they charge the doctrine of “imputed sin” as being derogatory to the justice of God.

The truth is, our doctrine vindicates the justice of the divine government, while it is that of the objectors, which militates against it. One class of the objectors admit the *fact*, as clearly revealed in the Bible and confirmed by universal experience, that we are naturally corrupt and destitute of holiness. Now this is an evil. And is it not more in accordance with the principles of justice, to view it as inflicted in the way of punishment for the imputed sin of a legal representative, than as proceeding merely from an act of absolute sovereignty in God? To account for the existence of this evil, in the latter way, is certainly to array the sovereignty against the justice of God. But one divine perfection is never exercised at the expense of another.—Equally at variance with the honor of divine justice is the scheme adopted by another class of the objectors—that mankind as born into the world are neither holy nor unholy, but at the same time placed under a divine constitution, that in-

fallibly secures a *sinful act* as the *first* to be performed by them as moral agents. Now we ask where is the justice (to say nothing of the goodness) of God in placing innocent beings under such a constitution? Can these objectors solve the difficulty which their own system here creates? Yet these are the persons, who are continually crying out *injustice*, whenever the doctrine of imputation is mentioned! Were they to attend a little more to the insuperable difficulties which their own scheme involves, perhaps they might be brought, in order to acquit the justice of God, to see the necessity of embracing the very doctrine, which they now endeavor to ridicule and calumniate.

But in connection with the present objection and in support of it, it is urged, that God always inflicts punishment with exclusive reference to *personal transgression*; and consequently, that the doctrine, which would represent the children of Adam as involved in the punishment of his sin, is false. And here, as usual, a confident appeal is made to the "competent, unperverted reason of mankind!" But let our appeal be to God's infallible word, in order to ascertain, whether it be a fact, that "God always inflicts punishment with exclusive reference to personal transgression."—

And what do we there discover concerning the nature of *Messiah's* sufferings? Were they not truly a *punishment* for sin? And if so, for what sin? Not surely for any personal sin of his own, but *exclusively* for the sin of others. A bare denial that his sufferings constituted a legal punishment for sin will not be admitted, so long as the Scriptures are so express and pointed upon the subject. "Yea, let God be true, and every man a liar."—Isaiah, prophesying of the sufferings of Christ, declares—"He bare the sin of many." Corresponding to this Paul says—"Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many :'" And Peter—"He bare our sins in his own body on the tree." *To bear sin* or *iniquity* is a legal phrase, used to express the just punishment of sin, as is evident from the manner of its application in the law of Moses. How frequently there is it said of the transgressor, "he shall bear his iniquity," where nothing else than *punishment* can be designed? It is manifest, then, from this single argument, that Christ was punished; and it is equally as manifest that he was not punished for *personal* sin, for he had none, but for the sins of others. Yes, blessed truth! "Messiah was CUT OFF, but not FOR HIMSELF." "He was made a CURSE FOR US." "HE SUFFERED, THE JUST FOR THE UNJUST." This

single instance of distinguished punishment entirely overthrows the above position; and hence, we ask, why may not the children of Adam suffer punishment for a sin, which is not *personally* theirs? But it is said, for the sake of caution—even if Christ *was* punished for the sin of others, it was with his own consent; whereas the posterity of Adam have never consented to be punished for his eating of the forbidden fruit. Most cheerfully do we admit, that Christ suffered the punishment of our sins with his own consent; for in no other way could he, being a divine person, endure suffering of any kind. But was there not something, besides his own consent, requisite in order to render his punishment a just one? Could a righteous judge inflict punishment upon an innocent person, merely because he consented to it? Would such be a legal punishment—a punishment demanded by law? or would it not be a mere gratuitous punishment? Ought not a person to be guilty, in *legal reckoning*, before he can be justly punished, even though his consent were obtained? Accordingly, Christ not only consented to bear the punishment of the sins of his people, but to bear that punishment in their *law-room* and *stead*; and hence, in consequence of that consent, agreement, or stipulation, those sins were judicially set over

to his account, or *imputed* to him. Therefore, Christ's being punished for the sins of his people, his representees, with his own consent, is so far from overthrowing the doctrine of Imputation, that on the contrary, it greatly tends to establish it.

But, because it behooved the divine Redeemer to give his consent, in order to his being punished for the sins of his people, must we, therefore, infer, that God cannot justly punish mere creatures, without first obtaining their permission or consent to be punished? Must his infliction of punishment depend upon such an improbable circumstance? It is not usual, we believe, for the court to ask the criminal, convicted of a capital offense, whether he will *consent to be hung*; but hung he shall be, whether willing, or not; because law and justice demand it. Now the case before us stands thus,—Adam sinned, and by virtue of a representative union, all his posterity, were involved in his guilt; and therefore, God visits that guilt upon them, in a penal manner, without condescending to ask their consent. And we are not of those who would arraign Him, for so doing, at their bar, or who would say unto Him—"What doest thou?"

Besides, where is the difference, in point of justice, between *punishing* persons for a sin, which is not personally theirs, and *justifying* persons on ac-

count of deeds, which are not personally theirs? But sinners, receiving justification before God, are not justified on the ground of their own personal deeds—"For by the deeds of the law shall no flesh living be justified"—their justification is wholly grounded upon the good deeds performed by another, even their representative, Christ Jesus, the Lord. Against this procedure on the part of God, the cry of injustice may be raised with the same propriety, as against the condemnation of men for the sin of their representative. A righteous judge will know no difference between these two cases, so far as the principle of justice is concerned.

Again, if God may not *punish* for acts, which are not personal, why should he *impute* acts, which are not personal? Some, indeed, deny that he ever does so, but this only shows their reckless disregard of the word of God: For, says the Apostle Paul—"David also describeth the blessedness of the man unto whom the Lord imputeth righteousness WITHOUT WORKS." (Rom. iv. 6.) The righteousness, here said to be imputed, does not consist in a man's own personal acts, for it is a righteousness *without works* on his part, but in the personal acts which have been performed by another, even Jesus Christ. But if God impute a righteousness, which is not personal, for justifica-

tion, may he not also with the same consistency, impute a sin, which is not personal for condemnation? And now, we ask, where is the difference, so far as justice is concerned, between the *imputation* of an act, which is not personal, and the infliction of *punishment* for an act, which is not personal? We leave it to the objectors to answer. And from what has been stated, the candid reader will easily discover whose doctrine it is, that involves contradiction and absurdity, and militates with the justice of God.

SEC. 3.—*That it strips Man of a Free-will and State of Probation, Answered.*

Our doctrine is supposed to be erroneous, because it destroys man's *free-will* and consequently his present state of *probation*. It is true, the doctrine we maintain does all this. But before the objection can in the least affect it, it must be proved, not from *common sense*, but from Scripture testimony, that unregenerated men do possess this free-will and are placed by Jehovah in a state of probation. By a *free will* is here meant a will equally able and equally inclined to choose good as well as evil; and by a *state of probation*, such an arrangement of God concerning fallen men, that their eternal condition depends upon the right

or wrong exercise of this *free-will*. Now, we have no hesitation in declaring, that there is no such doctrine as this taught in the whole compass of divine revelation—a doctrine entirely subversive of all christian hope.—We know, indeed, that Adam was created with a perfect freedom of will ; that is, he had the *power* of choosing to do good or evil, just as he saw fit—he could either act in the capacity of a humble worshipper and servant of the most high God, or he could turn rebel and enlist in the service of the old Serpent—he had sufficient power to have stood during the whole course of his appointed trial, otherwise his probation would have been a mere mockery, and he had the power to fall from his allegiance, as the event sadly demonstrated. It is true, the Almighty, who created him, could have prevented his fall—could, by the continual bestowment of grace, have preserved him in the path of rectitude. But it is also true, that such divine procedure would have destroyed every thing like a probationary state ; as it would have placed Adam in a state of confirmation, rather than in a state of trial, where perfect obedience, performed by strength already bestowed, was set forth as the condition of the everlasting continuance and increased enjoyment of the divine favor, both to himself and his repre-

sented posterity. However, when Adam sinned and fell from his primitive glory, his state of probation came to an end, and with it all his original freedom of will. For it will hardly be maintained, that Adam notwithstanding his fall and forfeiture of the divine favor, still retained the same power as formerly of *willing* what was acceptable in the sight of God; especially too, when it is remembered that he lost "the image of God," and was seized with a spiritual death.

But how stands the case with his descendants? Do they possess the same freedom of will, that Adam had in his state of innocence? And are they, therefore, also placed in a state of probation? Certainly not. This would be a dangerous sentiment to espouse—a dangerous principle to act upon. Because, by placing fallen man in a state of probation, you virtually deny that he has sustained any loss by the fall; you still give him the moral power of doing good as well as evil—of obeying God as well as disobeying him—of loving as well as hating him: And besides, you overthrow the whole system of grace, exalt human merit, and give ground for boasting. For, if you place man in a probationary state, if you mean any thing, you mean that he can save himself—that he can fulfill the conditions connected with

that state—that he can attain to the blessedness of heaven; otherwise than through the righteousness of our God-man Mediator; and when you get him to heaven, you most effectually seal his lips when that adoring and everlasting thanksgiving song passes through the entire circle of the Redeemed—“Unto him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood, and hath made us kings and priests unto God and his Father; to him be glory and dominion for ever and ever.”

It betrays, therefore, great ignorance of the word of God to assert, that man is still in a state of probation—that he still possesses a perfect freedom of will. The truth is, until regenerated by the Spirit of God, he has no power nor inclination to do any thing, that is holy and acceptable in the sight of God: “To do good he has no knowledge:” “Unto every good work he is reprobate:” “It is not in man that walketh to direct his steps:” “Every imagination of the thoughts of his heart is only evil continually:” “The things of the Spirit of God are foolishness to him—and he cannot know them:” “He is dead in trespasses and sins—his understanding is darkened—his heart is fully set in him to do evil—he is far from righteousness—he is alienated from the life of God.” What then becomes of the boasted *free-will* of the

spiritually *dead* sinner, if we take the Scriptures for our guide in matters of faith? Surely a *freedom of will* to what is good without the *power of willing* what is good, is an absurdity, a contradiction. But the scriptures just cited teach, as plainly as language can do, that fallen, unregenerated man possesses no power to will what is good and well pleasing in the sight of God. Indeed, if he had such power, hell would be comparatively empty ; for all, unless they were perfectly demented, would exert their free will, in order to escape hell and secure heaven ; since it is written—"He that believeth shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be damned."

But though fallen man does not possess the freedom or power of will to choose and pursue what is good, he possesses it to choose and pursue what is evil. Here he is perfectly free. Every sin he commits is an act of choice, and not of constraint : And though his will be exclusively inclined to the choice of evil, no compulsory power is exerted upon him—he acts with the greatest liberty—he sins because it is his pleasure to sin.

Thus, then it appears, that the objection is based upon a false assumption, taking that for granted which has no foundation in truth ; and consequently cannot in the least invalidate the doctrine,

which asserts the entire corruption of human nature, as flowing from the *imputed sin* of Adam.

SEC. 4.—*That it divests Man of the Character of a Moral Agent, Answered.*

The doctrine of Original Sin, as we hold it, is represented as divesting man of the character of a moral agent; because it places him, as soon as born, under a sentence of condemnation, ascribes to him a corrupt moral nature, and withholds from him a free-will. Although our doctrine, either directly or indirectly, does all that is here charged upon it in the premises, we nevertheless contend, that man is still a moral agent and strictly accountable to God for all his conduct. But we deny that a free-will, in the sense before explained, is necessary to constitute a moral agent; or that the condemnation, or corruption of man can divest him of the principle of moral agency. The following remarks of the Rev. R. Smith, a scottish divine of the last century, whose name has already been introduced to the reader, fully meet the present objection and destroy all its force:—"Our will is naturally set upon, and bends to evil; yet we remain moral agents. Moral agency consists in acting with a rational choice. An act is moral when it proceeds from a will capable of rational acting.

By reason of what is it that man is allowed to be a moral agent, when it is refused that a beast is such? Is it not, that the power of choice in the one, is quite diverse from that power in the other? That by which man chooses, is a rational will: that by which the beast makes choice, is instinct, or brutal appetite. This instinct is suited unto the nature of a creature without reason: the human will is adapted unto, and made to answer a creature having reason. The parts or shape of the carcase of any beast, do not more differ from those of the body of a man, than brutal instinct, and a human will do. Who does not see a most glaring difference between brutal appetite, and rational volition! This volition lies at the root of human agency, therefore it must be moral; while the acting is directed by a *rational* will, it must be, I say, moral. Now the *rational* nature of the will does not perish in the sinner. If his will was not rational, he would cease to be a rational being. I say, I cannot see whence the morality of agency takes its rise, if it spring not from the rationality of the agent. It is not from the moral dispositions in our nature, whether good or bad, that we are moral agents; but it is from the rationality of our nature. A man will only cease to be a moral agent, when he is stript of a rational will.

“I have said, that our will is bended by sin, but it is not destroyed by it. The Jews corrupted the temple; but the Romans destroyed it. Sin depraves the will as to its moral disposition, but it does not strip it of its essential form. The corruption of our nature affects the will, but in a way suited to the nature thereof. I mean, it does not destroy the being, but spoils the goodness of it. Man becoming a sinner, loses no part of his nature; neither does the will lose any part of its nature. It being the particular nature of his will that renders him a moral agent, that nature of his will continuing, he must remain such an agent.

“It is worth observing, that those who are against us, say, that a person’s will may be biassed to any evil, by *acquired* habits, and yet remain a moral agent. Now, since one remains a moral agent, even when his will is biassed by *acquired* habits, what is to hinder his being an agent of the same sort when his will is biassed to evil *from the womb*? The corruption of the will bends it, but does not break it. The man who is under the power of uncleanness, is a slave to it; his will is bent to it so that he cannot turn his back on that lust, yet we will not say, that he has not a rational will.”

SEC. 5.—*That it is Contrary to the Divine Declaration, that “the Son shall not bear the Iniquity of the Father,” Answered.*

It is seldom, that attempts are made to overthrow the doctrine of the Imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, by arguments expressly drawn from the word of God. There is one text, however, which the enemies of this doctrine claim in justification of their opposition to it. It is this—“The soul that sinneth it shall die: The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son; the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him.” (Ezk. xviii. 20.) But a little attention to this passage, viewed in its connection, is sufficient to show, that it entirely fails to answer the purpose for which it is adduced. It must be interpreted in consistency with plain and acknowledged facts. But it is a fact, which few will be disposed to deny, that *sometimes* God does visit upon children the iniquities of their fathers. To do so, he claims as his sovereign right, a right which he will never relinquish; for he has embodied it in the second precept of his unchangeable law—“I am a jealous God, visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the

children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me." And that he has exercised this prerogative in the infliction of sore judgments upon children, on account of the sins of their fathers is undeniable. Witness the case of Achan's children, the case of the seven sons of Saul, and many others that might be specified. Nor was this principle of divine government peculiar to Old Testament times; it has been acted on since the introduction of the new dispensation. Says Christ to the Jews—"Behold I send unto you prophets and wise men and scribes; and some of them ye shall kill and crucify; and some of them shall ye scourge in your synagogues, and persecute them from city to city; THAT UPON YOU may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias, son of Barachias, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar." (Matt. xxiii. 34. 35.)—Hence the text under consideration cannot mean, that the iniquities of fathers are never visited upon children.

Again, what was the case of the Jews in Babylon, who are addressed in the chapter, from which the objection is taken? They are represented, in the second verse, as using the proverb—"The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's

teeth are set on edge." Was this proverb totally destitute of truth, in an unpervverted application of it to their case? No, surely: For they were now actually enduring evils on account of the sins of their progenitors of a former age. This is truly acknowledged by the prophet Jeremiah in his Lamentations. Personating the church he declares—"Our fathers have sinned, and are not; and we have borne their iniquities." This confession was unquestionably made under the influence of the Spirit of truth and piety. Besides, the case must have been so; for so it had been predicted, with respect, in particular, to the sins of Manasseh.—"I will cause them to be removed into all kingdoms of the earth, because of Manasseh, the son of Hezekiah, king of Judah, for that which he did in Jerusalem." (Jer. xv. 4. See also 2 Kings, xxi. 10—16.) It is undeniable, then, that the Jews in Babylon were bearing the iniquities of their fathers; and therefore, that, the proverb which they used was not wholly destitute of truth, in respect to their miserable condition. Nevertheless in the sense, in which they used the proverb, and according to the application which they made of it, it had no foundation in truth. For they supposed themselves to be entirely innocent; and that the evils, they were groaning under, had befallen them *ex-*

clusively on account of the sins of their fathers. This they considered very hard treatment. And hence they reflected on the equity of the divine procedure towards them, saying "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge,"—the prophets have told us, that the flagitious crimes, committed by some of our forefathers, would, in a following generation be visited upon the nation. And we are the unfortunate people, on whom the threatened evil has fallen. Yes our fathers, Manasseh and Amon, and those living in their day, were abominable transgressors ; and now, poor, innocent we, without the least fault to be laid to our charge, have to bear their iniquities ! Now, it is against this false and impious view of the case, that Jehovah, in this chapter, is found vindicating the ways of his Providence. And we must understand him in his vindication, as referring to what was wrong in their representation of the matter, viz : that they, without any sin in themselves, were suffering on account of their fathers' sins. This he expressly denies. Although he does, as in the present case, visit the iniquities of the fathers upon the children, yet it is not without the consideration of sin being found in the children. They are viewed as guilty independently of their fathers' sins. Hence "The soul

that sinneth it shall die : The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son."

Now from this view of the whole case, it appears manifest, that this scripture is very far from asserting, that *Adam's sin is not imputed to his posterity*. He is certainly not to be reckoned among the fathers referred to by, the Jews, in the second verse, and consequently he is not referred to by Jehovah, in his reply, contained in the words of the objection. And were it true, (as it is not,) that there is here an express denial, that the persons addressed were in any sense punished for the sins of their fathers, it would not follow that Adam's posterity were not punished for his sin. For the argument would only amount to this—because the sins of one part of Adam's children are not punished on another part of his children, therefore, his sin, which he as a representative committed, is not imputed to his representees. Any person will see that the conclusion is a perfect illegitimate. But should it be maintained, that Adam is included among the fathers referred to in this passage, and consequently that his children do not bear his iniquity ; we reply, that the conclusion is not admissible, because, contrary to the spirit of the passage and the whole word of God, it proceeds on the assump-

tion of the *innocence* of his posterity. But their innocence is a dream: Jehovah views them as guilty; yea, as having sinned in Adam, inasmuch as he was their representative, at the time he sinned. His sin is imputed to them as being virtually their own sin, it being the sin of their federal representative.

And this leads to the remark, that the passage from which the objection is taken furnishes a strong proof in favor of our doctrine. For it must be acknowledged, that [God, in his holy Providence, does visit the iniquities of fathers upon their children; but, according to the Scripture under consideration, he never does so without the existence of sin in the children themselves; that is, he views them as antecedently guilty, otherwise he would not visit upon them the iniquities of their fathers. Now mere infants are often sufferers on account of their fathers' transgressions. When Jehovah, according to his threatening, visited the sins of Manasseh upon the wicked Jews, their *little ones* were involved in the awful calamity. Jeremiah, most pathetically, describes the wretchedness of their condition—"The tongue of the sucking child cleaveth to the roof of his mouth for thirst; the young children ask bread and no man breaketh it unto them. The hands of the pitiful

women have soddened their own children, they were their meat in the destruction of the daughter of my people." (Lam. iv. 4. 10.) Terrible as were the sufferings of these infants, the infliction of them, we are assured, was not without the consideration of sin being found in themselves, antecedently to all consideration of the sins of their fathers. But as they were chargeable with no actual, personal sins, we ask, how could they be viewed as guilty, as chargeable with transgression, unless they had sinned in Adam, and were regarded as having his sin imputed to them?

SEC. 6.—*What it makes God the Author of Sin, Answered.*

A very grievous charge is brought against our doctrine, that it virtually makes God the author of sin. This charge is utterly groundless. Those who make it, "understand neither what they say, nor whereof they affirm." Surely to *impute* sin is a very different thing from being the *author* of it. The imputation of sin is the act of a judge declaring, that the sin already exists. The representative of the human family sinned, and God judicially reckons his sin to be the sin of his representees: Is this to make God the author of that sin? Then the judge, in reckoning the criminal to be

guilty, becomes the author of his guilt! And as to "original sin inherent," so far as God has any agency in it, we hold, that it is strictly a *punishment* on account of the imputed sin of our representative. But surely to *punish* sin is a very different thing from being the *author of it*: Otherwise the judge would be the author of all the crimes, which he, as the executor of the law, finds it to be his indispensable duty to punish. Moreover, if in the infliction of just punishment the criminal be placed in a condition involving the necessity of sinning, even this necessity is a part of his punishment and arises wholly from his own fault. Hence the judge is not only just in inflicting the punishment, but is also free from all blame of the authorship of the sinful consequences arising from that punishment. These few hints are sufficient to show that our doctrine is infinitely above the reach of the objection. And we hazard nothing in saying, that there is no other view taken in respect of Original Sin, against which the objection may not be urged with far greater propriety. For instance, let the New Haven School defend *their own* system against this objection, when they tell us, that our first acts as moral agents are *necessarily* sinful ones, in *consequence* of Adam's sin, and by a *fixed constitution* of God!

SEC. 7.—*That it is Inconsistent with the Commandments of God, Answered.*

According to the view, we have taken of Original Sin, mankind have no power to obey the commandments of God; but it is objected, that the very fact of their being still required to obey, implies the possession of the requisite power, and consequently, that our view of the doctrine must be incorrect. In the preceeding pages, we attempted to prove, with what success the reader may judge, that mankind are punished with the loss of ability to keep God's law, on account of the sin of their federal head. The present objection, therefore, only lies against that particular argument. If, however, what is asserted in the objection were true, we should feel disposed to relinquish the whole doctrine. But is it true, because God enjoins duties upon men, that, therefore, they must possess the power to perform them? O yes, cries the objector; for if they had not this power, God would be dealing unfairly and unjustly in demanding obedience of them, even as it would be cruel and unjust for a master to command his servant, who had lost his limbs, to arise and walk and perform some impossible service! The objection simply amounts to this, God must always meas-

ure his commands by the creature's ability to obey them. And if the creature has lost all ability to obey holy precepts, then he must receive such as are unholy ; for, it seems, it would be cruelly unjust to cross his inclination and insult his corruption with such as are holy ! To suit his particular exigency, the old precepts of the divine law must be expunged and new ones, more congenial to his nature and more within his power to obey, inserted ; such as the following,—Thou shalt hate God ; thou shalt hate thy neighbor ; thou shalt love sin ; thou shalt serve the devil, &c. ! But if it be impossible for the Holy One to give such commands as these, it is also impossible for him to abdicate his throne and retire from the moral government of man. How then is he to act ? Precisely as he has done—to give holy precepts, even though man has lost his ability for obedience. For surely this loss on the part of man, which was occasioned by sin, cannot cancel Jehovah's right still to claim obedience, as the moral governor of the world.

Now, that the commands of God do not imply the power of obedience in those to whom they are addressed, is evident from this, that the performance of the things commanded is ascribed to God himself. For example, the sinner is commanded to “make himself a new heart ;” but this is the work

of God—"The Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart"—"A new heart will I give you." Again, the sinner is commanded to "awake from the dust and arise from the dead;" but this spiritual resurrection is the work of God—"You hath he quickened who were dead in trespasses and sins." Examples of this kind are numerous and do fully establish the want of power in fallen man to "do the commandments of God." Nor can we perceive any inconsistency in God's requiring of apostate sinners what they are unable to perform, which may not equally be objected against our Saviour's commanding the man with the *withered hand* "to stretch it forth;" or the *impotent* man "to arise and take up his bed and walk;" or the *dead* man lying in the grave "to come forth." These commands may be charged with inconsistency, with as much propriety as those contemplated by the objection, since there was no ability in the subjects of them for the performance of what was required.

Once more, among the commands laid on fallen men, we find one enjoining *perfection*. "Be ye perfect, even as your Father, who is in heaven, is perfect." (Matt. v. 48.) Does this command imply, that we possess the power of becoming as perfect as God? Few, even of the objectors, will

have the presumption to affirm it. Their whole objection, then, falls to the ground. And, by the way, we have witnessed a most singular inconsistency in some of the divines, who follow in the wake of the New Haven School. They zealously taught their hearers, that they could *regenerate* themselves ; for God had commanded them to “make to themselves a new heart,” which he never would have done, were they not in possession of the requisite power. Some believed them, and finding moreover that they were also commanded to be *perfect*, which implied, according to their teachers, that they could do so, they went to work and actually became perfect, as they supposed. But behold, these *perfect ones* were soon *ex-communicated* by those who had bewildered them ! And for what reason ? Just, because, they were simple enough to believe their ministers and to act agreeably to their instructions ! Now this glaring inconsistency on the part of the teachers, and this horrible delusion on the part of the taught, help to show, how groundless is the assertion contained in the objection, and consequently, that our argument remains unaffected by it.

SEC. 8.—*That it Contradicts the very Nature of Sin which Consists in Voluntary Action, Answered.*

Another objection, paraded forth with great confidence, is, that “all sin consists in voluntary action.” Now were it true, that all sin consisted in voluntary action, or proceeded from an exercise of the will, our doctrine would shake to its very foundation. But this assertion is not true. It is so far from being true, that all sin consists in *action*, that much of it consists in a *want* of action. This, we think, will hardly be disputed, after mature reflection. And that all sinful *action* must be *voluntary*, or flow from an exercise of the will, is what can never be admitted. Surely an act of the will is not necessary in order to originate *evil desires* in the heart. These naturally arise from a false and distorted conception of things, and not immediately from an exercise of the will; because, instead of being *obedient* to the will, they *govern* the will. Nay, are there no *sinful motives*, which influence the will and guide it in its operations? Or is there no such thing as *sinful motives*? Or will the absurdity be maintained, that motives *depend* on an exercise of the will? Indeed it is unquestionable, that *evil desires*, *sinful motives* and

unholy thoughts may arise even in the soul of a believer, when his will stands in opposition to them. But though they are thus involuntary, the believer views them as real violations of "the commandment which is exceeding broad." Hence his language—"The evil that I would not, that do I."

Again, the word of God teaches us, that the neglect of an *unknown* duty is a sin. The law of God, which is perfect, requires of all its subjects a knowledge of all the duties which it prescribes. Yet through ignorance of those duties, they become in many instances neglected. But all such neglect is *involuntary*; for it cannot be said with any propriety, that a person voluntarily neglects to perform a duty, of which he is entirely ignorant: Nevertheless such neglect is sinful. For, persons, under the law, offending in this manner, were required to present a sin-offering to the Lord to make atonement for their souls. (Num. xv. 27.) It is very far, then, from being a universal truth, that "all sin consists in voluntary action." And, therefore the objection has no weight, when urged against the doctrine of Original Sin, whether *imputed* or *inherent*.*

* See Chap. iii., Sec. 9, and Notes pp. 158 178.

SEC. 9.—*The Objection, that Original Sin cannot be Repented of, Answered.*

The last objection, that we consider worthy of notice, as made to the doctrine, which we have been endeavoring to defend, is, that Original Sin is something which cannot be repented of, and consequently is no sin. To this objection we oppose, as a sufficient reply, the following extract from a Sermon on Original Sin, by Dr. Thomas Goodwin, a divine of distinguished learning and piety, belonging to the *puritanic* school :

“We may, from what has been said, take an affecting view of our state and condition by nature : And as it is useful for us all, even those that are by grace delivered from it, to be looking to it ; so it is necessary for them that are under it to be fully acquainted with it. It is, at once, a state full of guilt, and a state full of corruption and defilement : We are all of us guilty before God, having the guilt of the first sin righteously imputed to us ; and this renders us obnoxious to the divine displeasure : and we are all polluted and unclean, having corrupted and defiled natures derived to us. A spiritual leprosy has overspread all our powers and faculties, and this renders us loathsome to God, and puts us in a state of separation

from him. What a fearful change has sin made in us! The soul, that was made in the image of God, is stript of its native righteousness and holiness, and invested with contrary qualities :—“There is as great a difference, says one, between the corruption of the soul in its degenerate state, and its primitive purity, as between the loathsomeness of a dead carcase, and the beauty of a living body.” Sad change indeed! and to be lamented with tears of confusion: How should this humble us before God, and hide pride forever from our eyes? How should it fill us with self-loathing and self-abhorrence, affect our souls with shame and sorrow, and cause us to repent in dust and ashes? especially when we repent of and confess our actual transgressions, we should, in the first place, confess and bewail this corrupt fountain of them: So does David in my text. This Psalm is recorded as a public testimony to the church, and the world, of his repentance of a great sin; and, we see, he does, in a particular manner, bewail and acknowledge this. And so did the church in Isaiah’s prophecy, (Isa. lxiv. 6.) When they humbled themselves, they not only acknowledged that their *righteousness was as a menstruous filthy rag*, but they chiefly complained of the uncleanness of

their persons, and that with respect to their natures ; *We are all as an unclean thing.*

“I am sensible some have made it a question, Whether we ought to repent of and be humbled for our original sin? But as the practice of the church, and the penitent Psalmist, in my text, shews they made no question of it, so we might evince, from many considerations, that this is a just ground of our repentance and humiliation. I will only mention one, and that is, that this is not only a sin in itself, but the fruitful parent of all other sins: That it is a misery, all grant, who acknowledge the thing itself; but that it is also properly a sin, appears, I think, sufficiently from the apostle John’s definition, who makes the formality of sin to consist in its opposition to the law, (1. John iii. 4.) “Sin is a transgression of the law.” Whatever is contrary to the law of God, and forbid in it, is a sin; but the corruption of our nature is forbid in the law, and contrary to what God requires therein: God requires “truth in the inward part;” but original corruption is the want, or rather the reverse of this. We are commanded to be *holy*, and that not only in our actions, but in our natures, for we are commanded to be “*holy as God is holy* ;” and so the want of holiness, which is the privative part of this sin, is forbid: We are moreover commanded to “love the Lord our God,

with all our heart ;” and so the heart’s inclination to hate God, which is the positive part of this sin, is forbid : In a word, there is in it a non-conformity to the whole law of God ; and a nonconformity to, is a transgression of the whole law. If therefore the apostle’s definition is just, the corruption of our nature is a sin ; and accordingly it is frequently called so in scripture, and acknowledged and confessed as such, by the saints, both in the Old and New Testament : So it is by David in our text ; and so it is by the apostle Paul, who bewailed and aggravated it exceedingly, (Rom. vii.) He not only complains of it as a misery, but he confesses and bewails it as a sin ; and lest we should think it a small peccadillo, a sin of an ordinary size, he calls it a *sin exceedingly*, hyperbolically, *sinful*.

“ Against this it is frequently objected ; it is not a sin, because it is not voluntary : But should we admit this rule, that whatever is not voluntary is not a sin, to be just, which will not hold true universally, and without limitation, even when applied to actual sins ; yet natural corruption is voluntary in some respects ; it is voluntary in its principle and cause : As it was voluntarily contracted by Adam, so he therein being our federal head and representative, his will was the will of us all : But this is not all, for this corruption is inherent in the

will, as its subject. If Adam had derived a bodily disease only to his posterity, it might have been an involuntary evil, because the diseases of the body may be foreign to the soul : But when the corruption invades the internal faculties, it is denominated from the subject wherein it is seated. What though it does not proceed originally from any act of the will in us? yet the consent of the will accompanies it, or rather it is itself the natural bias or inclination of the will to evil, and therefore to say that it is altogether involuntary, is no less than a contradiction. However, it is, to be sure, voluntary in us, with respect to an after-consent, and in the effects of it : Who amongst us can say, We never consented to our natural corruption, were never well-pleased with it, never cherished it by occasions of sin, never strengthened it by acts of sin, and never resisted the means whereby it should be mortified and subdued? All which are evidences of an actual consent. Now, if it is a sin, we ought to repent of it, and be humbled for it; for that we ought to be thus affected to, and by every sin, no one will deny. And this would further appear, if I could shew that this is not only a sin in itself, but the fruitful parent of all other sins: But, having hinted at this before, I must not enlarge upon it now."

The pious author of the foregoing extract, relating the circumstances connected with his conversion and particularly his strong natural bias to Arminian principles, thus speaks, in his Memoirs, of his own experience concerning the truth of Original Sin :

“But next I was brought to enquire into, and consider, what should have been the original cause, at the bottom of this fore-mentioned sinfulness, both in my heart and life. And after I had well debated with myself, that one place, (Rom. v. 12 :) “By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned; that is, *in whom*, or *in that all have sinned*; meaning, that it was in him they all sinned; for they had not, in and of themselves, committed any actual transgression (as those that die infants) after the similitude of Adam’s transgression. Which limitation is cautiously there added by the Apostle to shew, that they had not actually sinned of themselves, but were simply involved in his act of sinning. This caused me necessarily to conceive thus of it, that it was the guilt, or demerit, of that one man’s disobedience, that corrupted my nature. Under such like apprehensions as these, did my spirit lie convicted so strongly of this great truth, that being

gone to bed some hours before, and filled with these meditations, I in the end of all rose out of bed being alone, and solemnly fell down on my knees before God the Father of all the family in heaven, and *did of my own accord assume and take on me the guilt of that sin, as truly as any of my own actual sins.*"

CHAPTER X.

THE CONCLUSION.

Having, as we believe, fully established the truth of the important doctrine, had under consideration, and removed the principal objections that have been urged against it, we shall now conclude the discussion by making a few practical reflections : And—

1. The subject discussed should lead to a pious contemplation of the *sovereign authority* of God. Man, in his innocence, was soon given to understand that the Author of his being was a sovereign, possessed of authority, absolute and uncontrollable. And there was a noble congruity in this. For, without being fully penetrated with such a practical conviction, he was in danger of regarding himself as independent. Hence, he received a very lively display of sovereign authority, on the part of the Lord God, in the positive precept given him respecting “the tree of the knowledge of good and evil;” and also in the fact of his being constituted the moral, representing head of all his posterity. In the former case, a thing, in itself totally indifferent, was made the test of man’s fealty to his Lord ; in the latter, a relation of a supernatural order, such as had no foundation in nature,

was established. And neither the one nor the other could be impugned as *unreasonable*. For the sovereign authority of God was equally the foundation of both. And the *mere will* of God, however manifested, whether in the giving of precepts, or in the constitution of relations, is an all-sufficient reason for the existence of the thing, and should eternally silence all the cavils of the creature and command his most implicit obedience and faith. Hence, the divine procedure, in relation to holy Adam, could not fail to discover to him the sovereign and absolute supremacy of his Maker, and teach him his own dependence, duty and interest. And a consideration of that procedure should still have the same effect upon us. In our fallen condition we eminently need to be impressed with a sense of the sovereign authority of the Lord our God. This is necessary, in order, not only to secure our obedience to him, but also to lead us to acquiesce in those ways of his, which, the short-sightedness of human reason cannot penetrate. Accordingly, let every whisper of carnal reason against the performance of any commanded duty, or against the belief of any supernaturally revealed truth, be hushed into perpetual silence by the thunder of Jehovah's word—"Be still and know, that I AM God."

2. In the federal headship of Adam, we may see a display of the *goodness* of God. Considering the infinite distance necessarily intervening between the Creator and the creature, the establishment of a covenant with man and dealing with him, in a pactional manner, about his eternal happiness, was surely, on the part of the Most High, an astonishing act of goodness and condescension. This was conferring a dignity on man, to which he had no claim ; and exalting him to a fellowship with heaven, to which, otherwise, he could not have aspired. But the divine goodness was no less strikingly displayed in the representative character, with which Adam was invested in that federal transaction. Thereby all his posterity were taken upon trial in him. And hence in that supernatural investiture, the goodness of God was displayed both towards him and all his represented posterity,—towards him, as it held forth the most powerful motives to obedience, and as it guaranteed to his obedience alone a reward, which would redound to the eternal happiness of countless millions,—towards his posterity, as their immortal interests, from the nature of things, would be more secure in the hands of such a representative, than if placed in their own. They were to be brought into existence in a state of infancy ; he

was created in a state of perfect manhood. He, therefore, was better qualified for the management of their concerns, than they would have been themselves. True, indeed, he failed in keeping the covenant, but this only shows the greater certainty of their failure, had they, as successively brought into being, been placed upon trial in their own persons. And for aught we know, in this latter state of things, it might have been inconsistent with the divine government to have admitted the interposition of a Mediator—such gracious interposition having found no place in the case of the apostate angels, whose fall from their first estate was not owing to the disobedience of a representative. Hence, so far from regarding the federal headship of the first man, as an *evil*, a *hardship*, we ought to consider it, as unfolding a bright display of the infinite condescension and goodness of the High and lofty One, who has heaven for his throne and earth for his footstool.

3. In the federal headship of Adam we see also a complete vindication of the *justice* and *holiness* of God, in his inflicting sufferings upon infants. There is scarcely any circumstance connected with the lot of man, more painful, in its nature, than the sufferings of infants. It is acknowledged, that these sufferings come not of themselves, but are

inflicted by the God of Providence. They often arise, and they necessarily arrest the attention of the thoughtful. But how are they to be reconciled with the justice and holiness of God? The solution of this question is, in particular, deeply interesting and important to the believer. It would greatly mar his christian peace and comfort of mind, were he here left to grope his way through a labyrinth of doubt and painful conjecture. But God has not relinquished him to darkness and wild speculation, on a subject so deeply interesting. He has revealed a sufficient reason to justify his character and the acts of his Providence in the infliction of infantile suffering—"By the offense of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation." "As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, even so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned." "Behold I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me"—Hence, infants, in their sufferings, are not to be regarded as innocent: their sufferings are not inflicted in an arbitrary manner: they are truly sinners—their representative sinned, and they in him: his sin is justly, in virtue of the representative union, reckoned to their account; and one fruit of this is the corruption of their nature, and another the sufferings which they en-

duce. But overlook the representative character of Adam and the consequent imputation of his sin to his posterity, and you cannot satisfactorily account for the sufferings and death of your infants, nor vindicate the justice and holiness, of your God.

4. The subject teaches us the unspeakable loss mankind have sustained by the fall of Adam. We know, it is not congenial to the pride of the human heart to admit, that any damage has been incurred by the fall. Vain man would still arrogate to himself all the dignity and glory that belonged to the primitive state. But his boast is groundless and vain. It is far otherwise than he imagines. In the light of divine truth, and in perfect consonance with the dictates of experience, we learn, that the fall of Adam has affected the most grievous loss—a loss sufficient to make angels weep. By that dismal event our nature has been stripped of its original glory—We have lost the image of God; we have lost the most delightful communion with God; we have lost that innocence and righteousness and immortality that were primitive with our nature; we have lost all true happiness; we have lost all ability to serve God in a holy and acceptable manner; and, in a word, we have lost all spiritual desires after the enjoyment of God as our

eternal portion. Hence in the view of all this loss, we may well exclaim in the language of the mourning prophet—"How is the gold become dim! how is the most fine gold changed!"—"The crown is fallen from our head; woe unto us, that we have sinned!"

5. How wretched and dismal is the condition of men by nature! They have not only sustained a most grievous loss, but are also involved in evils of a positive and most awful nature. They are under the condemnation and curse of a broken law; their hearts are morally corrupt; they are dead in sin; they are by nature children of wrath; they are exposed also to all the miseries connected with a mortal nature, and all the evils incident to a fallen state. And worse than all, they are obnoxious, after death, to the endurance of the unmingled wrath of God, in hell, for ever and ever. Such is the natural condition of all the descendants of guilty Adam. Nor is this all, they have no ability to better their condition. Their impotence is commensurate with their guilt and wretchedness. They can neither make satisfaction to the offended justice of God for the guilt that lies already upon them, nor prevent the future accumulation of that guilt and consequent wrath, by acts of holy obedience. Indeed, were the eternal salvation of their

souls offered them, on condition of their performing a single act of holy obedience, such as the law of God requires, the offer would be worthless, as the condition could never be performed. Thus the natural condition of all mankind is, in itself considered, if not as wretched, at least as hopeless and desperate, as the condition of the apostate angels. Whatever, therefore, the pride of the human heart may say to the contrary, and however it may indulge in the Laodicean boast of self-sufficiency, there is nothing more certain from the word of God, than that all the children of Adam, are, by nature, "wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked."

6. There is something awfully evil in the nature of sin. This is evident from that loss and wretchedness, which it has introduced into the family of man. When we consider that God is essentially good, and infinitely disposed to communicate of his goodness to the creatures of his power, we can only account for the sad reverse that has taken place in the condition of man, by having recourse to the evil nature of sin. Surely it was sin, that dried up those streams of divine benignity, which flowed to man, while in his state of innocence; that caused the woful deprivation which his nature has experienced; and that has placed him in his

present state of degradation and wretchedness. Indeed, had it not been for the malignant influence of sin, our earth would yet have remained an Eden, and perpetual friendship and the most endearing intercourse would have been maintained between God and man. We have, therefore, learned to our sad experience, "that it is an evil thing and bitter that we have forsaken the Lord our God." The ruins of the fall are a monument, on which is deeply engraven the evil and malignant nature of sin. Hence we should count sin as our worst enemy, fight against it, zealously study its extermination, and pray the God of forgiveness for deliverance from its eternal and dreadful consequences.

7. How extensive also is the empire of sin! Revelation informs us, that sin sways its iron sceptre over two distinct classes of subjects, fallen angels and fallen men. The number of the former we know not, only it is exceedingly great; the number of the latter is equal to the whole posterity of Adam, except where grace has interposed a rescue. And even here, in the first instance, there is no exception, since sin *has* reigned over all the myriads of human beings that have already been called into existence, and *will* reign over all that are yet to be called into existence. Mankind are all born in the empire of sin, and are by nature its

wretched subjects. And over all these subjects the dominion of sin is most complete. It possesses and controls both soul and body. The understanding, the will, the conscience, the affections are all under its jurisdiction and influence ; and the members of the body are become the willing “instruments of unrighteousness unto sin.” How extensive, then, is the empire of sin, and how complete the dominion, which it exercises ! Strange attempts have been made to discover the reason, why God has permitted the erection of this malignant empire in our world. Thus, it has been maintained, that “the existence of sin is necessary in a moral system,” that “God in adopting the best moral system, could not prevent the existence of sin,” and that “sin is the necessary means of the greatest good of the universe.” These and similar positions have had, and still have, their zealous and pugnacious advocates ; who, by the way, in supporting their respective *hypotheses*, are not a little chargeable with what the Apostle calls “vain philosophy,” and with using what he also denominates “great swelling words of vanity.” There is great danger in curiously prying into the unrevealed reasons of the procedure of the great and mysterious I AM, and in thus seeking to become “wise above what is written.” Job, in descanting

upon the works of God, piously exclaims, "Lo, these are parts of his ways; but how little a portion is heard of him!" But taking revelation for our guide, we may safely affirm, that of all possible ends, Jehovah, in his infinite wisdom, has selected his own glory as the best and most exalted, and that all things are made, permitted, ordered, and governed with a view to the promotion of that end. Consequently it was for the manifestation of himself, for the brighter display of his unrivalled perfections, and for securing an eternal revenue of glory from the mediatory work of Immanuel, that he has permitted the existence of sin in his dominions. This consideration is entirely satisfactory to every pious mind; and beyond this it is arrogant in the creature, it is daring presumption to penetrate, or even enquire. Let all then, with christian reverence and modesty, learn to adore the wisdom and sovereignty of God displayed in this matter, and to say with the inspired Apostle, "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!"

8. It appears from what has passed under discussion, that the soul of man is of immense value. Very wonderful have been the arrangements of God respecting it. With the manifest design of secur-

ing its welfare he condescended to enter into a Covenant with Adam. And when that Covenant was broken and the way of obtaining life by it forever lost, he revealed a Covenant which could not be broken, even the Covenant of Grace, as made with the Eternal Son in the name, and for the salvation, of guilty sinners. Thus God has always dealt with man, about his eternal interests, in the way of solemn covenant transaction. And this conclusively shows the great value that he attaches to the soul of man. Indeed, all the most interesting operations of his Providence in the government of the world, have had an immediate reference to the human soul: And so true is this, that, if those operations had never taken place, the glory of divine Providence would have been greatly obscured—nay, all would be blank, where now is beheld such an illustrious display of every perfection. Hence a consideration of the stupendous arrangements and operations of Heaven, in relation to the subject of the human soul, tends to illustrate the force of our Saviour's words—"What shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul? Or, what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" Hence, then, if the soul of man possesses such an immense value,

how diligent and careful should all be in seeking its eternal welfare !

9. The subject teaches us the necessity of fleeing by faith to the New Covenant for salvation. All mankind are naturally in a state of condemnation and fearful exposure to *the wrath to come*. And as they have been ruined by the Covenant of Works, they cannot be saved, but by the Covenant of Grace. To show fallen man the impossibility of obtaining life by the broken Covenant, Cherubim, with flaming swords, were stationed at the east of Eden to keep the way of the tree of life. And corresponding to this emblematical intimation, we read in language of the plainest import—“By the deeds of the law, no flesh living can be justified;” and again—“As many as are of the deeds of the law are under the curse; for it is written, “Cursed is every one, that continueth not in all things, which are written in the book of the law to do them.” Salvation, therefore, is only attainable by the Covenant of Grace. The gospel contains a revelation of this Covenant, assures us that its condition has been fulfilled by the great Mediator and Surety, and proposes all its gracious blessings to sinners for their acceptance. “Ho, every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters, and he that hath no money: come ye, buy and

eat ; yea, come, buy wine and milk without money and without price—Incline your ear and come unto me ; hear, and your soul shall live ; and I will make an everlasting covenant with you, even the sure mercies of David.” Let the needy and perishing sinner, then, take hold of this everlasting Covenant and in the language of an appropriating faith, say with the typical David—“He hath made with me an everlasting covenant, ordered in all things, and sure ; for this is all my salvation and all my desire.”

10. We may learn from the subject the necessity of regeneration. The imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity has been attended with the corruption of their whole nature. Hence, without a spiritual renovation, without a new creation, without a supernatural and gracious change effected in them, they can neither enjoy God, nor perform acts pleasing in his sight. “That which is born of the flesh is flesh ;” and “they that are in the flesh cannot please God.” “A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit.” “Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles ?” “We are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works.” “If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature ; old things are passed away ; behold, all things are become new.” “Verily, verily,

I say unto thee, except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God."

11. We may see from the subject, that salvation is wholly of grace. This necessarily follows from that guilt, and corruption, and impotence, in which, as we have seen, all the descendants of apostate Adam have become involved. The justice and holiness of God would have been illustriously glorified in the eternal destruction of them all. And such destruction must inevitably have taken place, but for the interposition of free and sovereign grace. Accordingly the salvation of sinners is laid in grace, and is carried on and perfected by grace. Grace has planned and grace executes the whole work. "Grace reigns through righteousness unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ our Lord." From this work, creature-merit is forever excluded. "Not by works of righteousness, which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration and the renewing of the Holy Ghost." If salvation were not wholly of grace, there would be room for boasting, contrary to the whole tenor of the gospel. "Where is boasting then? It is excluded. By what law? of works? Nay; but by the law of faith." Hence if salvation be not received as the free gift of divine and glorious grace, it can

never be enjoyed. “For by grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God: Not of works, lest any man should boast.”

12. Finally from all that has been advanced, we may learn the injurious tendency of denying the doctrine of Original Sin. Our times are unhappily characterized by a spirit of error and innovation, in matters of religion. There are few of the doctrines of Christ, that are not openly and boldly attacked. And against none of them does this attack appear to be more successfully managed, than against the one, which we have been humbly endeavoring to vindicate. The establishment of a covenant of works with Adam is denied: his representative headship is refused: the imputation of his sin, beyond himself, is rejected: the loss of the moral image of God and the entire corruption of our nature is turned into mockery: and our total inability to love and serve God is laughed to scorn. Now, the denial of these points and the converting of them into ridicule, as is frequently done, must exert an influence most injurious to the salvation of souls. A denial of the Covenant of Works naturally leads to a denial of the Covenant of Grace: Adam’s representative character cannot be denied, and Christ’s representative charac-


ter maintained : If Adam's sin cannot be imputed to his posterity, there could be no imputation of our sins to Christ, nor of his righteousness to us : To deny, that we are born destitute of the image of God and are totally depraved, is to deny the necessity of regeneration by the Holy Spirit : And to deny the total inability of fallen man, in spiritual matters, is to deny the necessity of grace in order to the performance of good works. Thus, a denial of the doctrine of Original Sin, either in whole, or in part, draws excessively deep, and is necessarily accompanied with danger, if not certain perdition. It not only leads, as just stated, to a rejection of other fundamental truths of the great evangelic system, but helps to foster the native pride of the human heart, nurture an odious spirit of legalism, and to overlook the glory of free and sovereign grace, as reigning alone throughout the whole of the sinner's salvation.


Is it not, then, greatly to be lamented, that a course, so dishonoring to God and so injurious to the best interests of the immortal soul, as opposition to the great doctrine in question undoubtedly is, should be so zealously persisted in? And alas! this is done, not by a few restless, theological speculators only, but by multitudes in the church, both of ministers and people. Indeed, this evil

has become alarmingly *epidemic*, threatening the heritage of the Lord with “blasting and mildew,” and “perpetual desolation.” And if the friends of Zion feel alarm, lest she be visited with sore and destructive plagues, in consequence of the prevalence of these pernicious errors, let it not be reckoned strange : For surely there is danger to be apprehended, when the sacred ark of truth is touched with such unhallowed rudeness and shocking temerity. But, that threatened judgments may be averted, let all the friends of truth rally in its just and glorious defence, and observe with perseverance the divine injunction—**EARNESTLY CONTEND FOR THE FAITH WHICH WAS ONCE DELIVERED TO THE SAINTS.**

THE END.







Date Due


0 27 37

1030





Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer Library



1 1012 01014 5771